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Abstract 
 
 The purpose of this research was to review the commissioned occupational health and 
safety (OHS) reports in mining, over the past 50 years, in a two-step approach. The objective of 
the initial phase was to determine if there were any recommendations that were stated in more 
than one of the evaluated commissioned reports, that spanned the 50-year timeframe.  The 
reports were selected through a review of the literature and in consultation with experts in OHS 
and mining. A multi-stage analysis was conducted on the recommendations, and identified 6 
overlapping themes, and 49 sets of specific overlaps.  In the second phase, a seeded analysis 
using a qualitative data analysis software, was completed to understand how safety culture was 
discussed in the reports.  This was accomplished by completing a review of the literature to 
define safety culture, and to build the dictionary, which was seeded into the software. The 
analysis highlighted the use of various terms for safety culture throughout the 50-year history, 
with a particular emphasis on the fact that the term safety culture was not directly referenced in 
the selected reports until 1997.  
 
Keywords: Mining; Occupational Health and Safety; Accident Investigation; Commission 
Recommendations; Leximancer; Safety Culture 
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CHAPTER 1 
1.0 INTRODUCTION   
 This chapter will provide an introduction to the mining industry, common occupational 
hazards in mining, an overview of accident statistics in mining, and will conclude by outlining 
the overall objectives of the thesis.  
 
1.1 MINING INDUSTRY  
Mining currently accounts for 1% of the global workforce, approximately 30 million 
workers, but is responsible for 8% of fatal accidents at work (ILO, 2016).  Fatalities, injuries, 
and occupational disease are still prevalent among miners, and places mining as one of the most 
hazardous occupations in the world (Stephens & Ahern, 2002).  Mining broadly relates to the 
extraction of naturally occurring minerals by processes such as underground mining, open-cut 
extraction methods, quarrying, operation of wells, or evaporation pans, and dredging or 
recovering from ore dumps or tailings (Hamrin, 1980).   A major component increasing hazards 
in the mine environment is the constantly changing workplace circumstances, with the most 
severe changes including, but not limited to: the darkness of an environment without natural light 
where visibility can be reduced to zero; atmospheric air changes due to forced ventilation in the 
work areas, where the air components can quickly become contaminated and poisonous to the 
worker; and the constant threat of potentially unstable ground control, as a result of mineral 
extraction.  Although substantial progress has been made in the control of these occupational 
health and safety (OHS) hazards, including: hazard recognition, legislation, and regulations, 
more work is required.  This includes further analysis of current recommendations, to reduce 
occupational accidents for miners.   
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1.2 COMMON HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH MINING 
 The International Mining Fatality database (IMFD) was created by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO) to establish a global record of all ‘incidents causing fatalities’ in the 
last 142 years; with the majority of the data is from 1980-2008 (when reporting regulations were 
strengthened) (MacNeill, 2008).  According to the IMFD (2008), the dominant agents of fatality 
in mine operations included: asphyxiation, catastrophic failure, contact with moving equipment, 
drowning, electrocution, explosives, falls from heights, fire, gas ignited explosion, inrush, 
outbursts, uncontrolled release of energy, and unintended operation of equipment.  This database 
shows that falls from heights accounted for approximately 24% of all mining fatalities, and 
unintended operation of equipment accounted for 13%.  In addition, 77% of all mine accidents 
resulting in a fatality involved equipment, predominantly trucks (9.2%) and load haul dumps 
(8.7%) (MacNeill, 2008).  The majority of fatalities occured within the mining area at 
underground mining operations (82%), and production activities accounted for the greatest 
percentage of all mining fatalities (70%) (MacNeill, 2008).  In addition to the physical hazards, 
there are numerous occupational health hazards in mining.  These occupational hazards are often 
more difficult to recognize as they are not always linked to immediate fatality or injury. 
Donoghue (2004) completed an extensive review of occupational health hazards in mining and 
identified five major priority categories: physical, chemical, biological, ergonomic, and 
psychosocial (Figure 1.1). More recently, in 2015 there were hundreds of traumatic fatalities in 
the mining industry, including the United States (n=28), Canada (n=5), the United Kingdom 
(n=1), Australia (n=12), and New Zealand (n=5) (MSHA, 2016; WSN, 2016; United Kingdom 
Government, 2016; SafeWork AUS, 2016; WorkSafe NZ, 2016).  Understanding the 
occupational hazards and the dominant agents of fatalities present in the mining industry 
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provides the information needed to recognize the hazards that may arise in the analysis of the 
selected reports and recommendations.  
 
Figure 3.1: Schematic overview of the occupational health hazards identified in an in-depth 
review by Donoghue (2004) adapted by Tetzlaff. 
 
1.3 THESIS OUTLINE 
 The overall purpose of this thesis is to review the commissioned OHS reports in mining, 
over the past 50 years, in a two-step approach (Figure 1.2).  First, to determine whether there are 
any recommendations consistently identified in OHS commissions and reports; regardless of 
time or geography. Second, to investigate how safety culture has been framed in the reports.  
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Figure 1.2: Overview of the relationship between the papers to be completed for Master’s thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
A review of the literature regarding commissioned OHS reports, accidents, safety culture, and big 
data analysis. 
Chapter 3: Paper 1 
 
Analysis of Recommendations from OHS 
Mining Commissioned Reports: A 50 Year 
Review 
 
Objectives:  
1. Identify if there were any 
recommendations that are repeating in 
the English language, mining inquiries, 
over the past 50 years. 
2. Determine whether there are similarities 
in recommendations amongst coal 
mining and metalliferous mining 
accident reports. 
 
Chapter 4: Paper 2 
 
Analysis of Safety Culture in OHS Mining 
Commissioned Reports: A 50 Year Review 
 
 
Objectives:  
1. Investigate if/how safety culture was 
discussed in the reports. 
2. Determine if references of safety 
culture differ between coal and 
metalliferous mining.  
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
An overview of the mining industry, hazards associated with mining, and the thesis outline. 
Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
Summary of study findings, implications, future research directions, and final conclusions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW  
 This chapter will provide a summary of literature pertaining to accidents, safety culture, 
and big data analysis.  The first section will provide the background on accident literature 
including: risk assessments, accident causation models, and accident investigation frameworks, 
followed by a focus on the formulation and role of commissioned reports in mining OHS.  The 
second section provides the background review for safety culture and its roots in organizational 
culture and organizational climate.  The third section, will introduce CAQDAS, and provide 
background information to illustrate how this software can be used to explore a data set from 
both a high-level view and to address specific details contained within a document.  Further, a 
discussion on the use of visual text analytics and concept mapping techniques will be included to 
demonstrate how visual representations of concept space can be used to review the global scope 
of the underlying domain.  The final section will conclude by reviewing the gaps in the literature 
and outlining the research objectives for this thesis.  The aim of this chapter is to provide context 
and justification for the current research.  
 
2.1 COMMISSIONED OHS REPORTS  
Following a major accident, there are different levels of public inquiry that can be 
established.  Types of inquiries include: Coroner’s Inquests, Reviews, Commissions of Inquiry, 
Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions.  A Coroner’s Inquest is a public hearing designed 
to focus public attention on the circumstances of a death through an objective examination of 
8 
 
facts.  At the conclusion of an Inquest, recommendations are made that may prevent deaths in 
similar circumstances (Government of Ontario, 2016; Leveson, 2001).  Reviews are generally 
conducted as comprehensive examination of a particular industry, region, or site, that includes a 
number of topics, and seeks strategic input from advisory groups in industry, ministry, public or 
stakeholders (Government of Ontario, 2016).  Commissions of Inquiry are established by a 
Government Cabinet to fully and impartially investigate issues of national importance.  The 
findings and recommendations from a Commission of Inquiry are not binding; however, they 
often have a significant impact on public opinion and public policy (Government of Canada, 
2016c).  Tribunals of Inquiry are official reviews of events or actions ordered by a government 
body.  Tribunals of Inquiry differ from other commissions because they are conducted in a more 
public forum and focus on a more specific occurrence, opposed to numerous occurrences 
grouped together.  Lastly, Royal Commissions are temporary, ad hoc bodies with impartial 
members from outside of the government (i.e. non-legal professionals and field experts) (Prasser, 
2006).  Royal Commissions are generally established to investigate new and emerging issues, 
provide advice on an area where government lacks expertise, access external knowledge, and 
identify key issues on policy problems (Prasser, 2006).  Royal Commissions can be distinguished 
from other types of inquiry because they are typically, formally appointed by the Crown, rather 
than by a Minister or Cabinet.  Further, many countries establish Royal Commissions under 
specific legislation and therefore they have greater power, in comparison to other forms of 
inquiry (Prasser, 2006).  Royal Commissions are therefore “by virtue of their membership, 
statutory base, powers, and formal appointment by the Crown; are the most prestigious of 
executive inquiries” (Sherman, 1997, p.6).  This thesis will pay particular attention to Royal 
9 
 
Commissions.  The ability to distinguish between the levels of inquiry is important for 
understanding the severity of the event, and the scope of the inquiries referenced in this study.  
 The specific terminology and requirements for establishing a Royal Commission varies 
between countries.  Table 2.1 indicates the commission title, governing legislation and an 
explanation for five countries.  Understanding who produced the commission, and under which 
legislation it is being conducted is critical for considering the potential directed focus of the 
report or recommendations that are presented.  Royal Commissions receive frequent criticism 
and are often viewed as a means of demonstrating political expedience, such as showing concern 
about an issue, giving an illusion of action, demonstrating responsiveness, reducing opposition, 
and delaying decision-making (Prasser, 2006).  Therefore, the continued use of Royal 
Commissions has caused debate on why, and in what circumstances, governments resort to 
Royal Commissions over less formal and non-statutory forms of public inquiry (i.e. committees, 
working groups, and reviews).   
 Despite the political debate, Royal Commissions can provide the “means for defusing an 
issue, clarifying a problem, and providing recommendations that have a greater chance of being 
accepted” (Prasser, 2006, p.45).  Specifically, in health and safety there have been numerous 
commissioned reports produced over the years that have reviewed industrial accidents, and have 
published recommendations for change.  In some cases, the recommendations have heavily 
influenced the health and safety legislation of the country, state or province.  For example, the 
1976 Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines introduced 
the concept of the internal responsibility system, which provided the foundation for the Ontario 
Occupational Health and Safety Act in 1979.  However, in other cases we see repetition of 
recommendations that provide only temporary solutions for greater organizational malfunctions.  
10 
 
Hopkins (2002, p.7) provided an example of this in the context of reporting systems, “the issue is 
not whether the organization has a reporting system; it is whether, as a matter of practice, errors 
and near misses are reported.”  Therefore, considering the political climate is important for 
understanding how and why a commission was established.   
Table 2.3: Country specific legislation for establishing royal commissions 
COUNTRY CANADA UNITED 
STATES 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
NEW 
ZEALAND 
AUSTRALIA 
TITLE  Royal 
Commission 
Presidential 
Commission 
Royal 
Commission 
Royal 
Commission 
Royal 
Commission 
LEGISLATION Public Inquiries 
Act 
Federal 
Advisory 
Committee Act 
1972 
Tribunals and 
Inquiries Act 
1921 
Inquiries Act 
2013; Previously 
the Commission 
of Inquiry Act 
1908 
Public 
Governance, 
Performance and 
Accountability 
Act; previously 
known the Royal 
Commissions 
Act 1902 
EXPLANATION A panel of 
experts 
appointed by the 
Cabinet to carry 
out 
investigations of 
national concern 
(Government of 
Canada, 2016c) 
A special task 
force appointed 
by the President 
to complete the 
investigation 
(United States 
Department of 
Labour, 1972) 
An ad-hoc 
formal public 
inquiry and is 
established by 
the Head of 
State, on the 
advice of the 
government 
(United 
Kingdom 
Government, 
2013) 
Governor-
General can issue 
commissions 
without any 
statutory 
authority because 
they are the 
Chief Executive 
Office 
(Government of 
New Zealand, 
2013b) 
The highest form 
of inquiry and 
are inquired by 
the Governor-
General 
(Government of 
Australia, 2013) 
 
2.1.1 Authorities Responsible for OHS in Five Mining Countries   
Canada 
 In Canada, the OHS legislative authority is divided between federal and provincial 
jurisdictions, as dictated by the Constitution Act (LEGOSH, 2013b; Government of Canada, 
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1867).  The federal act that governs OHS Regulations is the Canada Labour Code (Government 
of Canada, 1985).  The federal legislation applies to companies or sectors that operate across 
provincial or international borders.  This comprises approximately 10% of the Canadian 
workforce (Government of Canada, 2016a).  On the federal level, Human Resources and Social 
Development Canada (HRSDC) is responsible for developing OHS policies, and the Canadian 
Centre for Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS) is then responsible for disseminating the 
information, and providing education and training (CCOHS, 2016).  Provincial or territorial 
governments are responsible for the legislation, administration and enforcement of OHS within 
their jurisdiction; the legislation is typically referred to as the OHS act (Ontario MOL, 1990).  In 
Ontario, the OHS act is founded on the Internal Responsibility System (IRS), which legislates 
that everyone in the workplace has a role in keeping the workplace safe and healthy 
(Government of Ontario, 2016a).  Further, it means that all employees have a statutory duty to 
report any unsafe situation to their employer or supervisor, and that the employers or supervisors 
are required to address the situation (Government of Ontario, 2016).  The three basic elements of 
the IRS system are: the right to know, the right to participate, and the right to refuse unsafe work.  
The IRS is further supported by health and safety policies and programs, such as the Five-Point 
Safety System which is one of the most widely-recognized safety programs in mining (George, 
1942; WSN, 2016).  Furthermore, the primary regulation specific to OHS in the Ontario mining 
industry is the Mines and Mining Plants Regulation (R.R.O. 1990, Reg.854) (Table 2.2).   
United States of America 
 In the United States of America (USA), federal and state statutes (LEGOSH, 2013e) 
primarily regulate OHS.  The federal agency responsible for developing and enforcing workplace 
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health and safety standards is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA, 2016), 
an agency within the Department of Labour (United States Department of Labour, 2016b).  The 
primary law protecting the health and safety of workers is the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act 1970 (United States Department of Labour, 1970), which is governed by the Secretary of 
Labour and the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC).  OSHRC is 
responsible for the administration, enforcement, regulations and performance of inspections and 
investigations for all workplaces (United States Department of Labour, 2016a; 2016b).  In 
addition, there are a number of regulations specific to the mining industry, including the Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 2006, which was previously 
known as the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977) (United States Department of 
Labour, 2006) (Table 2.2).     
United Kingdom  
 The Health and Safety Executive (HSE), is the governance body that is responsible for 
OHS legislation and regulations in the United Kingdom (UK) (LEGOSH, 2013d).  The HSE 
works within the Health and Safety Commission (HSC) and is directly linked to the government 
(UK Government, 2016).  The HSE is also connected to the European Agency for Safety and 
Health at Work (EASHW, 2016).  The primary legislation in the UK is the Health and Safety at 
Work Act 1974 (HSWA), but is supported by more than 200 other OHS related acts and 
regulations (UK Government, 1974).  The UK is currently undergoing a transition to reflect the 
European directives on health and safety, including the Management of Health and Safety at 
Work Regulations (UK Government, 1999).  In the United Kingdom, the primary regulation 
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specific to OHS in the mining industry is the Mines Regulation 2014 (MR14) (United Kingdom 
Government, 2016) (Table 2.2).   
Australia 
 In Australia, the regulation of OHS legislation is shared by: The Commonwealth, the 
states, and the territories (LEGOSH, 2013a).  There are nine general work health and safety 
statutes in Australia.  The Commonwealth statute encompasses all Commonwealth government 
departments, agencies and authorities, and states and territories each have separate legislation 
(Government of Australia, 2016a).  Australia has recently moved to standardize legislation, and 
the Australian Workplace Relations Ministers Council (WRMC) has implemented a Model Work 
Health and Safety bill (WHS) (Government of Australia, 2016a).  The WHS legislation includes 
a model WHS Act, regulations, Codes of Practice and a national compliance and enforcement 
policy.  Two federal agencies that influence OHS are: SafeWork Australia (SWA) and the 
Australian Safety and Compensation Council (ASCC).  The SWA is the national body in charge 
of developing work health and safety policies (Safe Work Australia, 2016).  The ASCC acts as a 
federal body that can declare standards and codes of practice, but these need to be adopted by 
states and territories before they have legal power (Government of Australia, 2016a).  
Furthermore, there are a number of regulations specific to the mining industry, including the 
Workplace Health and Safety (Mines) Regulations (Government of Australia, 2011) (Table 2.2).   
 
New Zealand 
 
 New Zealand’s health and safety legislative framework is primarily regulated by the 
Health and Safety and Employment Act 1992 (HSE) (LEGOSH, 2013c).  The HSE Act is 
modeled after the United Kingdom’s Roben’s Approach, which places each person responsible 
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for managing hazards in the workplace (Robens, 1972).  In addition to the HSE Act, there are 
two additional Acts that are principal regulators of OHS.  The Accident Compensation Act is the 
foundation of New Zealand’s compensation and rehabilitation system (Government of New 
Zealand, 2016).  The Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act (HSNO) ensures, that 
people are not harmed by exposure to harmful substances (Government of New Zealand, 1996).  
These three main Acts are supported by a number of additional Acts and regulations that 
influence workplace health and safety.  The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
governs the HSE Act.  Compliance to the HSE Act is monitored and enforced by the Department 
of Labour inspectors (Government of New Zealand, 2016).  The primary regulation specific to 
OHS in the mining industry is the Mining Operations and Quarrying Operations 
Regulations 2013, which was previously known as the Health and Safety in Employment Mining 
Administration Regulations 1992 (Government of New Zealand, 2013a) (Table 2.2).  
Having an understanding of the regulations specific to OHS, and the mining industry, for 
each country, provides the background for exploring the legislative recommendations that 
resulted from the inquiries.  Further, it will provide context for understanding how the 
terminology may vary between country, along with providing a frame of reference for the 
organizational and regulative bodies involved in the discussion.  
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Table 4.2: Summary of minerals, workforce, primary regulations, legislation, and agencies specific to OHS in the mining industry in 
five countries. 
 
 
CANADA UNITED STATES 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
NEW ZEALAND AUSTRALIA 
MINERALS 
Extracts more than 60 
minerals and metals, 
including: gold, nickel, 
copper, salt, diamonds and 
structural building 
materials  
(Mining Association of 
Canada, 2016) 
Extracts more than 14,000 
mines extracting coal, 
metal ores and non-metallic 
minerals  
(MSHA, 2016) 
One of the largest dredging 
industries in the world and 
marine-source aggregates 
make a vital contribution to 
the UK aggregate supply 
for construction, coastal 
protection, and land 
reclamation (LEGOSH, 
2013d) 
Produces abundant mineral 
resources including: coal, 
gold, iron sands, phosphate 
and limestone (LEGOSH, 
2013c) 
world’s largest producer of: 
lead, mineral sands, nickel, 
silver, tantalum, uranium 
and zinc (LEGOSH, 2013a) 
WORKFORCE 
370,000 workers  
(Mining Association of 
Canada, 2016) 
634,000 workers and 
provides 1.27 million jobs 
in allied industries (United 
States Department of 
Labour, 2016b) 
3,950 workers  
(UK Government, 2013) 
2,000 workers  
(LEGOSH, 2013c) 
750,000 Workers  
(Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2016) 
PRIMARY 
MINING 
REGULATION 
Mines and Mining Plants 
Regulation (R.R.O. 1990, 
Reg.854) 
 (Government of Canada, 
2016b) 
Mine Improvement and 
New Emergency Response 
(MINER) Act of 2006; 
Previously the Federal 
Mine Safety and Health Act 
of 1977 (United States 
Department of Labour, 
2006) 
Mines Regulation 2014 
(MR14) 
Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and Dangerous 
Occurrences Regulations 
2013 
(HSE, 2016) 
Mining Operations and 
Quarrying Operations 
Regulations 2013; 
previously the Health and 
Safety in Employment 
Mining Administration 
Regulations 1992  
(Government of New 
Zealand, 2013a) 
Workplace Health and 
Safety (Mines) Regulations  
(Government of Australia, 
2011) 
LEGISLATION 
Occupational Health and 
Safety Act (Government of 
Ontario, 1990) 
Code of Federal 
Regulations (30 CFR Part 
50)  
(United States Department 
of Labour, 2016a) 
Health and Safety at Work 
Act 1974 
(UK Government, 1974) 
Health and Safety and 
Employment Act 1992 
(HSE)  
(LEGOSH, 2013c) 
Model Work Health and 
Safety bill (WHS) 
(Government of Australia, 
2016a) 
REGULATING 
AGENCY 
Ministry of Labour  
(Government of Ontario, 
1990) 
Mine Safety and Health 
Administration (MSHA) 
(MSHA, 2016) 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) 
(HSE, 2016) 
Ministry of Business, 
Innovation and 
Employment 
(Government of New 
Zealand, 2016) 
Ministerial Council on 
Mineral and Petroleum 
Resources 
(Government of Australia, 
2009) 
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2.2 ACCIDENTS 
 Accidents are the product of the dynamic interaction between human and organizational 
factors, including: managerial, technological, and environmental factors in the presence of 
weakness or gaps in the systems barriers (Clarke, 2006; Bjerkan, 2010).  Reason (1998), 
provides a further explanation for the distinction between individual and organizational 
accidents:  
“the most critical distinction…lies in the quantity, quality and variety of the defenses, 
barriers and safeguards that protect people and assets from the local operational 
hazards. Individual accidents occur in circumstances where the hazards are close to 
people and the defenses are limited or non-existent. Organizational accidents, on the 
other hand, happen to complex systems that have defenses-in-depth-that is, protective 
measures possessing a great deal of diversity and redundancy.” (p.295) 
 Organizational accidents are usually low-frequency events and are typically triggered by 
unintentional errors, made possible by preexisting hazards or pathogens that have made the 
system vulnerable to failure (Reason, 1990).  There are numerous organizational factors that 
influence accidents, including: the quality of communication (Hofmann & Morgeson, 1999; 
Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003), the influence of organizational climate (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 
2000), leadership style (Kim, Park & Park, 2016; Zohar, 2002; Barling, Loughlin & Kelloway, 
2002), management practices (Flin et al., 1996), occupational stressors (i.e. role conflict, role 
ambiguity) (Hemingway & Smith, 1999; Gillen et al., 2002; Goldenhar, Williams & Swanson, 
2003), job demands (i.e. production pressure, role overload) (Clarke & Cooper, 2004), and 
psychological and behavioural characteristics of the individual (Oliver et al., 2002; Clarke, 
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2006).  Understanding the difference between individual and organizational accidents, and the 
factors that influence them is essential for understanding the events that triggered the 
commissions to be established.  
2.2.1 Risk Assessment 
 Risk assessment is the process of identifying hazards, analyzing and evaluating the risk 
associated with the hazards, and determining the appropriate method of eliminating or 
controlling the hazards (CCOHS, 2016).  Risk assessments are a core part of OHS management 
that serve multiple purposes, including: creating awareness of hazards and risk; identifying who 
is at risk, determining if existing control measures are adequate, preventing injuries or illnesses, 
and prioritizing hazards and control measures (CCOHS, 2016).  Following the identification of 
hazards, a level of risk can be allocated based on product information, past experience, legislated 
requirements, industry codes of practice, health and safety material, and results of testing.  
Additional factors can contribute to the level of risk, such as: the work environment, the 
capability, skill and experience of workers, and systems of work (CCOHS, 2016).  After 
allocating a level of risk, prioritizing the hazards can determine which is the most serious and 
should be controlled first.  Prioritization may be influenced by: percentage of workforce 
exposed, frequency of exposure, degree of harm likely to result from the exposure and 
probability of occurrence (CCOHS, 2016).  Following the identification of hazards control 
mechanisms can be applied, including: elimination, substitution, engineering controls, 
administrative controls, and personal protective equipment (Figure 2.1) (NIOSH, 2016). 
Understanding the hazards present in mining, and the hierarchy of the mechanisms used to 
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control these hazards is important when addressing how the recommendations were formulated, 
and which tier of control mechanisms were targeted.  
 
Figure 4.1: Tetzlaff (2016) adapted model of hierarchy of controls and risk control effectiveness  
 
2.2.2 Accident Causation  
 Accident causation models explain possible mechanisms for the accident occurrence, 
regardless of the specific setting (Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009).  Accident 
causation models recognize the reciprocal relationship between psychological, situational, and 
behavioural factors (Cooper, 2000), and how these causal factors can be traced to identify root 
causes (Goh, Brown & Spickett, 2010).  Knowledge of accident causation is important for 
understanding how the commissions reviewed the events leading up to the accidents.   
 One of the early accident causation models was the Domino Theory, developed by 
Heinrich (1941), which suggested that linear one-by-one progressions of events lead to an 
accident.  Often these models cited human error, defined as any one set of human actions that 
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exceed some limit of acceptability, as the cause of the accident (Rigby, 1970).  This model was 
supported until 1974, when the first modifications were proposed.  However, even with 
modifications, the model was a one-dimensional sequence of events (Kjellén, 1987; HSC, 1993) 
until Reason (1990) introduced multi-causality to the accident causation process, which related 
human systems or organizational defenses to a series of barriers.  Reason (1990) described 
accident causation as an interaction between latent and active failures, where active failures are 
“the immediate, observable causes in an accident which are easily identified” and latent failures 
are caused by organizational factors that may be present in a system for a long period of time 
before becoming active failures (i.e. communication, culture, training, resources, etc.) (Figure 
2.2).  
 
Figure 2.2: Reason (1998, p.296) ‘Swiss cheese’ model of defences-in-depth adapted by Tetzlaff.  
 Around the same timeframe, Rasmussen (1987) proposed the Skill-, Rule-, and 
Knowledge-framework, which is based on behaviour and human cognitive control of the 
environment.  Hale and Glendon (1987) then combined Reason and Rasmussen’s frameworks 
and developed the Attribution Theory.  This theory proposes that danger is always present in the 
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workplace, and conceptualizes the role of human action in controlling danger.  Rasmussen 
(1997) then presented a multi-level model of a socio-technical system that states that safety 
performance is influenced by internal (safety culture) and external factors (regulation and 
government).  In the same year, Reason (1997) developed a model of organizational accident 
causation, which demonstrated the influence and pathway of latent failures and outlined three 
levels of concern: the organization, the workplace, and the person.  Reason’s model has since 
been applied in industrial settings, through the development of proactive measures for 
organizational processes known to be implicated in accident causation.  Further, it has been 
applied in accident investigation techniques that guide investigators and analysts to the 
organizational root causes of past accidents.  Lastly, Hollnagel (1998) proposed the cognitive 
reliability and error analysis method, which distinguished between causes and effects and 
described the full context in which errors and accident occurs.  
 The evolution of accident causation models described above indicates a shift in 
understanding from a basic outline of the sequence of events, to a broader representation of the 
whole system (Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009).  It is also important to 
acknowledge that, “an accident can be explained in different ways depending on the accident 
analysis model that is used” (Svenson, 1999).  Different models focus on different aspects of 
accident causation and as a result may be associated with different recommendations for 
improvement (Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009; Lundberg, Rollenhagen & 
Hollangel, 2009). Therefore, the choice of causation model is critical to how an accident is 
investigated, because different accident causation models will influence different accident 
investigation outcomes, under altered circumstances.  Reviewing the evolution of accident 
causation models is important for this thesis because the reports cover a large historical 
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landscape, and therefore the causation theories that were applied to the inquiries changed over 
time.  
 
2.2.3 Accident Investigation 
 
 The outcome of an accident analysis depends not only on the view on causality, discussed 
previously, but on what factors are included as causes and contributing factors, and which are 
omitted (Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollangel, 2009).  Accident investigation methods are very 
specific and have been primarily developed for use in major accidents, in technologically 
complex systems (Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009).  Although differences may 
exist between how countries conduct investigations, generally in all cases, it is government 
agencies or their representatives who conduct the accident investigations (LeCoze, 2013).  
Dekker (2015) identified four purposes of accident investigations: (1) epistemological (i.e. 
establishing what happened); (2) preventive (i.e. identifying pathways to avoid future accidents); 
(3) moral (i.e. tracing the transgressions that were committed and reinforcing moral and 
regulatory boundaries); and (4) and existential (i.e. finding an explanation for the suffering that 
occurred).  The overarching intention is to avoid a reoccurrence of an accident rather than to 
establish blame (Vuorio et al., 2013).  
 
 Primary methods of accident investigation include: Fault Tree Analysis (Ferry, 1988), 
Management Oversight and Risk Tree (Johnson, 1980), Multilinear Events Sequencing (Benner, 
1975), Systematic Cause Analysis Technique (Kjellén & Hovden, 1993), Causal Tree Method 
(Leplat, 1978), TRIPOD (Wagenaar et al., 1994), Accident Evolution and Barrier Function 
(Svenson, 1991), Integrated Safety Investigation Methodology (Ayeko, 2002), Norske 
Statesbaner (Skriver, Haukenes, & Alme, 2003), and Control Change Cause Analysis (Kingston, 
2007) (Appendix A), to name a few.  Similar to accident causation, acknowledging that there is 
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an array of accident investigation techniques available to industry is important for understanding 
that there are various approaches to investigate an accident, and therefore various potential 
outcomes.  
 The evolution of accident investigation methods over time also demonstrates a shift from 
isolating a single immediate cause, to acknowledging multiple causes.  This drives the 
elimination of active causes, without impact on reducing latent causes, and therefore does not 
adequately prevent future accidents (Marais, Dulac & Leveson, 2004; Leveson, 2004).  Hovden, 
Albrechtsen & Herrera (2010) affirmed that most occupational, accident investigation experts 
still rely on investigation methods that only identify the approximate causes.  In addition, 
Hollangel (2008) refers to the ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find’ (WYLFIWYF) principle 
to explain accident investigations, which has further been expanded to the ‘What-You-Find-Is-
What-You-Fix’ (WYFIWYF) principle, meaning that the causes identified in an investigation, 
become the foundation of the formulation of the recommendations for change (Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen & Hollangel, 2009).   Accident investigation techniques, based on theories of 
accident causation and human error, result in a better understanding of: the relationship between 
the preceding human behaviour and the accident; therefore, allowing the root causes of the 
accident to be determined (Brown, 1995). Investigation methods should support the visualization 
of the accident sequence, provide a structured collection of evidence, and identify 
recommendations for change (Braut & Nja, 2010).  As the reports in this study cover a large 
historical landscape, reviewing the evolution of accident investigation methods is important to 
understand how the investigative approach may have changed over time.  
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2.2.4 Accident Reduction  
 Industries around the world are showing an increasing interest in the concept of safety 
culture as a means of reducing the potential for large-scale disasters, and accidents (Cooper, 
2000).  Safety culture, which is primarily aimed at preventing organizational accidents (as 
opposed to individual accidents) focuses on the root causes of accidents; not symptoms of 
accidents, leading to more effective accident prevention strategy (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000).  
Accident prevention, as defined by Heinrich, Petersen & Roos (1980) is “an integrated program, 
a series of coordinated activities, directed to the control of unsafe personal performance and 
unsafe mechanical conditions, and based on certain knowledge, attitudes, and abilities.”  In 
accident reduction, there are two primary sources of data: lagging indicators and leading 
indicators.  Lagging indicators are measurements of past performance, such as injury and 
incident statistics, whereas leading indicators are proactive measures (i.e. safety audit and safety 
climate measurements, training rates, preventative maintenance reports, etc.) (Farrington-Darby, 
Pickup & Wilson, 2005).  In high risk industries, the safety culture approach to accident 
reduction focuses on leading indicators within an organization (Clarke, 1999) which assists in 
reducing the tendency to blame an individual or group for the incident, and increases the 
opportunity to identify an effective preventative measure (Goh, Brown & Spickett, 2010).  
Therefore, safety culture provides a major contribution to the prevention of occupational 
accidents, and risk reduction.   
2.3 SAFETY CULTURE 
 Safety researchers have traditionally focused on hazard control technologies (DeJoy, 
2005), and human factors that are associated with accident-proneness (Greenwood & Woods, 
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1919; Hansen, 1989; Shaw & Sichel, 1971; Sutherland & Cooper, 1991; Clarke, 2000).  
However, major disasters, have illustrated the importance of recognizing that accidents are not 
only a result of human error, environmental conditions, or technical failures, but also a result of 
breakdowns in policies, procedures and management practices that contribute to system failures 
(Barling, Kelloway, & Iverson, 2003; Cox & Cheyne, 2000; Hayes et al., 1998; Parker, Axtell, & 
Turner, 2001).  As a result of detailed accident inquiries, the term ‘safety culture’ emerged in the 
literature, and has since been identified as a developing area of research, referred to as ‘the third 
age of safety’ (IAEA, 1986; Cox & Flin, 1998; Hale & Hovden, 1998).  Since the concept was 
developed, safety culture has begun to be cited in reports and commissions of accidents across 
multiple industries.  However, there is debate on how, or if, safety culture should be measured, 
monitored and incorporated into accident analysis, pre- or post-investigation.   
 Across the literature, authors had defined the term safety culture in various ways 
(Appendix B).  The definitions available typically reference the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that determine the 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and safety 
management (OSHA, 2015).  Reason (1998) simplifies the concept to be a combination of: 
something an organization is (i.e. beliefs, attitudes, values), and something that an organization 
has (i.e. practices, policies, controls).  The patterns of shared beliefs, attitudes and values that a 
group maintains are transferred to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel 
(Hopkins, 2002), thereby propagating the prevailing culture.  This self-sustaining nature also 
indicates that cultures are often resistant to change (DeJoy, 2005).  Understanding that there are 
various definitions of safety culture assists in acknowledging that it is a multi-faceted concept 
that incorporates a wide range of organizational factors.   
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2.3.1 Models of Safety Culture 
 
 Mirroring the discussion around defining the term safety culture, authors have proposed 
various models of safety culture.  One of the most widely accepted models is Reason’s (1997) 
model, which incorporates five key elements: informed culture, reporting culture, just culture, 
learning culture, and flexible culture (Figure 2.3).   
 
Figure 2.3: Tetzlaff (2017) visualization of Reason’s (1997) model of safety culture 
 The five key elements are all interconnected and influence the success of each other.  An 
informed culture is defined as “a culture in which those who manage and operate the system 
have knowledge about the human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that 
determine the safety of the system as a whole” (Reason, 1997).  A core aspect of an informed 
culture is supported by a reporting culture.  However, a reporting culture is not based on merely 
having a reporting system in place, individuals must use it in practice to report errors and near-
misses.  A reporting culture should maintain confidentiality or the de-identification of reporters; 
a separation of the department collecting the reports from the disciplinary authority; rapid and 
Informed 
Culture 
Flexible 
Culture 
Reporting 
Culture 
Learning 
Culture 
Just Culture 
Safety Culture 
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accessible feedback; and ease of reporting.  Although these factors are key in supporting a 
widely-used reporting system, Reason (1998) emphasizes that the most important factor is trust. 
Therefore, following the reporting culture, is the concept of a just culture.  In order for 
employees to feel comfortable reporting they have to trust that they will be treated fairly by 
management (Gill & Shergill, 2004).  Reason (1998) reiterates that in a just culture the line 
between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour is clear, and that there is an important distinction 
between errors and violations.  Errors are generally unintended, whereas violations involve a 
conscious decision.  Therefore, violations have motivational and situational origins (Reason, 
1998).  Violations can be further distinguished between routine violations and necessary 
violations.  Routine violations involve taking the path of least effort between two task-related 
points, regardless of the procedure (Reason, 1998).  Necessary violations stem from inadequacies 
of equipment or workplace procedures that are required to complete the task, making the 
individual a victim of circumstance (Reason, 1998).  A learning culture refers to the willingness 
and competence of the organization to draw appropriate conclusions from the reporting and 
monitoring systems.  Finally, a flexible culture refers to the ability of the organizational structure 
to be reconfigured to accommodate the changing environment.  All of the features concern 
organizational practices, emphasizing that practices are the focal point of safety culture Hopkins 
(2002).  Hofstede and Hofstede (1991) said:  
“Changing collective values of adult people in an intended direction is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible. Values do change, but not according to someone’s master 
plan. Collective practices, however, depend on organizational characteristics like 
structures and systems, and can be influenced in more or less predictable ways by 
changing these.” (p.181) 
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Understanding the core elements of safety culture is important for this thesis because as the 
reports and recommendations are explored, it will provide insight into which themes are repeated 
and whether or not safety culture was incorporated into the recommendations.   
2.3.2 Relationship between safety culture and safety-related outcomes 
 A strong safety culture is associated with numerous safety-related outcomes, including: 
performance of safe work practices (DeJoy, Murphy & Gershon, 1995; Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Mattila, Hyttinen & Rantanen, 1994), safety program effectiveness (Cheyne et al., 1998; Zohar, 
1980), and reduction in accidents, near misses, and other safety incidents (Dedobbleer & Beland, 
1991; Gillen et al., 2002).  Research has found evidence of these positive safety-related 
outcomes in a range of hazardous industries (e.g. chemical and nuclear processing) (Lee, 
MacDonald & Coote, 1993; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), high accident-rate sectors (e.g. 
manufacturing and construction) (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Zohar, 2000; Gillen et al., 2002), and 
in low accident-rate sectors (e.g. service industry) (Barling, Loughlin & Kelloway, 2002).  In 
contrast, a poor safety culture can adversely undermine a systems protection.  Breaches in system 
defences can often stem from a failure to understand and ‘fear’ the range of operational hazards 
present (Reason, 1998).  Referencing back to an informed culture, Reason (1998) states:  
“an informed culture is one in which people, at all levels, do not forget to be afraid. They 
know where the edge is without having to fall over it….an inability to appreciate the full 
extent of the operational dangers can lead to the creation of more longer-lasting holes in 
the defences.” (p.302) 
Therefore, by developing a positive safety culture, the organization will be able to identify and 
defuse latent failures before they breach defence systems, thereby improving safety related 
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outcomes (Reason, 1998).  This is relevant for this thesis because by retroactively looking at 
accidents there is an opportunity to view the latent failures and apply a safety culture lens to how 
safety-related outcomes can be improved in the future.  
2.3.3 Dimensions of safety culture 
 In order to avoid the failure of the system, there are various dimensions of safety culture 
that can be considered.  The following section will provide background on eight key dimensions 
of safety culture: (1) management and leadership, (2) safety systems, (3) risk attitudes and 
justification, (4) individual responsibility, (5) safety behaviour, (6) safety compliance, (7) safety 
motivation, and (8) system assessments and monitoring (Christian et al., 2009; Reason, 1998; 
Mearns & Flin, 1999; Vinodkumar & Bhasi, 2008; DeJoy, 2005; Clarke, 2000). Reviewing the 
dimensions of a strong safety culture provides further support for highlighting the repetition of 
recommendations, and how considering safety culture can help improve industry safety.   
Management and Leadership 
 The most widely accepted determinant of an organization’s safety culture is the role of 
management and leadership (Neal & Griffin, 2002; DeJoy, 2005; Kim, Park & Park, 2016).  
Safety culture is influenced by an organizations ability to manage safety and requires a high 
degree of control over, and coordination of the processes involving risk.  This can be referred to 
as a top–down organizational approach (Mohamed, 2003; Choudhry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007; 
Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003; Antonsen, 2009; Hopkins, 2002).  Previous research has 
demonstrated that management’s commitment to safety, management style, and management 
visibility, are key indicators of the safety culture (Flin et al., 2001).  Unfortunately, as discussed 
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by the Roben’s committee (1972), because this responsibility is diffused vertically in 
organizational hierarchies the dependence on senior management can be challenging due to 
competing concerns with other areas of the organization.  Therefore, there must be commitment 
from all levels of the organizational structure.  Understanding management’s role, in influencing 
an organization’s safety culture, will provide the ability to analyze and interpret who the 
commission recommendations were directed towards.  
Safety Systems 
 Major accidents can frequently be traced to failures in safety management systems 
(Hopkins, 2002).  Safety management systems refer to comprehensive business management 
systems, including: policies, strategies, and procedures, designed to control the risks that may 
affect health and safety in the workplace (Kirwan, 1998; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peon & 
Vazquez-Ordas, 2007).  Fernández-Muñiz et al. (2007) reported that an adequate safety 
management system must contain six key dimensions: safety policy, incentives for employee 
participation, training, communication, planning, and control.  Safety management systems can 
encompass many different aspects of an organization, including: safety officials, safety 
committees, safety policies, and safety equipment (Flin et al., 2000).  
 Safety management systems can be viewed as social systems, and therefore rely on 
employees’ behaviour in determining the efficacy of the system (Lee & Harrison, 2000; 
Choudhry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007).  Safety management systems influence behaviour, and 
behaviour influences the safety management system.  Due to this reciprocity, although the safety 
environment developed by an organization’s safety management system is the same for all 
individuals, the individual’s experience is dependent on their perceptions and safety-related 
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behaviour (Cooper, 2000).  Further, influences such as: production pressures, consequences (i.e. 
rewards/punishment) for compliance or non-compliance, and external influences (i.e. industry, 
legislature) may influence this reciprocal relationship (Pidgeon, 1997; Cooper, 2000).  
 Vulnerability in an organization can arise from interactions between preconditions, any of 
which acting alone, would be unable to challenge the safety system (Pidgeon, 1997).  As a result, 
many industries, such as aviation, design safety management systems with the perspective that 
there will always be threats to safety (Gill & Shergill, 2004).  This view allows the system to 
ensure that threats are constantly being looked for and managed before an accident occurs.  An 
organization, which has mechanisms to inform itself, will identify these failures; and an 
organization, which focuses solely on correcting unsafe behaviour, will not (Hopkins, 2002).  If 
the organization has a positive safety culture, the limitations of the safety system will be less 
influential (Hopkins, 2002).  Therefore, understanding the role of safety systems, and the 
different aspects of an organization that it encompasses, allows for a critical review of the 
formulation of recommendations that address these systems. 
Safety Attitudes 
 Organizations often try to change individual attitudes without consideration for job and 
organizational features (Atkinson, 1990). Similarly, changes are often made to organizational 
systems without regard for individual behaviour or attitudes (Seddon, 1989). Attitude is defined 
as “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree 
of favour or disfavour” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Attitudes are preceded by cognitive, affective, 
and behavioural processes, and attitudes produce cognitive, affective, and behavioural responses 
(Guldenmund, 2000).  Therefore, safety attitudes refer to both individual and collective beliefs 
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about hazards and the importance of safety, together with the motivation to act on those beliefs 
(Pidgeon, 1991). 
 Individuals are “neither deterministically controlled by their environments nor entirely self-
determining” (Davies & Powell, 1992).  This is referred to as a state of reciprocal determinism, 
where the individual and the environment perpetually influence each other.  This model of 
reciprocal determinism was originally developed by Bandura, and is founded in the Social 
Cognitive Theory (SCT) (Bandura, 1986) and Social Learning Theory (SLT) (Bandura, 1977).  
SCT and SLT both explain psychosocial functioning in terms of three reciprocal causal factors: 
internal psychological factors, the environment, and behaviour.  However, the influence applied 
to each element by the others may not occur simultaneously (Bandura, 1977).    
 Bandura's model has further been adapted (Cooper et al., 1994; Cooper, 1996) to reflect the 
concept of safety culture.  Researchers have applied Bandura’s model to the workplace and 
proposed that the reciprocal causal factors that form an organizations safety culture are: the 
attitudes, perceptions and beliefs of individuals, their behaviour’s, and the safety management 
systems (Cooper, 2000).  Cooper (2000) also illustrated that safety culture does not operate in a 
vacuum: it affects, and in turn is affected by, other non-safety-related operational processes or 
organizational systems.  Therefore, understanding the role of individual attitudes, and the 
reciprocal relationship between the organizational environment and changing attitudes, is 
important for analyzing if any repeating recommendations are presented in a manner that can 
achieve the necessary attitudinal and organizational changes.  
 
Internal Responsibility System  
 The Internal Responsibility System (IRS) refers to the concept that all parties in the 
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workplace contribute to detecting and correcting workplace issues that can lead to injury and 
illness (Plummer, Strahlendorf & Holliday, 2000).  The IRS first appeared in the literature in 
1976 in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines lead 
by Dr. James Ham.  The IRS then became the underpinning of the Ontario Occupational Health 
and Safety Act (OHSA) in 1979.  Research has since found that individuals at different 
hierarchical levels have different ways of conceptualizing and prioritizing work safety (Clarke, 
1999).  In the organizational setting, two types of social supports have been distinguished: 
supervisory support and co-worker support.  Supervisory support is defined as the degree of 
consideration expressed by the immediate supervisor for the sub-ordinates (Michaels & Spector, 
1982).  Co-worker support refers to the degree of consideration expressed between co-workers 
(Blau, 1960).  The interaction between social supports is key to the foundation of the IRS.  
Groups with a greater proportion of members, who are noncompliant with required safety 
behaviours, accumulate a greater number of contributory causal factors over time (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006).  Therefore, noncompliance with safety procedures and refusal to participate in 
activities that enhance safety may not directly affect the person that fails to carry out the 
behaviour, but it may create the condition for someone else to be injured. Responsibilities 
towards safety have a large influence on the overall safety culture of an organization. Therefore, 
understanding the IRS assists in addressing the repeating recommendations targeted specifically 
at responsibilities.   
Safety Behaviour 
 Safe work behaviour is influenced by psychological and environmental factors (Bandura, 
1977; Cooper, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 1999).  Safe work behaviour is a critical consideration for a 
33 
 
safety management system because culture refers to patterns of behaviour.  Therefore, modifying 
behaviour in an organizational context, by definition, modifies the culture (Hopkins, 2002).  
When an individual’s behaviour is not aligned with their values the individual feels tension, 
known as cognitive dissonance.  Hopkins (2002) explains that “if the behaviour is determined by 
the organization then the individual’s values will shift accordingly,…if the organization 
constrains the individual to behave safely, the individual will begin to value safe behaviour more 
highly” (p.6).  Further, the behaviour of management and workplace leaders is instrumental in 
determining the culture of an organization (Hopkins, 2002).  Consequently, if the behaviour of 
managers is modified, there is greater potential for organizational changes (Hopkins, 2002).  
Although behaviour modification has been seen to reduce accident rates in some cases, other 
researchers challenge that focusing on behavioural change diverts attention away from the deeper 
causes of accidents (i.e. understanding why people behave unsafely) (Hopkins, 2000).  
Therefore, safety behaviour and accidents should be observed at the group level, rather than the 
individual level (Neal & Griffin, 2006).   
 The aim of most safe behaviour strategies is to identify behaviour’s that are not compliant 
with safe work procedures (Hopkins, 2002).  Behaviour models identify the worker as the main 
cause of the accident, based on the tendency for humans to make errors under various situations 
and environmental conditions (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000).  The foundation of most behaviour 
models is the accident proneness theory (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000).  The accident proneness 
theory assumes that there are permanent characteristics in a person that make them more likely to 
have an accident.   
 
 Behaviour-Based Safety Management (BBSM) focuses on the identification and 
modification of critical safety behaviours, and emphasizes how such behaviours are linked to 
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workplace injuries and losses (DeJoy, 2005).  Secondly, it emphasizes the fundamental 
importance of the organization’s safety culture and how it shapes and influences safety 
behaviours and safety program effectiveness (DeJoy, 2005).  BBSM can be viewed as an 
extension of applied behaviour analysis, and draws on theories and practices of operant 
conditioning and reinforcement theory.  BBSM is a bottom-up approach that begins with 
defining, observing and recording critical behaviours to target in a workplace, followed by the 
implementation of an intervention to change the behaviour (DePasquale & Geller, 1999).  A 
typical feature of BBSM is the inclusion of a training program where the learning experiences 
are designed to produce desired cognitive or behavioural changes among participants 
(DePasquale & Geller, 1999).  If implemented properly, BBSM can facilitate employee 
perceptions of personal control (DePasquale & Geller, 1999) and the self-efficacy necessary for 
long-term change among individuals (Bandura, 1997).  Knowledge of individual and group 
behaviour is instrumental in understanding how safety behaviour can be influenced to change.  
This understanding can assist in determining if the repeating recommendations incorporated a 
behavioural element.  
Safety Compliance 
 Safety behaviour can be divided into two categories: safety compliance and safety 
participation.  Safety compliance refers to the core activities that individuals perform to maintain 
workplace safety, and adhere to the safety management system (i.e. wearing personal protective 
equipment) (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Safety participation describes behaviours that do not directly 
contribute to an individual’s personal safety but assist in developing an environment that 
supports safety (i.e. attending safety meetings) (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  In the past, assumptions 
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about how to improve safety participation and compliance in the workplace have focused 
interventions on compliance to regulations, blame has been attributed to poor safety attitudes, 
and incentive techniques have been used to change noncompliance.  Researchers have since 
determined that identifying the antecedents and determinants of behaviour has a greater influence 
on compliance and participation (Neal & Griffin, 2002).  Understanding the commitment to 
safety by all tiers of an organization, as a determinant of an organization’s safety culture, assists 
in analyzing the repeating recommendations to see if they addressed compliance and 
participation.  
Safety Motivation 
 Related to safety compliance and safety participation, is safety motivation.  Safety 
motivation refers to an individual’s willingness to exert effort to enact safety behaviours and the 
valence associated with those behaviours (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Therefore, some degree of 
authority is needed to activate the motivation to care about safety (Turner & Pidgeon, 1997).  
Research has demonstrated that motivation mediates the relationship between safety climate and 
self-reported safety compliance and participation.  The relationship between safety climate and 
safety motivation can be explained using the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and 
expectancy-valence theory (Vroom, 1964).  The social exchange theory predicts that if an 
individual perceives that the organization is concerned about safety, they will reciprocate 
through safe behaviours (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  The expectancy-valence theory predicts that 
employees are motivated to comply with safety procedures and participate in safety activities if 
they believe that these behaviours will lead to valued outcomes (Zohar, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 
2006).  If an organization identifies safety motivation as a problem, this indicates that there may 
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be a broad range of underlying individual and environmental causal factors present.  Therefore, 
safety motivation is an influential element of the overall safety culture.  Understanding the social 
exchange theory and expectancy valence theory can assist in viewing these reports retroactively 
to see if perceptions reflected actions.  
System Assessing and Monitoring 
 Monitoring and assessing the safety culture of an organization is an important factor in 
ensuring the effectiveness of risk management (Antonsen, 2009).  Traditional measures of safety 
relied on retrospective, or lagging, data such as: lost-time injuries, accidents, and fatalities.  In 
contrast, measuring safety culture is a forward-facing, predictive assessment (Flin et al., 2000; 
Antonsen, 2009).  This shift away from lagging indicators reduces the reliance on waiting for a 
system to fail to identify its weaknesses.   
 Assessments can provide an organization with a benchmark of organizational safety 
performance to compare future emerging safety outcomes (Mearns & Flin, 1999).  These 
assessments can measure various features of safety culture, including: individual and group 
values, perceptions, attitudes and behaviours with respect to safety, commitment of management, 
work pressure, competence, available resources, and visible support to safety programs.  Further, 
a key feature of assessing and monitoring is having a safety information system that collects, 
analyzes and disseminates information from incidents and near misses (Flin et al., 2000; Reason, 
1998).  Understanding the various organizational factors that can be monitored and assessed will 
assist in reviewing whether the recommendations directed at these measurements focused on 
lagging (i.e. accidents) or leading indicators (i.e. safety culture). 
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2.3.4 Safety Climate  
 The term safety climate has been defined as the perceptions of policies, procedures, and 
practices relating to safety in the workplace (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  It can be further defined as 
the manifestation of the underlying safety culture in safety-related behaviours and attitudes of 
individuals or groups (Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 2003).  As stated by Schein (1990) “climate [is] 
a reflection and manifestation of cultural assumptions.”   
 Research has indicated that when individuals perceive a safe working environment, they 
will reciprocate by complying to the safety management system (Neal & Griffin, 2006; James & 
James, 1989).  Safety climate is positively associated with safety compliance and a reduction in 
accidents at the individual, group and organizational levels (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Hayes et 
al., 1998; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996; Rundmo, 1994; Varonen & Mattila, 2000; Zohar, 2000; 
Neal & Griffin, 2002).  There is currently no concrete agreement regarding the key dimensions 
of safety climate (Neal & Griffin, 2002), and therefore there are numerous measurement tools of 
safety climate available that provide general, or industry specific assessments.  However, the 
features assessed are relatively similar, including: perceptions of management attitudes and 
behaviours towards safety, perceived production pressures, discipline, perceptions of safety 
procedures, competence, individual dispositions (i.e. optimism, fatalism), self-reported safety 
behaviours (i.e. risk taking), and accident reporting (Flin et al., 2000).  Similar to safety culture, 
it is important to note that perceptions of safety climate may also vary among groups within the 
same organization because of differences in-group processes (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Therefore, 
although safety culture and safety climate overlap as dimensions of an organization, they differ 
in fundamental elements (Neal & Griffin, 2002; Moran & Volkwein, 1992; Mearns & Flin, 
1999). 
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2.3.5 Organizational Culture 
 The concept of safety culture is preceded in the literature by an extensive body of research 
into organizational culture (or corporate culture).  Organizational culture is defined as a complex 
framework of shared behaviours, beliefs, attitudes and values regarding organizational goals, 
functions and procedures, which are seen to characterize particular organizations (Furnham & 
Gunter, 1993; Cooper, 2000; Helmreich & Merritt, 1998; Parker, Lawrie & Hudson, 2006).  The 
complexity of the definition is reiterated by Schein (1992): 
“Observed behavioural regularities when people interact (language, customs and 
traditions, rituals), group norms, espoused values, formal philosophy, rules of the 
game, climate, embedded skills, habits of thinking/mental models/linguistic 
paradigms, shared meanings and ``root'' metaphors or integrating symbols'', [all] 
illustrate the fact that behind the term culture a lot of different meanings are hiding.” 
(p.8) 
 Research has demonstrated that within a single organization there can be both within-group 
homogeneity and between-group variation in perceptions (Parker, Lawrie & Hudson, 2006).  
This variability can be explained by exploring the sub-cultures within an organization.  Antonsen 
(2009) pointed out that organizational cultures typically are biased to reflect the values of the 
dominant group, or subculture, in the organization.  This is relevant to note because although 
organizational cultures can enhance organizational goals, they can also perpetuate negative 
behaviour, beliefs, attitudes, and values (Pidgeon, 1997).  Therefore, to address cultures, as a 
form of resistance, focus must move beyond individual attitudes to shared cognitions and 
organizational structures. Understanding that the foundation of safety culture lies in 
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organizational culture is crucial for understanding the complexities of how organizational values, 
behaviours, beliefs, etc. are perpetuated.  
 In contrast to organizational culture, which incorporates values, beliefs and underlying 
assumptions, organizational climate is a measure reflecting the perceptions of the organizational 
atmosphere (Gonzalez-Roma et al., 1999).  The organizational climate is therefore viewed as the 
property of the individual, and how they experience and interpret what happens within the 
organization (Bjerkan, 2010).  In the literature, this is also often referred to as psychological 
climate.  Psychological climate refers to individual perceptions of the work environment (James 
& James, 1989).  When these perceptions are shared by members of a group or organization they 
are referred to as group or organizational climate (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Organizational climate 
measures often assess perceptions of organizational policies, procedures, and practices (Reichers 
& Schneider, 1990).  
2.3.6 Accident Investigation and Safety Culture  
 Despite its origins in an accident investigation (i.e. Chernobyl 1986), it is uncommon for 
safety culture to be directly addressed in investigations of accidents.  Strauch (2015) believes 
that due to limitations in the measurement of safety culture, the direct assessment of safety 
culture during accident investigations may produce misleading results:   
“Investigators need to establish a cause and effect relationship in an accident, relying on 
identifiable performance measures, and the presence or absence of such aspects of an 
organization’s culture, such as managerial commitment to safety, does not satisfy the need 
for a logical, direct link between a factor and the accident, nor is that a readily identifiable 
parameter.” (p.106)  
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However, post-accident investigations may provide the opportunity to identify more aspects of 
an organization’s culture.  In various industries, it is becoming increasingly common for 
companies and researchers to apply safety culture retroactively to explain accidents and incidents 
(Strauch, 2015).  Antonsen (2009) found that the data obtained through accident investigation 
reports on an offshore drilling platform better described an organizations actual practices, in 
contrast to collecting information regarding perceived safety obtained through traditional safety 
culture questionnaires and assessments. Similar findings were found in an investigation of a 
marine accident (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013).  Another investigation conducted 
by the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority of a subway accident determined that the 
organizations actions and decisions made after the investigation, described elements of safety 
culture better than a direct assessment of the culture, through typical measurement methods, 
could have done (Stauch, 2015).  Other major accidents, including: Piper Alpha, King’s Cross, 
Clapham Junction, the Bristol Royal Infirmary pediatric cardiac exposure, and the Columbia 
tragedy (Reason, 1990; Warszawska & Kraslawski, 2015; Zhang et al., 2002) all discussed safety 
culture post-investigation.  
 In addition, to the debate around the inclusion of safety culture pre- or post-investigation, 
the discussion continues into whether safety culture should be included in the formulation of the 
recommendations.  Very few accident investigations provide recommendations that specifically 
address cultural factors. However, it was found that two United States agencies, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (2011) and the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement 
(2013) recognized the application of safety culture principles to increase a positive safety culture 
within their industry after investigations were completed.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
specifically cited safety culture principles to apply to the industry, however, the commission did 
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not provide insight on how to implement or monitor these factors (Stauch, 2015).  Overall, what 
can be derived from these findings is that safety culture, although rarely directly assessed in 
accident investigations because of the unique difficulties in measurement and assessment, can be 
influential when incorporated post-investigation to distinguish between perceived safety and 
actual safety.  
  
 In the mining industry, various methods of disaster analysis have utilized official accident 
reports.  Barry Turner (1978) examined a decade of mining disasters in the United Kingdom in 
his book Man Made Disasters.  Braithwaite (1985) examined 39 coal mine disasters to focus on 
the role and effectiveness of enforcement in his book, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of 
Coal Mine Safety.  Quinlan (2014) also examined single and multiple-fatality incidents to 
identify patterned causes in his book, Ten Pathways to Death and Disaster: Learning from Fatal 
Accidents in Mines and Other High Hazard Workplaces. Researchers have acknowledged that 
this style of sources provide “a detailed and impartial assessment of the evidence pertaining to 
the causes of the incident, at least within societies where there is some level of community voice, 
governance and due process and accountability” (Quinlan, 2014).  However, it is recognized that 
not all accident inquiries are unbiased, including: the government, appointed investigators, the 
terms of reference, the legislation governing safety and the investigation process itself, time and 
resource constraints, and media coverage (Quinlan, 2014). Another consideration in conducting 
historical analysis of such reports is how investigations are shaped by the current technical 
knowledge, dominant discourses, and community structures during the time period.  
Preoccupations with certain influences can detract attention from other underlying failures.  
Therefore, researchers must recognize that the findings identified in an investigation report are 
relative to how the investigation was conducted.   
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2.4 BIG DATA ANALYSIS  
 Large bodies of data, such as OHS commissioned reports of a longitudinal data set, can be 
difficult to analyze.  Human-based analysis of large volumes of data are time-consuming and 
resource-intensive to (Indulska & Recker, 2012; Smith & Humphreys, 2006), and additional 
challenges include coder reliability, and the influence of subjectivity and interpretation bias.  
Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) can provide an alternative 
method, solving some of these problems.  
2.4.1 Computer-Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis Software 
 CAQDAS can perform multiple analyses of data and provide a varied perspective on a 
single data set (Sotiriadou, Brouwers & Le, 2014).  Typically, the mitigation of subjectivity in 
human coding requires an extensive investment of time and money in the content analysis 
process, through the investment of multiple coders and inter-coder reliability testing (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977).  Coder reliability is not an issue for CAQDAS, as text segments are always coded 
in the same way; given the same parameter settings (Smith & Humphreys, 2006).  Therefore, a 
primary advantage to utilizing CAQDAS is that it reduces the subjectivity and interpretation bias 
that may negatively affect the validity of the research (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Indulska & 
Recker, 2008).  Further, CAQDAS facilitates the exploration of bodies of text (Indulska & 
Recker, 2012), and provides advantages related to scalability, repeatability, and consistency.  
There are numerous types of CAQDAS available with advantages and disadvantages of each, 
based on the type and size of data, and the aim of the analysis. Reviewing the types of CAQDAS 
provides support for the selection of Leximancer as the software best suited for scope and style 
of this analysis.  
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2.4.2 Leximancer 
 Leximancer is a text analytics software that performs a style of computer assisted content 
analysis (Cretchley et al., 2010a).  Computer assisted content analysis is the semantic extraction 
of dominant concepts or most commonly occurring terms, based on the statistical processing of a 
body of text (Berelson, 1952; Weber, 1990; Indulska & Recker, 2012), followed by the relational 
extraction (Smith & Humphreys, 2006).  The conceptual analysis examines the data for the 
presence, frequency, and centrality of concepts (Indulska & Recker, 2012).  The relational 
analysis tabulates the frequency of concepts in the body of text and the co-occurrence of 
concepts.  Co-occurrence identifies how concepts are related to each other within the documents 
(Indulska & Recker, 2012).  The Leximancer software therefore goes beyond keyword searching, 
by discovering and extracting thesaurus-based concepts from the text data, with no requirement 
of a static dictionary (Smith & Humphreys, 2006; Weber, 1990; Indulska & Recker, 2012).  The 
cumulative support of all the words in the thesaurus determines the classification weighting 
(Smith & Humphreys, 2006).  The advantage of generating the concept list automatically is that 
the list is statistically reliable and reproducible because it is generated from the input text itself 
(Smith, 2003) (Appendix E).   
 When larger bodies of text, or datasets beyond the ability of typical analysis, are 
considered, Leximancer is believed to be at its greatest utility (Smith & Humphreys, 2006).  
Leximancer has been applied across a diverse range of big data research domains, including: 
evaluating accident reports in maritime operations (Grech, Horberry & Smith, 2002); comparing 
risk management profiles of large computer organizations (Martin & Rice, 2007); analyzing 
opinion polls and political commentary (McKenna, 2007); tracking changes in the content of 
abstracts in academic journals (Cretchley, Rooney & Gallois, 2010b); and analyzing social media 
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responses to controversial incidents (Pegoraro et al., 2014).  To date, no studies have utilized the 
Leximancer software to longitudinally examine the relationship between reappearing accident 
recommendations and safety culture in mining.  
2.4.3 Concept Mapping 
 In a parallel timeline to the development of CAQDAS, the field of visual text analytics has 
developed methods to give a visual appreciation of relationships within data-sets (Risch et al., 
2008; Tufte, 2001).  Concept mapping is one such technique used to display information from 
large bodies of text throughout the concept of space (Jackson & Trochim, 2002; Chen et al., 
1996).  Concept mapping can be derived algorithmically from a corpus of text (Novak & Gowan, 
1984).  For the latter, CAQDAS applications are used to conduct concept statistics, clustering, 
and multidimensional scaling analyses, which then produce the maps and analytical outputs to be 
interpreted (Jackson & Trochim, 2002).  The automated process generates a graphic display via 
an interactive concept map, or as tables indicating key concepts and conceptual relationships 
(Angus, Rintel, & Wiles, 2013) (Appendix 2E).  
 When analyzing and interpreting large bodies of data, concept maps can provide additional 
benefits to the researcher.  The concept map presents a graphical representation that illustrates 
relationships spatially between various concepts (Novak & Gowan, 1984; Indulska & Recker, 
2012).  This visualization process enables the analyst to examine concepts in the original text 
linked to a global perspective of the entire volume of data (Angus, Rintel, & Wiles, 2013; Smith 
& Humphreys, 2006).  The interactive interface then allows the researcher analyze the 
underlying data to understand the context of the concepts, identify the sources and discussion of 
the concepts, and identify relevant text excerpts (Indulska & Recker, 2012).  The concept 
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mapping feature greatly assists the interpretation in this study due to its ability to graphically 
represent a large body of data (Appendix E).  
2.4.4 Framing Theory  
 Framing theory suggests that how something is presented influences the choices people 
make about how to process that information.  The frame is defined as a mental scheme that 
facilitates the processing of information (Goffman, 1974), and can provide meaning to a series of 
events (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  Frames can also be viewed as groups of various 
independent textual elements combined to create an overall frame.  In addition to making up a 
frame, each independent textual element can also signal different meanings to the reader 
(Entman, 1993).  This sociological approach to framing research includes: words, images, 
phrases, and presentation styles that are used to create stories (Druckman, 2001).  By 
investigating the association between textual elements within the document and the overall 
framing of the story you can examine the changes in the relative proportion and stability of 
frames during a given time period.  The framing process can make particular aspects more 
prominent through the selection, emphasis, and exclusion of information (Entman, 1993; 
Zaharopoulos, 2007) and can reflect the dominant norms and values in a society (Endres, 2004; 
Goffman, 1974).  Therefore, framing theory proposes that an issue can be viewed from various 
perspectives in which people can develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient 
their thinking (Chong & Druckman, 2007).  
 Tracking frames provides a process to identify trends in issues, definitions, and examine 
coverage across multiple sources.  The application of framing theory typically requires four 
steps.  First, the identification of an issue or an event; second, the isolation of a specific attitude; 
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third, the inductive identification of an initial set of frames to create a coding scheme; and finally 
select sources for content analysis (Chong & Druckman, 2007, p.106-108).  Typically, when 
researchers rely on computer programs to analyze large volumes of text, they must identify the 
dictionary of words that mark the presence of the frame.  Coders than analyze the sample 
identifying the presence of the predefined frames.  This analysis can be carried out with the 
Leximancer interface, as it can identify the main themes, their underlying concepts, and their 
evidence words, to gain an understanding of the context of the frame (Indulska & Recker, 2012). 
 Framing theory can also provide insight into cultural shifts or change over time.  Chong 
and Druckman (2007) stated that “the dimension of time allows the separation of new issues 
from previously discussed issues that are familiar to those who are knowledgeable on the topic.”  
New issues are often variants of other issues that have been discussed in the past.  In contrast, 
older issues have a defined structure and elicit more routine considerations (Chong & Druckman, 
2007).  Therefore, older issues can be transformed into new issues by the process of reframing.  
In applying the framing theory and content analysis on longitudinal data the findings can be 
portrayed along a timeline.  This allows the discovery of cross-sectional relationships and the 
impact of content on industry over-time (Neuendorf, 2001).  This can be referred to as 
conceptual drift, the change of known concepts with reference to the evidence provided by new 
documentation that is made available over time (Widmer & Kubat, 1996).  Applying framing 
theory to assist in reviewing the historical component of the study will assist in reviewing the 
repeating recommendations to identify how older issues have been transformed into new issues.  
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Chapter 3 
Analysis of Recommendations from Occupational Health and Safety Mining Commissioned 
Reports: A 50 Year Review  
ABSTRACT This research project focuses on a systematic analysis of ten Occupational Health 
& Safety (OHS) commissioned reports from: Canada, New Zealand, the United States, Australia, 
and the United Kingdom; spanning from 1967 to 2015.  The objective was to identify 
commonalities and differences in the key recommendations across the identified reports over the 
50-year timeframe.  The systematic analysis was undertaken in two stages.  First the text-mining 
software, Leximancer, was utilized to analyze the content of the recommendations through 
semantic extraction of dominant themes, followed by relational extraction, which involved the 
mapping of thematic relationships against each other.  In the second stage, the researchers 
analyzed the themes identified in the map to fully understand the relationships and ensure proper 
interpretation.  The thematic analysis, based on the concept map, provided a longitudinal 
perspective of the recommendations, identified six key themes and 49 sets of overlapping 
recommendations.  The themes were: health and safety hazards (n=10 sets), regulating bodies 
(n=13 sets), emergency preparedness and mine rescue (n=9 sets), worker training (n=10 sets), the 
role of technology (n=4 sets), and research (n=3 sets).  The results of this analysis illustrate that 
the same hazards continue to be identified across reports and recommendations to mitigate the 
identified hazard also appear in more than one report.  These findings suggest that mining 
hazards are not being adequately addressed or that mitigation strategies are not being 
implemented, this is independent of time or country.  
KEYWORDS OHS; Mining; Recommendations; Leximancer 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 “In 1992, a violent explosion…occurred in the depths of the Westray coal mine, instantly 
killing the 26 miners working there at the time” (p.vii). “In 2006, an explosion occurred at the 
Sago mine…fifty-two hours later, the bodies of 12 miners had been recovered from the mine” 
(p.iii).   In 2010, on Easter Monday, “a powerful explosion tore through the Upper Big Branch 
mine…twenty-nine miners died” (p.4).  In 2010, the Pike River coal mine exploded, “twenty-
nine men underground died immediately, or shortly afterwards, from the blast or from the toxic 
atmospheres” (p.12).  Following each of these tragedies, inquiries were established, new rules 
and regulations were formulated and recommendations to eliminate organizational hazards were 
designed to prevent the reoccurrence of that particular accident (Hopkins, 2002).  However, these 
examples illustrate four cases where the accident causation chain concluded with similar fatal 
methane explosions.   
 Mining currently accounts for 1% of the global workforce, approximately 30 million 
workers; but is responsible for 8% of fatal accidents at work (ILO, 2016).  Fatalities, injuries, 
and occupational disease are still prevalent amongst miners, and places mining as one of the 
most hazardous occupations in the world (Stephens & Ahern, 2001).  A major component 
increasing hazards in the mine environment is the constantly changing workplace circumstances, 
with the most severe changes including, but not limited to: the darkness of an environment 
without natural light where visibility can be reduced to zero; atmospheric air changes due to 
forced ventilation in the work areas, where the air components can quickly become contaminated 
and poisonous to the worker; and the constant threat of potentially unstable ground control, as a 
result of mineral extraction.  Although the incidence of occupational injuries and diseases 
associated has declined markedly following developments in science and technology, such as 
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engineering controls, protective equipment, safer machinery and processes, and adherence to 
regulations and labour inspections (Hale & Hovden, 1998), there is a need to review and evaluate 
recommendations stemming from previous OHS commissioned reports in order to understand 
occupational accidents for miners.  
3.1.1 Organizational Accidents 
 Reoccurring accidents are not unique to the mining industry. Aviation, aerospace, 
transportation, oil, healthcare, construction, among others, all have a history of accidents that 
have commonalities between them (Cox & Flin, 1998; Pidgeon, 1998; Zhang et al., 2002). 
Lessons from these accidents, for risk prevention and reduction of consequences, are drawn from 
the analyses of several types of single events and series of events (Dechy et al., 2012).  Most of 
these accidents involve complex, dynamic interactions between humans, task demands, 
environmental events, and social and organizational factors, in the presence of weakness or gaps 
in the systems barriers (Clarke, 2006; Bjerkan, 2010; Dismukes, Berman & Loukopoulos, 2007).  
Organizational accidents are usually low-frequency events and are typically triggered by 
unintentional errors, made possible by pre-existing hazards that have made the system vulnerable 
to failure (Reason, 1990).  Although the contexts of various work environments can be different, 
there is an opportunity to learn from occupational accident investigations and recommended 
practices from other countries, industries or variations within the same sector (i.e. metalliferous 
and coal mining) (Turner, 1978; Vuorio et al., 2013; Lind and Kivistö-Rahnasto, 2008).  
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3.1.2 Accident Investigations, Reports and Commissions  
 The outcome of an accident analysis depends not only on the investigators view on 
causality, but on which factors are included, and omitted, as causes and contributing factors 
(Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009).  Although differences may exist between how 
countries conduct investigations, generally government agencies or representatives conduct 
accident investigations (LeCoze, 2013).  Dekker (2015) identified four purposes of accident 
investigations: (1) epistemological (i.e. establishing what happened); (2) preventive (i.e. 
identifying pathways to avoid future accidents); (3) moral (i.e. tracing the transgressions that 
were committed and reinforcing moral and regulatory boundaries); (4) and existential (i.e. 
finding an explanation for the suffering that occurred).  The overarching intention is to avoid a 
reoccurrence of an accident rather than to establish blame (Vuorio et al., 2013).  The evolution of 
accident investigation methods over time also demonstrates a shift from isolating a single 
immediate cause, to acknowledging multiple causes.  This shift drives the elimination of active 
causes, without impact on reducing latent causes, and therefore does not adequately prevent 
future accidents (Marais, Dulac & Leveson, 2004; Leveson, 2004).  For both accident causation 
and accident investigation, acknowledging that there is an array of accident investigation 
techniques available to industry is important for understanding that there are various approaches 
to investigate an accident, and therefore various potential outcomes.  Hollnagel (2008) refers to 
this as the ‘What-You-Look-For-Is-What-You-Find’ (WYLFIWYF) principle, which has further 
been elaborated to the ‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’ (WYFIWYF) principle, meaning that 
the causes identified in an investigation, become the foundation of the formulation of the 
recommendations for change (Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009).   
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 In the mining industry, various methods of disaster analysis have utilized official accident 
reports.  Barry Turner (1978) examined a decade of mining disasters in the United Kingdom in 
his book Man Made Disasters.  Braithwaite (1985) examined 39 coal mine disasters to focus on 
the role and effectiveness of enforcement in his book To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of 
Coal Mine Safety.  Hopkins (2000) conducted a sociological analysis of two Australian mining 
disasters which were contextually different but revealed underlying similarities.  Quinlan (2014a) 
also examined single and multiple-fatality incidents to identify patterned causes in his book Ten 
Pathways to Death and Disaster: Learning from Fatal Accidents in Mines and Other High 
Hazard Workplaces. Researchers have acknowledged that these styles of sources provide “a 
detailed and impartial assessment of the evidence pertaining to the causes of the incident, at least 
within societies where there is some level of community voice, governance and due process and 
accountability” (Quinlan, 2014a, p.32).  However, it is recognized that not all accident inquiries 
are free of influences that come from, for example, the government, appointed investigators, the 
terms of reference, the legislation governing safety and the investigation process itself, time and 
resource constraints, and media coverage (Quinlan, 2014a).  Another consideration when 
conducting historical analysis of such reports, is the influence of how investigations are shaped 
by the current technical knowledge, dominant discourses and community structures during the 
time period.  Preoccupations with certain influences can detract attention from other underlying 
failures.  Therefore, the researchers must recognize that the findings identified in an investigation 
report are relative to how the investigation was conducted.  Despite these considerations, 
inquiries are able to highlight and “uncover a wealth of information about how the organizations 
in question were operating – their cultures, incentive arrangements and organizational 
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weaknesses, and in addition, the way in which regulators failed to deal with any of this” 
(Hopkins, 2015, p.496).   
3.1.3 Report Recommendations  
 A key part of an accident investigation, and the subsequent accident report, is the proposal 
of remedial actions, usually referred to as recommendations.  The recommendations are 
established to prevent a reoccurrence of that particular accident (Hopkins, 2002; Leveson, 2001).  
In many cases, accident investigation recommendations focus on new rules and regulations that 
influence the health and safety legislation of the country, state or province in which they were 
published.  The formulation of recommendations is therefore a reactive process, aimed to 
provide proactive solutions for the future (Stoop & Dekker, 2012).  In many accident inquiries, 
the commissioners acknowledge the presence of themes identified by inquiries into previous 
tragedies; however, if the recommendations fall into a common set of themes that reappear, an 
argument can be made that the recommendations are not really achieving their purpose, or full 
impact. 
 As was discussed previously, due to the WYLFIWYF and the WYFIWYF principles, 
similar to how accident investigations are influenced by the accident model, the 
recommendations are also influenced by various factors (e.g. political and economic 
considerations; limitation of the number of recommendations to be published; expediency) 
(Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009).  The recommendations may therefore be affected 
by factors other than the outcome of the accident analysis.  Another key issue with the 
formulation of recommendations and subsequent implementation is their specificity.  Lundberg, 
Rollenhagen & Hollnagel (2009) describe this difficulty as ‘problem framing’ because there are 
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multiple levels of specificity in describing what, how or why.  The recommendation process is 
further complicated by the translation and communication of the recommendations as intended, 
to all individuals that will be interpreting the document in industry to ensure that the recipient 
understands the problem to address.   
In his book, Ten Pathways to Death and Disaster: Learning from Fatal Accidents in Mines 
and other High Hazard Workplaces, Quinlan (2014b) began the discussion by posing various 
questions, including the following:  
“Why do mine disasters continue to occur in wealthy countries when major mine hazards 
have been known for over 200 years and subject to regulation for well over a century? 
What lessons can be drawn from these disasters and are mine operators, regulators and 
others drawing the correct conclusions from such events?” (p.1) 
These questions warrant the consideration of the recommendations that have accompanied 
previous accident inquires, and what insight they may offer to the cyclical nature of the repetition 
of similar accidents. 
3.1.4 Change Management  
 The aim of establishing a recommendation is to create change.  Traditional change 
management literature separates the diagnosis of a system and the intervention method (Schein, 
1996).  Schein (1996) states that this model has been perpetuated by industries, such as 
consulting, as the model proposes a diagnostic phase where an analysis is completed (i.e. 
interviews, questionnaires, investigations), and a set of recommendations are produced.  
However, the fundamental problem is that the role ends with the release of the recommendations.  
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The model followed in implementing change can influence an individual’s perception of change, 
the involvement of those affected and the sequencing of change enhancing activities.  There are 
various models of change, including Vollman’s (1996) model of organizational change which 
consists of eight facets: (1) strategic intent (e.g., addressing the correct issues); (2) competencies 
(e.g., linking current competencies to a desired outcome); (3) processes (e.g., establishing 
metrics for assessing change); (4) resources (e.g., technology); (5) outputs (e.g., identifying 
expectations); (6) strategic responses (e.g., planning actions); (7) challenges (e.g., anticipating 
obstacles); and (8) learning capacity (e.g., identifying new required knowledge, skills and 
abilities).  
 Various industries have conducted studies of organizational change transformations.   
Meyer, Brooks & Goes (1990) summarized evolutionary industry- and organizational- level 
changes taking place in hospitals, reflecting a stable external environment.  Kelly & Amburgey’s 
(1991) conducted an analysis of the deregulation of airlines and drew conclusions on the impact 
of context on varying organizational responses.  Haveman (1992) investigated legislative and 
technological changes on the California savings and loan industry.  Miles & Snow’s (1978) 
proposed that to be sustainable, change must be consistent with an organization’s current identity 
or envisioned identity and image.  Sastry’s (1997) findings provide insights into how 
organizations may fail in attempting to introduce change, such as failure to adopt a strategic 
orientation that matches the requirements of its external environment.  
Resistance to change efforts is directly related to how the situation is framed (Gabarro & 
Kotter, 1993).  Therefore, there are numerous factors to consider which can influence an 
organizations ability to resist change.  First, an organization’s past experiences with strategic 
change have an influence on subsequent tendencies to change strategic direction (Huff, Huff & 
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Thomas, 1992).  Second, if individuals are not prepared for the introduction of change, then 
denial and resistance will likely be initial consequences of a change process (Jick, 1991).  Third, 
how change is implement is considered to be as important as what the change incorporates 
(Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer, 2002).  Lastly, when a disconnect exists between the corporate 
culture and the change, culture can diminish the potency of the change initiative.  Therefore, 
during any change process, the change must become rooted to the existing corporate culture 
(Galpin, 1996).   
3.1.5 Big Data Analysis  
  Single event investigations are often criticized for their lack of statistical relevance and low 
cost-effectiveness (Stoop & Dekker, 2012).  However, each accident investigation relies on a 
large body of data, from a variety of sources to reach their conclusions (Strauch, 2015).  
Therefore, accident investigation reports provide a great resource for conducting a large scale 
longitudinal review of the industry to identify lessons for risk prevention (Dechy et al., 2012).  
 Traditionally, large volumes of textual data were resource-intensive to manually analyze 
(Indulska & Recker, 2008; Smith & Humphreys, 2006), and additional challenges include coder 
reliability, and the influence of subjectivity and interpretation bias.  Computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) can provide an alternative method, solving some 
of these problems.  CAQDAS facilitates more effective exploration of bodies of text and 
provides advantages related to scalability, reliability, repeatability, and consistency; therefore, 
providing an analytic process that is reproducible and capable of handling large datasets that 
would be challenging for manual analysis (Indulska & Recker, 2008).  For example, Leximancer 
is a text analytics software that performs computer assisted content analysis (Cretchley et al., 
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2010a).  Computer assisted content analysis is the semantic extraction of dominant concepts or 
most commonly occurring terms, based on the statistical processing of a body of text (Berelson, 
1952; Weber, 1990; Indulska & Recker, 2008), followed by the relational extraction (Smith & 
Humphreys, 2006).  The conceptual analysis examines data for the presence, frequency, and 
centrality of concepts (Indulska & Recker, 2008).  The relational analysis tabulates the frequency 
of concepts in the body of text and the co-occurrence of concepts.  This identifies how concepts 
are related to each other within the documents (Indulska & Recker, 2008).   
3.1.6 Framing Theory  
 Framing theory suggests that how something is presented influences how that information 
is processed (Entman, 1993).  By investigating the association between textual elements within 
the document and the overall framing of the story you can examine the changes in the relative 
proportion and stability of frames during a given time period.  Tracking frames provides a 
process to identify trends in issues, definitions, and examine coverage across multiple sources.  
Framing theory can also provide insight into cultural shifts or change overtime.  Chong and 
Druckman (2007) state that “the dimension of time allows the separation of new issues from 
previously discussed issues that are familiar to those who are knowledgeable on the topic” 
(p.108).  New issues are often variants of other issues that have been discussed in the past.  In 
contrast, older issues have a defined structure and elicit more routine considerations (Chong & 
Druckman, 2007).  In applying the framing theory and content analysis on longitudinal data the 
findings can be portrayed along a timeline.  This allows the discovery of cross-sectional 
relationships and the impact of content on industry over-time (Neuendorf, 2001).  This can be 
referred to as conceptual drift, the change of known concepts with reference to the evidence 
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provided by new documentation that is made available over time (Widmer & Kubat, 1996).  
Applying framing theory to assist in reviewing the historical component of the commissioned 
mining reviews will assist in reviewing the repeating recommendations to identify how older 
issues have been transformed into new issues.  
3.1.7 Research Objectives 
 Recently, the Ontario Ministry of Labour released the Mining Health, Safety and 
Prevention Review, a comprehensive review of underground mining (2015).  Of the sixteen 
published recommendations, one focused on reviewing past public enquiries into mining health 
and safety and from Coroner’s inquests into mining fatalities: 
“Recommendation 5.4: conducting and regularly updating an aggregate analysis of all 
past inquests into mining fatalities; and holding information sessions with the Chief 
Coroner to identify opportunities for coroners to use the analysis to improve future 
inquests into fatalities in the mining sector.” (p.12) 
This recommendation reiterates the importance of reviewing what has already been published to 
ensure that all possible lessons have been learned, and not forgotten, from the past.  The aim of 
this study was to address this recommendation, by: 
I) Identifying whether any recommendations are repeating in the English language, mining 
inquiries, over the past 50 years. 
II) Determine whether there are similarities in recommendations amongst coal mining and 
metalliferous mining accident reports. 
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3.2 METHODS 
 
 The research approach follows the protocol outlined by Indulska & Recker (2008) and 
Cretchley, Rooney & Gallois (2010b) in their analysis of conceptual drift in journal publication 
history.  The study was conducted in three steps.  First, the selection of each commissioned 
report. Second, the isolation of the recommendation sections of the reports and a computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis.  Lastly, the interpretation of the results.  
3.2.1 Commissioned Report Dataset 
 The OHS commissioned reports were selected through a review of the literature, and in 
consultation with industry professionals, known for their expertise in mining safety and accident 
investigation (Appendix 2C & 2D). The inclusion criteria were commissioned reports from: 
English speaking countries, coal mining and metalliferous mining, and reports on single 
accidents, disasters and broader industry reviews.  In addition, the report had to be deemed to 
have had a significant impact on OHS in the mining industry (i.e. established to investigate new 
and emerging issues; provide advice on an area where government lacks expertise; accesses 
external knowledge; identifies key issues on policy problems; provided recommendations for the 
future (Prasser, 2006)).  The final list contained ten commissioned reports focusing on OHS, 
published in English, by five countries: Canada (n=5), United States (n=2), Australia (n=1), New 
Zealand (n=1), and the United Kingdom (n=1), were selected for analysis in this study (Table 
3.1).  The reports span from 1967 to 2015, and represent a combination of coal mining (60%) 
and metalliferous mining (40%). 
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Table 3.1: Description of OHS commission reports selected for this study 
Commission 
Date of 
Incident 
Date 
Inquired 
Date 
Published 
Country Industry Pages 
Report of the Tribunal 
Appointed to Inquire into 
the Disaster at Aberfan  
October 21 
1966 
July 19 1966 July 19 1967 
United 
Kingdom 
Coal Mining 151 
Report of the Royal 
Commission on the Health 
and Safety of Workers in 
Mines  
N/A 
September 10 
1974 
June 30 1976 Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
380 
Towards Safe Production  N/A July 1980  April 1981 Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
422 
Improving Ground 
Stability and Mine Rescue  
N/A 
October 24 
1984 
February 
1986 
Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
107 
Report on an Accident at 
Moura No. 2 Underground 
Mine  
August 7 
1994 
October 18 
1994 
April 6 1995 Australia Coal Mining 102 
The Westray Story:  A 
Predictable Path to 
Disaster - Report of the 
Westray Mine Public 
Inquiry  
May 9 1992 May 15 1992 
November 
1997 
Canada  Coal Mining 831 
Report on the Sago Mine 
Disaster  
January 2 
2006 
January 9 
2006 
July 19 2006 United States Coal Mining 124 
Upper Big Branch:  A 
Failure of Basic Coal 
Mine Safety Practices  
April 5 2010 
April 13 
2010  
May 2011 United States  Coal Mining 126 
Royal Commission on the 
Pike River Coal Mine 
Tragedy 
November 19 
2010  
December 14 
2010 
October 
2012 
New Zealand Coal Mining 448 
Mining Health, Safety and 
Prevention Review  
N/A 
December 
2013 
201March 
2015 
Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
108 
 
 
3.2.2 Computer Assisted Qualitative Data Analysis of Recommendations 
 A computer assisted qualitative data analysis software, Leximancer (Version 4.0, 2011, 
Leximancer Pty Ltd., University of Queensland), was used to explore the commissioned reports.  
The analysis was undertaken in two stages.  First, Leximancer was used to jointly analyze the 
content of the recommendations within the 50-year data set, through semantic extraction of 
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dominant themes, followed by relational extraction.  The relational extraction then provided a 
concept map that was used to identify and explore core themes within the recommendations, 
through colour coding and theme centrality indicated on the concept map (see Smith & 
Humphreys (2006) for further explanation of the Leximancer system).  
 Any documents that had separate files, such as: appendices or additional volumes, were 
amalgamated.  Documents unreadable by Leximancer were converted verbatim into readable text 
files using ABBYY FineReader (Version 12, 2014, ABBYY Group, Russia).  For analysis, all 
standard operational settings in Leximancer were set to default with the exception of: removing 
the identification of name-like words, turning off auto-paragraphing, and merging word variants 
(for detailed explanation of settings see Leximancer Manual 4.0).  Word-like concepts with 
similar semantic meaning were merged (i.e. workers and miners), and concepts of low semantic 
meaning were removed (i.e. mine).  To explain further, in an exploratory analysis of the 
recommendations (where no changes are made to the standard operational settings) the dominant 
theme that would emerge is ‘mine.’  As the reports are all from the mining industry, identifying 
‘mine’ as a theme adds no additional support for addressing the research objective, and further, 
its presence may suppress a relevant theme from emerging. 
3.2.3 Interpretation of Results   
 Based on the interpretation of the concept map, the common themes that emerge will 
provide the framework to analyze the recommendations.  The recommendations grouped within 
each concept word on the map were reviewed to identify overlap, which provided insight into 
how Leximancer grouped the recommendations into themes, and aided the understanding of how 
the concepts are connected between themes.  This incorporated a review of the quotes that 
Leximancer had collected to illustrate the concepts.  In addition, the recommendations were 
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manually reviewed by the researchers to ensure all occurrences of repetition were captured, 
which further supported the interpretation of the context of the overall recommendation 
discussion. 
3.3 RESULTS  
3.3.1 OHS Commission Reports  
 The 10 reports span from 1967 to 2015.  The reports represented a combination of coal 
mining (60%) and hard rock mining (40%) (Table 3.2).  The average number of days from the 
date of an incident, to the date of the commission being inquired were 46.2 days (min: 5 days; 
max: 73 days), and the average duration from inquiry to publication was 552 days (min: 170 
days; max: 1996 days).  The reports on average were 280 pages in length, with the shortest report 
at 151 pages, and the longest report at 831 pages.  Overall, the sample included 2,799 pages of 
data.  Within the reports, 532 recommendations were published. On average, each report 
published 53.2 recommendations (min: 16 recommendations; max: 116 recommendations).   
Table 3.2: Description of OHS commission reports dates of incident, inquiry, and publication, 
mining type and page count evaluated in this study 
 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 TOTAL 
            
Date of 
Incident 
Oct. 21 
1966    
August 
7 1994 
May 9 
1992 
Jan. 2 
2006 
April 5 
2010 
Nov. 19 
2010   
Date 
Inquired 
July 19 
1966 
Sept. 
10 
1974 
July 
1980 
Oct. 24 
1984 
Oct. 18 
1994 
May 15 
1992 
Jan. 9 
2006 
April 13 
2010 
Dec. 14 
2010 
Dec. 
2013  
Date 
Published 
July 19 
1967 
June 30 
1976 
April 
1981 
Februar
y 1986 
April 6 
1995 
Novemb
er 1997 
July 19 
2006 
May 
2011 
Oct. 
2012 
March 
2015  
Duration 365d 659d 274d 465d 170d 1996d 191d 383d 657d 455d 562d 
            
Metalliferous 
Mining  
X X X 
     
X 4 
Coal Mining X 
   
X X X X X 
 
6 
            
Pages 151 380 422 107 102 831 124 126 448 108 2799 
Note: Not all reports selected were commissioned due to a specific accident and therefore may not have a ‘date of incident.’  
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3.3.2 Leximancer Analysis of Recommendations 
 Based on the concept map (Figure 3.1), 55 ‘word-like’ concepts, and six-key 
recommendation themes emerged, these themes were: regulatory framework, OHS hazards, 
emergency management, training, technology, and research.  Table 3.3 provides reference to the 
number of recommendations grouped within the categories, and the following subsections 
provide specific examples of recommendations repeating within the categories.  
 
Table 3.3: Number of recommendations coded per theme by report year. 
Theme Report Year Total 
 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015  
Regulatory 
Framework 
16 30 50 16 2 23 6 13 11 4 171 
OHS 
Hazards 
0 72 11 4 6 31 16 6 0 4 150 
Training 2 5 14 25 7 9 7 9 2 3 83 
Emergency 
Management  
0 0 2 5 8 5 37 11 3 3 74 
Technology 1 2 0 5 0 2 7 11 0 0 28 
Research 0 7 5 6 2 3 1 0 0 2 26 
 19 116 82 61 25 73 74 50 16 16 532 
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Figure 3.1: Concept map generated by Leximancer resulting in 6 major themes: regulatory 
framework (yellow & blue), OHS hazards (red), emergency management (green), training (light 
green), technology (green/yellow overlap), and research (purple). 
198
6 
200
6 
199
5 201
1 
201
5 199
7 
201
2 
197
6 
Emergency Management & 
Mine Rescue 
Training, Education & 
Competence 
Legislation, Regulations and 
Organizational Structure 
 
Researc
h 
Health & Safety 
Hazards 
Technol
ogy 
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Historical Analysis of Concept Map 
 In order to grasp a historical perspective, the locations of the year markers present on the 
map were reviewed (Figure 3.1), along with the values indicated in Table 3.3.  As evident by the 
map, the 1976 report appears to have focused on recommendations that were different from the 
other reports, as noted by its distinct location at the bottom of the concept map (Figure 3.1).  This 
is consistent with the number of recommendations identified relating to OHS hazards (n=72), 
being higher than found in other reports.  It is also noted that the 1976-year marker is 
encompassed within the red cluster, indicating the most frequently used.  This is consistent with 
the fact that the 1976 report had more recommendations than other reports (n=116).   
 In contrast, the 2012 Pike River report is located centrally within the yellow concept 
cluster which discussed legislation and governance, and was tightly linked to the term 
‘management’ (Figure 3.1).  Again, this is consistent with Table 3.3, which indicates the 
majority of the Pike River recommendations related to the regulatory framework (n=11).  Both 
the 2006 Sago report and 2011 Upper Big Branch reports were located in close proximity to each 
other, and swayed peripherally with the discussion around emergency management and mine 
rescue.  The Sago report had the highest number of recommendations specific to mine rescue and 
emergency management (n=37), and the Upper Big Branch report had the second highest 
frequency (n=11).  The 1995 Moura report was also placed near the discussion of emergency 
management and mine rescue which is consistent with the Table 3.3 indicating it with the third 
highest number of emergency management recommendations (n=8).  
  The 1986 report is directly linked to the terms ‘ground’ and ‘control’ and in proximity to 
the discussion of training.  This is consistent with the focus of the report, and the Table 3.3 
which indicates that the 1986 report had the highest frequency of recommendations related to 
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training.  The 1997 Westray report is also placed near the concept cluster focused on training.  
The 1967 and 1981 reports are both linked to the cluster focused on occupational health and 
safety, and committees, which is overlaid with the cluster focused on legislation and governance.  
Table 3.3 indicates that the majority of recommendations within these two reports related to 
regulatory frameworks (n=16, n=50).  Lastly, the 2015 report is placed near training, and close to 
the concept of ‘exercise’ relating to fitness standards; however, the recommendations within the 
2015 report were fairly evenly distributed between the various categories.  
 This analysis set the stage for identifying the overlap between themes discussed in the 
recommendations, specific examples of direct replication, along with identifying concepts that 
only occurred in distinct reports.  
3.3.3 Categorization of Recommendations  
Legislation, Regulations and Organizational Structure 
 A total of 171 recommendations were identified as being related to regulations and 
regulatory bodies.  Of the 171 recommendations, there were 13 sets of recommendations that 
demonstrated repetition (Table 3.4, and Appendix 3A). 
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Table 3.4 Summary of recommendations related to legislation, regulations and organizational 
structure 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Incentive Plans   X   X     
Hazard review  X        X 
Violations       X X   
Audits  X X        
Enforcement   X     X   
Leg. Revisions X X X  X X X X X X 
Revisions Org. 
Structure 
 X    X X  X  
Inspections X  X   X     
Safety 
Performance Data 
  X     X   
Mining Permits     X    X  
Communication    X  X   X  
Rights & 
Responsibilities 
  X     X   
JHSC  X X        
 
 
 The sub-theme with the most recommendations was revisions to legislation.  
Recommendations related to legislative changes were from all five countries, both types of 
mining, and were present across the full 50-year time period.  For example, recommendations 
related to incentive plans were identified in two reports, published 16 years apart, from the same 
country.  However, they were from different provincial jurisdictions, and one report was from 
hard rock mining, and one from coal mining:  
“That the government make known its intention to legislate an end to direct individual 
(or small crew) production incentive plans in Ontario mines if these plans are not 
voluntarily discontinued.” (Canada: Towards Safe Production, 1981, Page 238). 
 
“Incentive bonuses based solely on productivity have no place in a hazardous working 
environment such as an underground coal mine. Such schemes should be replaced, where 
practical, by safety...” (Canada: Westray, 1997, Page 188).  
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Health and Safety Hazards 
 A total of 150 recommendations were identified as being related to health and safety 
hazards.  Of the 150 recommendations, there were 10 sets of recommendations that overlapped 
in two or more documents (Table 3.5, and Appendix 3B). 
Table 3.5 Summary of recommendations related to occupational health and safety hazards. 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Fall protection   X X       
Inspections   X X       
Mine Lighting    X X       
Ground Control    X X  X     
Dust Standards  X    X     
Exposure Limits  X      X  X 
Accident Data 
Base 
 X  X       
Ventilation 
Standards 
 X    X X X   
Atmosphere 
Monitoring 
    X X     
Rock Dusting       X X X   
 
 The recommendations related to fall protection were identified in two reports from the 
same country, and same type of mining.  The recommendations were published 5 years apart, 
and provide an example of an initial recommendation to install equipment wherever was deemed 
practical, followed by the subsequent recommendation referring to making fall-on equipment 
installation mandatory.  
“That wherever practical, fall-on protection be installed on all man-operated 
underground equipment.” (Canada: Towards Safe Production, 1981, Page 233) 
 
“That Fall-On Protection shall be mandatory on all vehicles operating in areas 
requiring this type of protection.” (Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 
69) 
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Both the 1981 report and the 1986 report also talked about inspections: 
 “That these inspections be carried out under an auxiliary source of high intensity 
lighting.” (Canada: Towards Safe Production, 1981, Page 234) 
 
“That auxiliary high-intensity lighting be available in all active work areas to assist in 
ground-control- related activities such as inspection and scaling.” (Canada: Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 64) 
Again, these recommendations were published 5 years apart, and provide an example of a 
repeating recommendation related to conducting underground inspections with auxiliary high-
intensity light. Recommendations regarding rock dusting were only present in coal mining 
reports:  
“A mine operator should file with the regulator a copy of the stonedusting program for 
the mine, including the method and frequency of testing; the type of testing equipment 
used; the type and number of dust-spreading machines used; the frequency of dusting; 
and the location and quantity of stonedust stored in the mine for emergencies (as opposed 
to normal usage).” (Canada: Westray, 1997, Page 350) 
 
“Adequate rock dusting of the area prior to sealing must be required. Operators must be 
required to bulk dust each entry and crosscut prior to the start of the sealing process. The 
final seals should not be installed until the area is inspected and the agencies are 
satisfied the area has been sufficiently rock dusted” (USA: Sago, 2006, Page 9) 
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“Mechanized rock dusting must be conducted in all portions of underground mines, as 
well as the installation of “passive barriers” to help stop ignitions from turning into 
large explosions, such as occurred at Upper Big Branch.” (USA: Upper Big Branch, 
2012, Page 110) 
Rock dusting is a procedure conducted in coal mining, therefore it was not identified in any hard-
rock mining reports.  These recommendations came from two countries, and spanned a 14-year 
period.  Therefore, this repetition indicates that rock dusting programs continue to be considered 
in accident investigations, and the formulation of recommendations. 
Training, Education & Competence 
 A total of 83 recommendations were identified as being related to training, skills and 
qualifications.  Of the 83 recommendations, 10 sets of recommendations were found to overlap 
in two or more documents (Table 3.6, and Appendix 3C). 
Table 3.6 Summary of recommendations related to training, education and competence. 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Training 
Engineers 
X X X X       
Modular Training  X X X   X X   
Joint Training    X X      X 
Ground Control   X  X  X     
Rock Mechanics   X   X     
Refresher Courses    X X X    X 
Inspector 
Training 
  X    X    
Certification   X  X X  X X  
Training Records      X X    
Emergency 
Situations  
   X   X X   
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The following examples demonstrate the repetition of recommendations regarding the training 
and education of engineers:  
“… in order to ensure that only suitably qualified engineers are employed for site 
investigation, a Panel of Approved Engineers should be established on lines similar to 
those set up under the Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Act, 1930, as amplified in a Report 
on Reservoir Safety by the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1966…” (United Kingdom: 
Aberfan, 1967, Page 126) 
 
“That engineering schools review and redefine their responsibility to the profession to 
ensure that graduates are more keenly aware of and responsive to the impact of 
technological design upon the occupational health and safety of workers” (Canada: 
Royal Commission, 1976, Page 205) 
 
“That each mining company operating in Ontario employ at least one professional 
engineer with post-graduate qualification in rock mechanics and that a person holding 
such qualification be used in the design and planning of a mine or mine expansion and 
that a person holding such qualification be made responsible for the company’s ground 
control program.” (Canada: Towards Safe Production, 1981, Page 233) 
 
“That instruction in ground control be integrated into the undergraduate programs in 
mining engineering. The Rock Mechanics and Strata Control Committee of the 
Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy shall be asked to affect this change through 
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the organization of a National Forum on mining-related ground control education.” 
(Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 56) 
 The examples provided illustrate the repetition of recommendations regarding the 
emergency training: 
“That the necessary additional training in non-fire emergencies be developed by a 
tripartite committee consisting of representatives of mine management, unions, and 
government.” (Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 63) 
“Training for SCSR donning and escape must be wholly separate from all other types of 
training miners currently receive. This training must be repeated every 90 days”. (USA: 
Sago, 2006, Page 12) 
“SCSR training should be conducted quarterly, instead of annually.” (USA: Upper Big 
Branch, 2011, Page 113) 
“SCSR and escape training must be done in actual conditions underground and, to the 
extent possible, reflect real-life emergency situations. Miners must don the SCSR training 
model and walk at least a portion of the escape-way.” (USA: Sago, 2006, Page 12) 
“SCSR training should be realistic and conducted in actual mining situations, such as 
riding in a man-trip and working on a longwall. It should incorporate a variety of actual 
in-mine scenarios for which the SCSR must be donned and activated. The training should 
emphasize the importance of activating the SCSR at the very first warning of an 
emergency.” (USA: Upper Big Branch, 2011, Page 113) 
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This example demonstrates repetition in recommendations of the broader concept of emergency 
training but also demonstrates repetitions in specific aspects of that training (i.e. frequency of 
training, and training in actual mining situations).  These recommendations came from two 
different countries, and there is a distinction between the type of emergency training.  In the hard 
rock mining environment, the recommendation relates to non-fire emergencies, and in the coal 
mining environment it relates to SCSR training.  Within the coal mining reports that were 
published 5 years apart, there is distinct repetition in the recommendations relating to the 
frequency of the training and the training occurring in actual mining situations.   
Emergency Management and Mine Rescue  
 A total of 74 recommendations were identified as being related to emergency 
management and mine rescue. Of the 74 recommendations, there were 9 sets of 
recommendations overlapped in two or more documents (Table 3.7, and Appendix 3D). 
Table 3.7 Summary of recommendations related to emergency management and mine rescue. 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Competitions      X X    
Emergency 
Response Plans 
    X X  X X X 
Team Availability        X X   
Roles in 
Emergencies   
  X X   X   X 
Investigation 
Procedures 
      X X   
Rescue Team 
Requirements  
      X X  X 
Emergency 
Communication 
      X X   
Certification           
Rescue 
Equipment 
   X  X X X   
Emergency 
Facilities  
   X X  X  X  
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 Recommendations regarding emergency facilities were discussed in four reports, from 
different countries, and both metalliferous and coal mining reports, spanning a 26-year period:  
 “That manway sizes, escape routes and refuge stations be sufficient to accommodate 
rescue operations.” (Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 63) 
 
“Accordingly, it is recommended that the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines set up a working 
party, comprising persons with appropriate knowledge and experience, to examine and 
report on a range of issues relating to emergency escape facilities.” (Australia: Moura, 
1995, Page 67) 
 
“Safety chambers and safe havens should be required in all mining operations. The 
Union notes that these are two distinct systems and they cannot be used 
interchangeably.” (USA: Sago, 2006, Page 13) 
 
“To support effective emergency management, operators of underground coal mines 
should be required to have modern equipment and facilities: Operators should be 
required to have equipment and facilities suitable for self-rescue by workers during an 
emergency; Operators should be required to include, in their emergency management 
plans, provisions for continued monitoring of underground atmospheric conditions 
during an emergency; and Operators should be required to install facilities that will 
support emergency mine sealing and inertisation.” (New Zealand: Pike River, 2012, 
Page 365) 
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These examples suggest that regardless of time or geography recommendations for emergency 
underground facilities continue to appear in the commissioned reports.  Another strong example 
of repetition is evident in the recommendations for emergency response plans and procedures 
through five similar recommendations from four countries:  
“It is recommended that mines be required to put in place Mine Safety Management 
Plans to cater for key risk areas.” (Australia: Moura, 1995, Page 62) 
“Every mine operator, indeed, every industrial plant or facility, should have a well-
defined and comprehensive emergency procedures manual…” (Canada: Westray, 1997, 
Page 560) 
“Mine operators’ emergency response plans (ERPs) must be treated more than just more 
paperwork. ERPs should be developed collaboratively with miners, their families, local 
responders, and mine rescue team members, and revised based on mine-specific drills 
and table-top exercises.” (USA: Upper Big Branch, 2011, Page 112) 
“Emergency management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention: Operators 
of underground coal mines should be required by legislation to have a current and 
comprehensive emergency management plan that is audited and tested regularly; The 
emergency management plan should be developed in consultation with the workers and 
the Mines Rescue Service; The emergency management plan should specify the facilities 
available within the mine, such as emergency equipment, refuges and changeover 
stations, and emergency exits…” (Australia: Pike River, 2012, Page 354) 
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“The Ministry of Labour to require mining companies to conduct risk assessments to 
establish Emergency Response Plans for exploration sites, new mines, surface mines and 
mining plants.” (Canada: Mining Review, 2015, Page 40) 
These four examples suggest that over this 20-year period recommendations that related to 
emergency response plans and procedures in mining were consistently part of commission 
findings.   
Research  
 A total of 26 recommendations were identified as being related to research.  Of the 26 
recommendations, 3 sets of recommendations overlapped in two or more documents (Table 3.8 
and Appendix 3E).  
Table 3.8 Summary of recommendations related to research 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Broad Requests    X X       
Mine Lighting    X X       
Communication     X   X    
 
 Although the earlier recommendation relates to radio devices, and the latter refers to 
wireless communication, the following example provides an indication that despite technological 
advances, research into mine communications systems reappeared as a recommendation:        
 “That research to perfect the development of an effective radio communication device 
for use underground be continued and accelerated, with active government support”. 
(Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 58) 
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“MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund and direct continued studies and research 
to develop a new generation of wireless communications technology”. (USA: Sago, 
2006, Page 11) 
These recommendation examples came from two different countries, different mine 
environments (hard rock and coal mining), and were published 20 years apart.  Another broader 
example is the repetition in the recommendations for mine lighting.  In 1981 mine lighting 
research was a stand-alone recommendation, but in 1986 it was grouped into a broader request 
for research:  
“That an independent authority in the field of mine lighting be retained to direct and co-
ordinate the research effort” (Canada: Towards Safe Production, 1981, Page 234).  
 
“Among the subjects the organization shall consider for funding are the following: Rock 
bursts, Destressing, Backfill,…, Scaling, Pillar design and recovery,…, Ground 
support,…, Monitoring and testing of ground conditions, Mine Lighting, Computer 
modelling, and Equipment design and mechanization as it applies to hazardous ground 
conditions” (Canada: Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 51).  
These two recommendations demonstrate a shorter time period, with only 5 years between 
publications.  Further, both of these examples came from the same country and the same type of 
mining environment.  
 
Technology  
 A total of 28 recommendations were identified as being related to technology.  Of the 28 
recommendations, 4 sets of recommendations overlapped in two or more documents (Table 3.8 
and Appendix 3F).    
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Table 3.9 Summary of recommendations related to technology 
Sub-Theme 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Changing 
Technology   
 X    X     
Tracking Devices        X X   
Communication 
System  
X      X X   
Monitoring 
Systems  
   X    X   
 
The recommendations related to technological changes demonstrated that regardless of the 
different technologies available at the time, the industries response to technological advances 
still requires attention:  
 “That task groups set up by the Occupational Health and Safety Authority to advise on 
codes of practice and statutory regulations relating to technological change in mining 
include representatives of labour” (Canada: Royal Commission, 1976, Page 163). 
 
“The mine's joint occupational health and safety committee should periodically review 
training standards, policies, and programs to make sure that they adequately reflect 
changing technology and mining conditions and practice within the mine” (Canada: 
Westray, 1997, Page 133).   
 
These examples came from the same country; however, they represent different types of mining, 
and were published 21 years apart.  Another example concerns tracking devices which were 
discussed in 2006 and 2011 reports:  
“Tracking devices that can identify the location of miners at all times underground must 
be required at all operations. Such technology is currently available and MSHA must 
require mine operators to provide these devises to all miners working underground. Any 
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system that can increase the ability for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is 
limited in scope, must be utilized” (USA, Sago, 2006, Page 12). 
 
“Immediate implementation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel-recording 
system to formally identify and locate all personnel who are underground at a given time, 
including supervisory personnel.  Redefine the state and federal regulations to ensure 
that no one, including management, goes underground without a tagging device.” (USA, 
Upper Big Branch, 2011, Page 110).   
 
These examples illustrate the use of different terminology relating to the same concept of 
personnel tracking.  These two reports were published within 5 years of each other, in the same 
country, and both from the coal mining industry.  The repetition in this recommendation 
indicates that it may not have been implemented as the first example recommended, resulting in 
the restating of the importance of these systems 5 years later.  Overlap in recommendations 
regarding monitoring systems were present in the 1986, and 2011 reports:  
“Operators must assess the adequacy of rock dust through direct readout explosibility 
meters and submit these results electronically to regulatory agencies.” (Canada: Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, Page 69) 
 
“Operators must be required to use real-time continuous monitoring for explosive 
methane gas and respirable dust in coal mines.” (USA: Upper Big Branch, 2011, Page 
110) 
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These recommendations came from two different countries, different mining types and were 
published 25 years apart.  Although the two monitoring systems referenced in the 
recommendation are different, they are similar in the requirements for the operator to administer 
direct readout/ real-time monitoring.  
3.4 DISCUSSION 
 The findings of this study provided an opportunity to retrospectively analyze mining 
commissioned report recommendations from the past 50 years.  The aim of this study was to 
identify if there were any recommendations that were consistently reappearing in English 
language mining inquiries, over the past 50 years; and to determine if there were any similarities 
between coal mining and metalliferous mining accident report recommendations.  The results of 
this study have captured the numerous repeating recommendations, and have provided evidence 
of similar recommendations between coal mining and metalliferous mining.  This study further 
provides evidence for how centralized the overall focus has been, as all recommendations fell 
into 6 key themes, as captured by the visual concept map (Figure 3.1).  
Legislation, Regulations and Organizational Structure 
 As depicted in the concept map (Figure 3.1), recommendations focusing on legislative 
changes and regulations were present in all commissions analyzed in the study.  This is 
consistent with what is expected in the literature, as legislative changes offer a direct means to 
improve safety related outcomes: “OHS legislation is essential as a first step for the 
implementation of improved measures for safety and health as well as the prevention of 
accidents and diseases in the world of work” (ILO, 2016).  Every commission included in the 
study had recommendations focused on legislation and regulations.  Although legislative changes 
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and regulations are fundamental for improving OHS outcomes, the presence of rules or 
guidelines does not ensure they will be followed (Wood & Bandura, 1989).  Hopkins (2002) 
further highlighted this issue when he argued that the issue is not whether the organization has a 
reporting system; it is whether, as a matter of practice, errors and near misses are reported.  In 
essence, regardless of the recommendations to update legislation and corresponding regulations 
within the mining industry, if the frontline workers are not involved in a company with a positive 
safety culture, these recommendations could fall on deaf ears.  Therefore, not only do future 
studies need to consider the formulation of the recommendations, but in order to address the 
implementation of the recommendations, to make sure they are reaching the frontline workers, 
additional factors such as the company’s safety culture at the time of the incident, including 
reporting culture, need to be incorporated.  Not only do we want to continue to ensure the 
legislation and regulations are changed and updated as necessary, but we need to also ensure the 
workers are receiving the new recommendations for their own safety.  
Health and Safety Hazards  
 The primary differences identified in the recommendations between coal mining and 
metalliferous mining related to the type of hazards.  For example, repeating ventilation concerns 
were evident in coal mining reports, whereas occupational diseases were more evident as 
repeating concerns in metalliferous mining reports (Table 3.5).  However, there were some 
instances where hazard recommendations, from both types of mining, were focused on the same 
hazard, for example dust standards and mine lighting (Table 3.5).  This provides further support 
for the sharing of knowledge across the industry and global landscape.  
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Emergency Management and Mine Rescue  
 Emergency management and mine rescue recommendations were identified in almost all 
reports studied.  Given that the investigation process is a retrospective analysis that reviews the 
events leading up to an accident these findings are not unexpected.  Since the rescue efforts are 
the final aspect of the accident, and are therefore easily inspected because they do not involve 
long-term recall of events or causal factors that may have occurred days, weeks, or months prior 
to the accident.  Based on our analysis of the emergency management and mine rescue 
recommendations, it appears that some of the recommendations are still focusing on providing 
reactive responses (Table 3.7).  For example, there was a selection of recommendations related 
to self-contained self-rescue (SCSR) devices (Appendix 3D).  Although these devices can save 
lives if functioning correctly, they are one of the least effective means of protection based on the 
hierarchy of controls (Figure 2.1).  Therefore, if recommendations are focusing and prioritizing 
these types of control mechanisms as solutions, it would seem that larger organizational 
malfunctions are not being addressed.   
Training, Education & Competence 
 The findings identified recommendations related to training, education and competence 
in all of the reports analyzed.  These recommendations covered the who (i.e. engineers, 
supervisors), what (i.e. ground control, emergency), where (i.e. simulated environment), when 
(i.e. college, refresher courses), and how (i.e. joint training, modular) the industry learns (Table 
3.6).  Although structured learning is critical, understanding an organization’s unstructured 
learning, or learning culture, is also important.  Learning theorists emphasize that as innovation 
and systems becoming more complex, organizations have an increasing need to function as a 
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learning culture, where learning adaptation is a continuously evolving process.  Schein (1985) 
stated that in order to change, a shift is required in the basic assumptions that result from past 
learning.  Assumptions are embedded and sustained by an organizations culture.  In order to 
implement change in an organization, it must incorporate theories of organizational design and 
culture (Levinthal & March, 1993).  Therefore, when evaluating an organization, design factors, 
such as: policies, procedures, compensation and organizational structure should be considered; 
however, documenting cultural norms, unwritten rules of work, the political system, and 
informal leaders may provide further benefit to achieving desired outcomes (Mento, Jones & 
Dirndorfer, 2002).  If an organization has a strong learning culture, not only are the employees 
technically competent, but the organizational structure will be able to accommodate change, and 
identify and eliminate latent organizational issues that may challenge the system in the future.  
Research & Technology 
 The findings of this study identified that repetition was evident related to research and 
technology recommendations, which continued to call for the development or adoption of new 
technologies or studies.  The adaptation over time of recommendations related to technological 
advances and research, is supported by the literature on framing theory.  It is known that 
concepts can transform over time, as new information is provided (Widmer & Kubat, 1996).  
However, as new issues are often variants of older issues that have been discussed in the past 
(Chong & Druckman, 2007), the repetition in this theme may also provide evidence for a need to 
improve the industries’ reaction to incorporating change. 
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Summary of Potential Reasons Why Recommendations Repeat 
 In 2015, there were hundreds of traumatic fatalities in the global mining industry, 
including, but not limited to, the United States (n=28), Canada (n=5), the United Kingdom (n=1), 
Australia (n=12), and New Zealand (n=5) (MSHA, 2016; WSN, 2016; HSE UK, 2016; 
SafeWork AUS, 2016; WorkSafe NZ, 2016).  Unfortunately, these statistics, and the findings of 
this study demonstrate that “lessons learnt from past tragedies do not automatically translate 
into better health and safety practices for the future” (Pike River, 2012).  Despite the numerous 
commissions and inquiries previously established, and the resulting recommendations, similar 
accidents continue to occur around the world. Inquiries have the power to collect a wealth of 
information and provide opportunities to impact the industry in a substantial way.  However, 
inquiries and reports are only effective if industries and governments learn from them and 
implement their learnings.  To continue to see repetitions amongst recommendations across 
decades, warrants consideration for how these recommendations are formulated, implemented, 
and evaluated.  The remainder of this section will reference sources from across the literature, 
including: change management, learning theories, organizational culture, and accident 
investigations to highlight ten potential reasons why recommendations repeat: 
 
1. Change management is complex 
 Change management is a multifaceted process incorporating analytical, 
educational/learning, political and cultural processes (Pettigrew, 1985; Pettigrew & Whipp, 
1991; Johnson, 1990; Pettigrew, Ferlie and McKee, 1992), and as a result, resistance to change 
can be multidimensional.  If implemented poorly, change can negatively impact organizational 
commitment, workplace climate, morale, compliance, stress, cynicism, workplace withdrawal 
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(e.g., absenteeism and lateness), employee turnover, resistance, and receptivity (Mossholder et 
al., 1995; Gilmore, Shea & Useem, 1997; Becker, 1992; Becker et al., 1996; Meyer & Allen, 
1997; Clarke et al., 1996).  These negative outcomes can then become barriers for future change, 
and therefore should be considered in future frameworks for planning and implementing 
organizational change.  The consequences of these barriers are evidenced in Dalziel and 
Schoonover’s (1988) findings that organizations with patterns of resistance are likely to be 
repeated.  Studies in other industries have found similar findings, of organization’s being more 
likely to repeat changes they have previously experienced (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991; Meyer, 
Brooks & Goes, 1990).  Therefore, if the recommendations are not approached with a clear 
change management protocol they are prone to fail, not reappear as a recommendation in a future 
report.  
 
2. Feasibility  
 Another key aspect to consider when addressing repeating recommendations is the 
feasibility of the proposed change.  In this case, feasibility refers to how easily or conveniently a 
recommendation can be implemented, and the practicality of the change.  Although inquiry 
bodies generally engage content experts, there is the potential for a recommendation to be made 
that cannot be feasibly implemented.  This was recently addressed in the Scottish Parliament 
report on the Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Bill (2015), when it was 
proposed to legislate mandatory compliance to Sheriff recommendations.  It was argued that to 
make recommendations legally enforceable would lead to numerous problems, including that 
recommendations may not be practicable or affordable, and may result in the inquiry becoming 
adversarial.  This is founded on the fact that inquiries do not always cover all of the issues 
present, and may address individuals, or groups, not present or represented during the inquiry.  
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Further, there can be risks associated to the implemented change that may not have been 
identified or discussed prior to the recommendation being made, and could also have wider 
implications that need to be considered in a broader context.  In the mining context, although it is 
not being suggested that recommendations become mandatory under legislation, some of the 
practical implications of feasibility discussed in Scotland are relevant to consider for why 
recommendations may be repeating.  
 
3. Communication  
 In the change management literature, it is evident that communication is a foundational 
aspect of change.  Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer (2002) stated that the process in which change is 
introduced sets the tone for recipients with respect to acceptance or rejection.  For example, what 
was uniquely noted in the recommendation analysis, is that there were occasions where an initial 
recommendation ‘suggested’ a change, and the following report published x-years later would 
restate the recommendation with stronger language, such as ‘regulate’ or ‘mandate.’  For 
example, in 1981 it was recommended that “that wherever practical, fall-on protection be 
installed on all man-operated underground equipment” (Burkett et al., 1981, p.233), five years 
later in 1986 it was recommended that “Fall-On Protection shall be mandatory on all vehicles 
operating in areas requiring this type of protection” (Stevenson et al., 1986, p.69).  Other terms 
provide leeway for interpretation, such as “manway sizes, escape routes and refuge stations be 
sufficient to accommodate rescue operations” (Ground Control & Mine Rescue, 1986, p.63) or 
“every effort should be made to coordinate the emergency response of the federal, state and local 
agencies” (Sago, 2006, p.14).  Individuals interpretations of sufficient, and every effort may be 
drastically different.  If a recommendation for change leaves room for interpretation errors, it 
may lead to organizational resistance to change.   
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 Another key aspect of communication to consider is whom the recommendation is 
addressing.  In 2015, the Scottish Parliament published a report on the Inquiries into Fatal 
Accidents and Sudden Deaths Bill.  This Bill was introduced with the aim of reforming the law 
in relation to fatal accident inquiries (FAIs).  A key issue that was addressed was the lack of 
implementation in the past, which was attributed to the lack of awareness of the party addressed 
through the recommendation.  There is similar evidence of this in the recommendations 
examined, where ambiguity is left for who the authors were speaking to, or hoping for the 
recommendation to reach.  In step four of Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer’s (2002) change 
framework, it is reiterated that implementation plans should include clear responsibilities for the 
strategists, implementers (i.e. management, supervisors, OHS specialists on-site, government) 
and recipients (i.e. front line workers).  Therefore, if the target audience is not aware of the 
recommendation, it may remain unanswered, and at risk of repeating.  Another potential reason 
why recommendations repeat is the comprehensiveness of the recommendation.  For example, if 
a recommendation is published that provides little support to the reader interpreting it, the reader 
may be less likely to attempt to uncover the meaning.   
 Further, researchers acknowledge that communicating the message in the same way will 
not have the desired affect at different hierarchical levels of the organization, and can be greatly 
impacted by the perceptions, and the frame of reference (FOR) that individuals have towards 
safety.  An individual’s unique FOR relates to the resistance or openness to change (Jick, 1991; 
Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer, 2002).  Armenakis & Bedeian (1999) identified five components 
that should be incorporated in communicating change effectively: (1) discrepancy (i.e., we need 
to change); (2) self-efficacy (i.e., we have the capability to successfully change); (3) personal 
valence (i.e., it is in our best interest to change); (4) principal support (i.e., those affected are 
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behind the change); and (5) appropriateness (i.e., the desired change is right for the focal 
organization).  Therefore, the way change is communicated needs to adapt within the 
organizational context (Mintzberg, 1973; Wood & Bandura, 1989).  If communicated 
incorrectly, individuals may not trust the change, and may question if adopting the 
recommendation will make a difference.  Using Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer’s (2002) term from 
step 2 of his change model, the ‘change recipients’ represent the largest group of people that 
must adapt to the change, and must be convinced that the change will benefit them.  Therefore, if 
a change initiative lacks credibility with any of the targeted audiences, or sub-cultures of an 
organization, “the initiative is dead before it even begins” (p.50).  This may indicate a need to 
further consider how recommendations are formulated to repeat, and the specific semantic 
considerations for how they will be interpreted by industry, as this may.  
 
4. Accountability & Compliance 
 As discussed in communication considerations, whom a recommendation addresses, can 
also be discussed from the perspective of accountability.  Many of the recommendations do not 
directly identify who is being held accountable for the change being proposed.  
Recommendations which specifically state an organization do not leave room for questioning 
whom the authoring body is placing accountability on, for example: 
“MSHA should rescind its regulation that permits alternative materials and methods for 
constructing seals, and immediately require that all seals be explosion-proof seals or 
bulkheads, as is required by Section 303(y)(2) and (3) of the Federal Mine Safety and 
Health Act of 1977” (Sago, 2006, p.10). 
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In contrast, a recommendation that does not specifically state who is responsible for actioning 
the change, leaves rooms for individuals to assume someone else will be accountable, for 
example: 
“Current communication systems must be hardened (reinforced to withstand the forces of 
an explosion) to increase their survivability” (Sago, 2006, p.11). 
The Scottish Inquiries into Fatal Accidents and Sudden Deaths Bill is addressing this same 
concern by outlining that when a Sheriff makes recommendations, the relevant 
person/organization, whom the recommendations are addressed, has 8-weeks to respond 
explaining how they will implement, or why they will not be implementing the recommendation.  
This therefore addresses both accountability, and feasibility as discussed earlier.  Further, 
holding individuals/organizations accountable provides a greater ability to measure/monitor 
compliance.   
 
5. Knowledge Sharing 
 As evidenced by the findings related to OHS hazards, there were numerous 
recommendations overlapping between the types of mining (Table 3.5).  This provides support 
for highlighting the lack sharing, across the industry and global landscape, as a potential factor in 
repeating recommendations.  For example, the Pike River (2012) report mandated a 
“compar[ison] with any similar matters in other countries” (p.7).  Upper Big Branch (2010) 
referenced that “lifelines were already general practice in a number of other countries” (p.47), 
and Sago (2006) said “MSHA did not require the use of tracking devices to locate trapped miners 
underground, even though such technology has been available for over 30 years and is used 
widely in other countries” (p.IV).  The recent Mining Review (2015) has again recommended the 
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need to share information on emerging injury and illness trends and information on incidents 
causing injury across the industry (recommendation 6.1), and has also recommended looking to 
other industries (i.e. transportation, military and healthcare) to see how mining compares in 
terms of worker fatigue (recommendation 1.3).  If information was more readily shared between 
company to company, country to country, and industry to industry there would be a greater 
number of learning opportunities, and potentially a reduction in repetition.  Flyvbjerg (2001) 
views accident investigations as case studies and has shown that conclusions can go beyond the 
individual case.  This perspective further illustrates that there is an opportunity for 
recommendations to have benefits beyond the particular care.  
 
6. Failure to Identify Root Cause  
 If a recommendation is repeating, there is also the potential that it is failing to address the 
root cause, and thus the same accident is occurring.  Preoccupations with certain influences can 
detract attention from other underlying failures, which can sway the recommendations.  For 
example, the inquiry into the Moura mine disaster (1995), a methane gas explosion killing eleven 
men in Australia, blamed the disaster on technical failures and management neglect.  However, 
Hopkins (2000) studied the disaster using a different sociological approach and identified that 
there was a very influential culture of denial, which led to misbeliefs of vulnerability to hazards, 
dismissing warning signs, and the normalization of deviance, contributing to the disasters 
occurrence.  This illustrates that the best way to “prevent recurrence is not to focus on a discrete 
set of causes but to identify some background factor that, if changed, would prevent a 
recurrence” (Hopkins, 2013, p.5).  This has also been evident in other studies following accident 
inquiries, such as Vaughan’s (1996) rejection of the prevalent explanations of the cause of the 
NASA Challenger disaster.  The Presidential Commission into the disaster attributed the cause of 
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the accident to a technical failure of the O-ring, which seals a critical joint of the solid rocket 
booster.  Vaughan used a sociological approach to identify deeper root causes of the failure, 
including the culture at NASA and the normalization of deviance.  Vaughan further described 
that NASA’s culture provided “a way of seeing that was simultaneously a way of not seeing” 
(1996, p.394).  Researchers must recognize that the findings identified in an investigation report 
are influenced by how the investigation was conducted and the political and social climate of the 
time.  Therefore, if the same preconceived causal factors are assumed to have been the primary 
influences, the same recommendations will be produced. 
 
7. Prioritization of Recommendations 
 The number of recommendations published in the reports was highly variable, with 
reports ranging from 16 recommendations to 116 recommendations.  Although it was beyond the 
scope of this study to directly address the relationship between the number of recommendations 
published, and how many are fully implemented, it is interesting to consider how the 
prioritization of recommendations and number published may be factors in repetition.  If an 
organization is approaching the recommendations with some degree of financial, resource, or 
human capital limitations, the recommendations may be reprioritized by the organization.  This 
therefore may result in recommendations not being implemented, and repeating in subsequent 
reports.   
 
8. Turnover of Employees – Lessons Lost 
 A key aspect of an organization’s ability to capture new learning is how it facilitates the 
dissemination of that learning to current and future employees (Marsick & Watkins, 2003).  The 
forecasted changes with staffing in the Ontario Mining industry, provide even greater emphasis 
on the importance of organizational learning.  It is projected that by 2018, approximately 50% of 
  107 
 
Ontario miners will exit the industry (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2009) creating 
large hiring requirements and training needs (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2013), 
along with the wealth of organizational knowledge and history that those workers may possess.  
It was reported that the Ontario mining industry usually has 14,900 new workers over 10 years, 
however, current estimates report that the sector may require up to 59,000 new employees by 
2023 (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2013).  Turnover of employees can be 
associated to lost lessons.  For example, four serious accidents in the UK chemical industry 
repeated 10 or more years later in the same company; however, not always the same unit.  Kletz 
(1993) attributed this “with the passage of time and changes in staff, the recommendations made 
after the original accidents were forgotten” (p.4).  Kletz (1993) emphasized that “organizations 
have no memory; only people have memories and they move on” (p.4).  Learning theory tells us 
that individuals learn by their own experience, however it is unusual for the same accident to 
occur to the same person twice, and people are slower to learn from the experience of others.  
The individuals that experience an accident, or are even employed by an organization at the time 
of an accident, are more likely to remember it.  Therefore, changes that come of the accident are 
more likely to be understood by those workers.  However, when those workers leave, the 
memory of why the change occurred may dissipate with them.  This can relate back to why 
recommendations may repeat, because similar accidents may reoccur, resulting in the same 
changes being suggested.  
9.  Act of God 
 As research in accident investigation and accident theory has progressed, understandings of 
accidents have evolved.  It is now understood that disasters in large-scale technological systems 
are not chance events, unexpected combinations of circumstances, or an Act of God (Pidgeon, 
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1997; Dechy et al., 2012).  Through analyzing the reports, it was noted that many of them 
reference the idea of accidents being an ‘Act of God’ and dispute it as a factor, for example:     
“The belief that accidents are a chance event, or ‘Act of God’, would lead to no attempt 
being made to tabulate incidence, since it would serve no purpose” (Towards Safe 
Production, 1981, p.60)  
“Based on the Union’s investigation, and contrary to other assertions, it is not factual to 
say that events beyond the control of the mine operator or the regulatory agencies simply 
happened. Nor is it accurate to state the explosion was “an act of God,” and thus 
unavoidable” (Sago, 2006, p.49) 
“If, for example, it were determined that the explosion and deaths were the result of an 
“act of God” – something over which the owner had no control and could not have 
predicted, the company could argue that it would have no legal liability” (Upper Big 
Branch, 2010, p.70). 
As a reader, this leads you to believe that although the literature has shown these accidents are 
not ‘acts of God’, this may still be a conviction held by individuals in the industry.  This relates 
to recommendation repetition, because if an individual believes the events were out of the 
control of mine managers, or individuals involved, they may not be as vested in supporting the 
recommendations.   
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10. Culture 
 Lastly, the final consideration that will be reviewed as a potential factor for repeating 
recommendations is the role of safety culture.  The literature has recognized that OHS 
management systems are not effective in workplaces with a poor safety culture (Hale & Hovden, 
1998).  This message is still being reiterated 19 years later by Kim, Park & Park (2016), in their 
acknowledgement that many organizations that have introduced new OHS management 
strategies have failed to show improved effectiveness because these strategies did not consider 
the impact of the organizational culture.  Kim Park & Park (2016) view safety culture as three 
components: psychological, behavioural, and situational.  The psychological component consists 
of shared values, attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that drive decisions and behaviors regarding 
safety.  The behavioral component is defined as the methods concerning safety in the workplace, 
and the situational component are the policies, procedures, regulations, organizational structures, 
and management systems related to safety.  From the perspective of these three components, and 
reflecting on the recommendations reviewed in this study, it is clear that the recommendations 
are primarily situational, with some behavioural components.  This indicates that the 
psychological component has been vastly underrepresented in the recommendations produced in 
these OHS mining commissions.  Other industries, and organizations, like the Health and Safety 
Commission, in the United Kingdom, have acknowledged that lessons learnt from previous 
accidents indicate that it is critical to create a corporate culture where safety is accepted as the 
number one priority (1993).  Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer’s (2002) framework outlines that 
change needs to be rooted in the existing culture; and if a disconnect exists between the culture 
and the change, culture can diminish the strength of the change initiative.  Therefore, although it 
is clearly recognized that technological improvements, engineering controls, regulations, and 
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management systems reduce risks in the workplace, addressing safety culture is crucial for 
further risk reduction and for promoting a prevention culture (Kim, Park, Park, 2016).  
3.5 LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 While the study encompasses 50 years, 5 countries, and 10 reports, it is not without 
limitations, and there are numerous avenues of future research that can stem from the findings 
presented.  Firstly, although the sample itself was large in scope, including over 2,000 pages of 
data, there could have been a more diverse number of reports included.  The countries included 
in the study were all English-speaking countries, that are considered to have good OHS standards 
and practices.  Therefore, having incorporated additional countries that may not have as robust 
standards for safety may have provided a more diverse discussion.   
 Secondly, it is also important to acknowledge that commissioned reports, or investigation 
reports, have the potential to be influenced by the authoring body.  Therefore, this thesis is 
limited to the interpretation of what was published as recommendations.  It is acknowledged that 
there may have been discussion throughout the investigation process that further outlined 
recommended actions that were not captured in this data, or that were not included because of 
prioritization.   
 The breadth of the recommendations published were highly variable, with reports ranging 
from 16 recommendations to 116 recommendations.  Although this was not a limitation of the 
study, as a comprehensive review was conducted utilizing Leximancer, and the researchers read 
all cases of repetition to verify, it identifies a unique opportunity for the future.  Future studies 
could more specifically look at the number of recommendations published, and how many are 
fully implemented, to see if there is an optimal number for the industry to help prioritize future 
change management.  
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 Further studies could be conducted to assess affective and behavioural reactions to 
organizational change within the mining industry, following substantial reviews or commissions 
such as those included in this study.  In various industries, researchers have investigated 
reactions to change (i.e. Orlikowski, 1996) and have successfully identified best-practices.  This 
could therefore be conducted for the mining industry, to assist in identifying protocols for future 
change management processes.  
 Lastly, future research could further address the recently published comprehensive Mining 
Review (2015) of the health, safety and prevention issues related to underground mining in 
Ontario.  The review published 18 recommendations for the industry to focus on and address. 
Circling back to the research objective, this study demonstrated a methodology for conducting a 
historical review which addressed an array of reports simultaneously.  This methodology could 
be specifically applied to answer recommendation 5.2 from the Mining Review (2015), which 
requests a method for “aggregate analysis of all past inquests into mining fatalities…[and] to 
use the analysis to improve future inquests into fatalities in the mining sector.”  
3.6 IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
 The finding from this study reiterate the importance of reviewing what has already been 
published to ensure that all possible lessons have been learned, and not forgotten, from the past. 
With the 2015 mining review, there is a new round of recommendations, and a new opportunity 
for researchers, and industry stakeholders to be reminded of what we can learn from past reports.  
Further, it is an opportunity to tackle the current recommendations with solutions that not only 
address hazards through engineering controls, regulations and legislation, but that incorporate a 
broader approach to ensure that the industry does not see these recommendations republished in 
the future.  The findings of this study have additional relevance to how governments 
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contemplating a future public inquiry and future commissions might approach it. The findings 
are therefore relevant to governments, commission counsels, lawyers, researchers, and others 
directly involved or influenced by future public inquiries.  This research has further identified a 
new methodology for continued research in this area, using big data analysis techniques to learn 
from past recommendations.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Analysis of Safety Culture in Occupational Health and Safety Mining Commissioned 
Reports: A 50 Year Review  
 
 
ABSTRACT The objective of this study was to investigate how safety culture has been 
addressed, in ten commissioned, occupational health and safety (OHS) reports from the mining 
industry internationally, spanning the past 50 years.  The investigation incorporated a computer 
assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) and the theoretical structure of framing, to review 
publically available English language reports.  To conduct the analysis, a safety culture 
dictionary was developed and seeded into the CAQDAS to determine if/how safety culture has 
been framed, and to identify the language used to frame the concept.  The analysis highlighted 
the use of various terms for safety culture throughout the 50-year history, with a particular 
emphasis on the fact that the term safety culture was not directly referenced in the selected 
reports until 1997.  Therefore, it is evident from the findings that although safety culture was 
discussed, it was not a consideration in the formation of the recommendations.   
KEYWORDS OHS; Mining; Safety Culture; Leximancer 
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4.1 INTRODUCTION  
 Mining currently accounts for 1% of the global workforce, approximately 30 million 
workers, but is responsible for 8% of fatal accidents at work (ILO, 2016).  Fatalities, injuries, 
and occupational disease are still prevalent among miners, and places mining as one of the most 
hazardous occupations in the world (Stephens & Ahern, 2002).  Mining broadly relates to the 
extraction of naturally occurring minerals by processes such as underground mining, open-cut 
extraction methods, quarrying, operation of wells, or evaporation pans, and dredging or 
recovering from ore dumps or tailings (Hamrin, 1980).  A component of this hazard is because 
workers in the mine environment are faced with constantly changing workplace circumstances, 
including, but not limited to: atmospheres without natural light or ventilation, and potentially 
unstable ground control; as a result of mineral extraction.  The International Mining Fatality 
database (IMFD) was created by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to establish a 
global record of all incidents, which caused fatalities in the last 142 years, with the majority of 
the data from 1980-2008 (when reporting regulations were strengthened) (MacNeill, 2008).  
According to the IMFD (2008), the dominant agents of fatality in mine operations include: 
asphyxiation, catastrophic failure, contact with moving equipment, drowning, electrocution, 
explosives, falls from heights, fire, gas ignited explosion, inrush, outbursts, uncontrolled release 
of energy and unintended operation of equipment.  Due to these hazards, amongst others, the 
international mining industry has a long history of accidents and disasters that have resulted in 
high fatality and injury rates (ILO, 2016; Dechy et al., 2012).  For the purpose of this study, 
disasters will be defined following Turner’s (1978) definition of man-made disasters which 
distinguishes between severe accidents and disasters based on the presence of an incubation 
period.  Turner defines the incubation period as “the accumulation of an unnoticed set of events 
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which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for their avoidance” 
(p.85).  A further definition specific to the mining industry was provided by Braithwaite (1985) 
where a disaster is “an incident in which five or more persons lose their lives” (p.15).  Therefore, 
although substantial progress has been made in the control of OHS hazards, with regards to 
exposure recognition, legislation and regulations, there are still similar accidents and disasters 
reoccurring.  
Reoccurring accidents are not unique to the mining industry. Aviation, aerospace, 
transportation, oil, healthcare, construction, among others, all have a history of accidents that 
have commonalities strung between them. Often, this is due to a failure to learn all of the 
possible lessons from a single accident (Dechy et al., 2012).  Most accidents involve complex 
dynamic interactions between humans, task demands, environmental events, and social and 
organizational factors, in the presence of weakness or gaps in an organizations safety system 
(Clarke, 2006; Bjerkan, 2010).  Organizational accidents are usually low-frequency events and 
are typically triggered by unintentional errors, made possible by pre-existing hazards or 
pathogens that have made the system vulnerable to failure (Reason, 1990).  Inquiries into major 
accidents frequently identify poor safety culture as a key contributor to the occurrence of an 
accident (Baker et al., 2007; Cullen, 1990; Magnus et al., 2005; Sheen, 1987; Goh, Brown & 
Spickett, 2010).  However, it is unknown to what extent cultural influences can act as drivers for 
the reoccurrence of accidents.  The various cultural drivers within an organization, and the fact 
that different individuals are involved in patterned events, implicates causal factors related to the 
organization.  Therefore, unless cultural drivers are changed and the areas of weakness are 
removed, the same accidents will continue to happen (Reason, 1998).  
  122 
 
 Considering the numerous OHS reports published to date in the mining industry, and the 
growing recognition of the importance of addressing safety culture, there is an opportunity to 
learn lessons from the past, to prevent accidents in the future.  This paper will incorporate 
computer assisted context analysis and the theoretical structure of framing to review publically 
available English language OHS reports from mining, to determine how safety culture has been 
framed in the context of causation and prevention.  By retroactively reviewing accidents there is 
an opportunity to view pre-existing hazards, and utilize safety culture to determine how safety-
related outcomes can be improved in the future. 
4.2 SAFETY CULTURE   
 The concept of safety culture was originally constructed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency’s International Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (INSAG) following the 
Chernobyl Nuclear accident.  INSAG (1986) defined safety culture as the assembly of 
characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals, which establishes that, as an 
overriding priority, nuclear power plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their 
significance.  Since the terms conception, the definition has been adapted across the literature by 
various industries and authors (Table 4.2).  The lack of a universally accepted definition of safety 
culture maintains that it is a multi-faceted concept that incorporates a wide range of 
organizational factors.  Recently, OSHA (2015) defined safety culture as the product of 
individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization’s health and 
safety management (OSHA, 2015).  Reason (1998) further simplifies the concept to be a 
combination of something an organization is (i.e. beliefs, attitudes, values), and something that 
an organization has (i.e. practices, policies, controls).  The patterns of shared beliefs, attitudes 
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and values that a group maintains are transferred to new members as the correct way to perceive, 
think and feel (Hopkins, 2002), thereby propagating the prevailing culture (whether positive or 
negative).  
 A strong safety culture is associated to numerous safety-related outcomes, including:  
performance of safe work practices (DeJoy, Murphy & Gershon, 1995; Griffin & Neal, 2000; 
Mattila, Hyttinen & Rantanen, 1994), safety program effectiveness (Cheyne et al., 1998; Zohar, 
1980), and reduction in accidents, near misses, and other safety incidents (Dedobbleer & Beland, 
1991; Gillen et al., 2002).  Research has found evidence of these positive safety-related 
outcomes in a range of hazardous industries (i.e. chemical and nuclear processing) (Lee, 
MacDonald & Coote,1993; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1996), high accident-rate sectors (i.e. 
manufacturing and construction) (Brown & Holmes, 1986; Zohar, 2000; Gillen et al., 2002), and 
in low accident-rate sectors (i.e. service industry) (Barling, Loughlin & Kelloway, 2002).  In 
contrast, a poor safety culture can adversely undermine an organization’s system of defence or 
protection.  Breaches in defences can often stem from individuals or organizations failing to 
understand, and fear, the range of operational hazards present (Reason, 1998).  Therefore, by 
developing a positive safety culture, an organization will be able to identify and mitigate latent 
failures before they breach defence systems, thereby improving safety related outcomes (Reason, 
1998).  However, if an organization fails to mitigate these failures, an accident can occur, and an 
investigation will be conducted.   
4.2.1 Accident Investigation  
 Following a major accident, there are different levels of public inquiry that can be 
established.  Types of inquiries include: Coroner’s Inquests, Reviews, Commissions of Inquiry, 
Tribunals of Inquiry and Royal Commissions.  Although differences may exist between 
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countries, generally government agencies or representatives conduct accident investigations 
(LeCoze, 2013).  Dekker (2015) identified four purposes of accident investigations: (1) 
epistemological (i.e. establishing what happened); (2) preventive (i.e. identifying pathways to 
avoid future accidents); (3) moral (i.e. tracing the transgressions that were committed and 
reinforcing moral and regulatory boundaries); (4) and existential (i.e. finding an explanation for 
the suffering that occurred).  The overarching intention is to avoid a reoccurrence of an accident 
rather than to establish blame (Vuorio et al., 2013).  The evolution of accident investigation 
methods over time also demonstrates a shift from isolating a single immediate cause, to 
acknowledging multiple causes.  For both accident causation and accident investigation, 
acknowledging that there is an array of accident investigation techniques available to industry is 
important for understanding that there are various approaches to investigate an accident, and 
therefore various potential outcomes.  Hollangel (2008) refers to this as the ‘What-You-Look-
For-Is-What-You-Find’ (WYLFIWYF) principle, which has further been elaborated to the 
‘What-You-Find-Is-What-You-Fix’ (WYFIWYF) principle, meaning that the causes identified in 
an investigation, become the foundation of the formulation of the recommendations for change 
(Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009). 
 In the mining industry, various methods of accident analysis have utilized official 
accident investigations or Coroner’s Inquests to try and establish broader causation mechanisms. 
Turner (1978) conducted a qualitative analysis on 84 British accident inquiries spanning a 10-
year period.  Turner’s man-made disaster model found that disasters can be defined in 
sociological terms; as a disruption of the existing cultural beliefs and norms about hazards, and 
for addressing them and their impacts.  Braithwaite (1985) examined 39 coal mine disasters to 
focus on the role and effectiveness of enforcement.  Braithwaite identified that fatal accidents are 
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attributable to defects in: planning, communication, definition of responsibilities, training / 
supervisors, and attention to hazards.  He further concluded that greater compliance to law would 
dramatically reduce fatalities in mining.  Hopkins (2000) conducted a sociological analysis of 
two Australian mining disasters which were contextually different but revealed underlying 
similarities in the presence of a culture of denial; suggesting that similar systems of belief may 
underlie other disasters.  Lastly, Quinlan (2014) examined single and multiple-fatality incidents 
and identified 10-patterned causes that were consistently present in accident reports.  Quinlan 
further discussed why patterned causes can be resistant to intervention by governments, and 
discussed the balance between prescriptive regulation and risk management.  Researchers have 
therefore acknowledged that these types of sources (i.e. Inquests, Inquiries, Commissions) 
provide “a detailed and impartial assessment of the evidence pertaining to the causes of the 
incident, at least within societies where there is some level of community voice, governance and 
due process and accountability” (Quinlan, 2014, p.32).  
4.2.2 Safety Culture & Accident Investigation 
 Despite its origin in the Chernobyl (1986) accident investigation, it is uncommon for safety 
culture to be directly addressed in investigations of accidents.  Stauch (2012) believes that due to 
limitations in defining and measuring, the direct assessment of safety culture during accident 
investigations may produce misleading results:   
“Investigators need to establish a cause and effect relationship in an accident, relying on 
identifiable performance measures, and the presence or absence of such aspects of an 
organization’s culture…does not satisfy the need for a logical, direct link between a factor 
and the accident, nor is that a readily identifiable parameter.” (p.106) 
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However, post-accident investigations may provide the opportunity to identify more aspects of 
an organization’s safety culture.  In various industries, it is becoming increasingly common for 
companies and researchers to apply safety culture retroactively to explain accidents and incidents 
(Strauch, 2015).  For example, Vaughan (1996) rejected the prevalent explanations of the cause 
of the NASA Challenger disaster, and used safety culture to identify the root causes of the 
failure. Antonsen (2009) found that accident investigation reports on an offshore drilling 
platform better described the organization’s safety culture, in contrast to measures of perceived 
safety obtained through traditional assessments.  Similar findings were offered in an 
investigation of a marine accident that identified a parallel discrepancy between employee safety 
beliefs and operational practices (National Transportation Safety Board, 2013).  Another 
investigation conducted by the Washington Metropolitan Transit Authority of a subway accident 
determined that the organization’s actions and decisions made after the investigation, described 
elements of safety culture better than a direct assessment of the culture through typical 
measurement methods (Strauch, 2015).  Therefore, what can be derived from these findings is 
that safety culture can be influential when incorporated post-investigation to distinguish between 
perceived safety culture and actual safety culture.  Dekker (2016) simply explained that by 
putting forward the question: why did their decisions make sense to them at the time? an initial 
picture can begin to be created of the organizations safety culture at the time of an accident.  
4.2.3 Big Data Analysis & Concept Mapping  
 Until recently, large volumes of textual data were time-consuming and resource-intensive 
to manually content analyze (Indulska & Recker, 2008; Smith & Humphreys, 2006), and had 
additional challenges with regard to establishing inter-coder reliability, and the influence of 
subjectivity and interpretation bias.  An alternative method to traditional human coding is 
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utilizing: computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS).  CAQDAS facilitates 
more effective exploration of bodies of text and provides advantages related to scalability, 
reliability, repeatability, and consistency; therefore, providing an analytic process that is 
reproducible and capable of handling large datasets that would be challenging for manual 
analysis (Indulska & Recker, 2008).  For example, Leximancer is a text analytics software that 
performs a style of computer assisted content analysis (Cretchley et al., 2010).  Leximancer 
functions in two stages, the semantic extraction of dominant concepts or most commonly 
occurring terms, based on the statistical processing of a body of text (Berelson, 1952; Weber, 
1990; Indulska & Recker, 2012), followed by the relational extraction (Smith & Humphreys, 
2006). A key advantage of Leximancer is the generation of a concept list that is statistically 
reliable and reproducible, as it was generated from the input text itself.  In contrast, manual lists 
require inter-coder reliability and validity checks (Angus, Rintel & Wiles 2013).  Further, 
Leximancer facilitates the analysis of an entire data-set, instead of a human coded subsample.   
 Leximancer has been used in a diverse range of research domains, including: evaluating 
accident reports in maritime operations (Grech, Horberry & Smith, 2002); tracking changes in 
research and journal foci over time (Rooney, McKenna & Barker, in press; Indulska & Recker, 
2008; Cretchley, Rooney & Gallois, 2010); identifying themes and patterns in various facets of 
education (Grimbeek et al., 2005; Rooney, 2005); and exploring concepts related to healthcare 
(Davies et al, 2006; Watson & Rooney, 2010; Cretchley, Rooney & Gallois, 2010).  Leximancer 
has also been utilized in social media analysis, combined with framing theory (Burch et al., 
2015; Frederick et al., 2016).  Although framing theory is typically employed to examine various 
forms of traditional media, and more recently social media, (e.g. Druckman 2001; Nelson & 
Oxley 1999; Tewksbury et al., 2000), its application in combination with computer-assisted 
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content analysis can provide valuable way to describe the power of a communicating text 
(Entman, 1993). 
4.2.4 Framing Theory  
 In this study, the text framing process will serve to highlight various aspects of safety 
culture in OHS mining reports, and make them more salient through the selection, emphasis, and 
exclusion of information (Entman, 1993). Salience refers to making a piece of information more 
noticeable, meaningful, or memorable to the audience. Therefore, an increase in salience 
enhances the probability that receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning, process it, 
store it in memory, and choose to act on it (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  Thus, frames are both 
defined by what they include as well as what they omit.   
 A frame is defined as a device that reflects a pattern of cognition, interpretation, and 
presentation (Gitlin, 1980), and are therefore indicative of broad conceptual categories that 
provide culturally specific meaning to the reader (Goffman, 1974; Zaharopoulos, 2007). These 
cultural contexts can influence how frames are processed to reflect dominant norms and values in 
a society (Endres, 2004; Goffman, 1974), or in this case in an industry.  Entman (1993) suggests 
that frames have four locations in the communication process: the communicator, the text, the 
receiver, and the culture.  Communicators make framing judgements in deciding what to say, 
guided by frames that organize their belief systems.  In this study, the communicator is the 
organization or regulatory body that produced and published the OHS report.  The text contains 
frames defined by the presence or absence of certain keywords, phrases, sources of information, 
and sentences that provide thematically reinforcing clusters of facts or judgments.  In this study, 
it is the inclusion or exclusion of safety culture related terminology.  The receiver processes the 
frames and forms their conclusion; the receiver’s interpretation may or may not reflect the 
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framing intention of the communicator.  In this study, the receiver represents all stakeholders in 
the mining industry that are influenced or affected by the OHS reports.  Lastly, the culture refers 
to the commonly presented frames that represent the mentality or commonly demonstrated 
thinking of a social grouping.  
 Further, framing theory suggests that how something is presented influences how that 
information is processed.  Therefore, by investigating the association between textual elements 
within the document and the overall framing of the story, changes in the relative proportion and 
stability of frames during a given time period can be examined. Leximancer and framing theory 
can be utilized similarly to axial coding in traditional textual analysis, where themes are 
regrouped or reduced based on related dimensions (Saldana, 2009).  These groups of stored 
clusters will represent the influences that guide individual processing.  Gamson (1992) found that 
the power of a frame can be as great as the language used itself, therefore its application in this 
context will direct attention to how a communicated text exerts its power. 
4.2.5 Research Objectives  
 Despite the numerous coroner’s inquests, and commission reports published to date, and 
the resulting recommendations, similar accidents continue to reoccur around the world.  This 
raises interest for considering how the greater organizational culture towards safety may be 
influencing the continuation of these similar accidents.  As indicated by Stauch (2012) the direct 
assessment of safety culture during an accident investigation is uncommon; however, post-
accident investigations may provide the opportunity to identify more aspects of an organization’s 
culture (i.e. Vaughan, 1996; Antonsen, 2009; National Transportation Safety Board, 2013).  
Therefore, although safety culture may not have been directly assessed, it may be present in the 
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broader conversation captured in commissioned reports post-investigation, and may therefore 
provide insight to the nature of similar accidents.  Thus, the overall objective of this study is to 
analyze ten OHS reports in mining to:  
I) Investigate if/how safety culture has been framed; and 
II) Determine if references to safety culture differ between coal and metalliferous 
mining.   
4.3 METHODS  
 The method used follows a similar protocol to that used by Indulska & Recker (2008) and 
Cretchley, Rooney & Gallois (2010); in their analysis of conceptual drift in journal publication 
history, and Harpoulou’s (2013) seeded analysis of organizational decision-making; in the 
context of business sustainability outcomes.  Further, this study applies aspects of the framing 
theory methodology used by Burch et al. (2015) and Frederick et al. (2016).  The study was 
conducted in four steps: (1) the selection of each commissioned report; (2) the development of a 
safety culture dictionary; (3) a Leximancer analysis, including contextual filtering; and finally 
(3) the interpretation of the results.  
4.3.1 Commissioned Report Dataset  
 The OHS commissioned reports were selected through a review of the literature, and in 
consultation with industry professionals, known for their expertise in mining safety and accident 
investigation (Appendix 2C & 2D).  The inclusion criteria were commissioned reports from: 
English speaking countries, coal mining and metalliferous mining, and reports on single 
accidents, disasters and broader industry reviews.  In addition, the report had to be deemed to 
have had a significant impact on OHS in the mining industry (i.e. established to investigate new 
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and emerging issues; provide advice on an area where government lacks expertise; accesses 
external knowledge; identifies key issues on policy problems; provided recommendations for the 
future (Prasser, 2006)).  The final list contained ten commissioned reports focusing on OHS, 
published in English, by five countries: Canada (n=5), United States (n=2), Australia (n=1), New 
Zealand (n=1), and the United Kingdom (n=1), were selected for analysis in this study (Table 
4.1).  
 
Table 4.1: OHS commission descriptions 
Commission 
Date of 
Incident 
Date Inquired 
Date 
Published 
Country Industry Pages 
Report of the Tribunal 
Appointed to Inquire into the 
Disaster at Aberfan  
October 21 
1966 
July 19 1966 July 19 1967 
United 
Kingdom 
Coal Mining 151 
Report of the Royal Commission 
on the Health and Safety of 
Workers in Mines 
N/A 
September 10 
1974 
June 30 1976 Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
380 
Towards Safe Production  N/A July 1980  April 1981 Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
422 
Improving Ground Stability and 
Mine Rescue 
N/A 
October 24 
1984 
February 1986 Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
107 
Report on an Accident at Moura 
No. 2 Underground Mine 
August 7 
1994 
October 18 
1994 
April 6 1995 Australia Coal Mining 102 
The Westray Story:  A 
Predictable Path to Disaster - 
Report of the Westray Mine 
Public Inquiry  
May 9 1992 May 15 1992 
November 
1997 
Canada  Coal Mining 831 
Report on the Sago Mine 
Disaster 
January 2 
2006 
January 9 2006 July 19 2006 United States Coal Mining 124 
Upper Big Branch:  A Failure of 
Basic Coal Mine Safety Practices 
April 5 2010 April 13 2010  May 2011 
United 
States  
Coal Mining 126 
Royal Commission on the Pike 
River Coal Mine Tragedy 
November 
19 2010  
December 14 
2010 
October 2012 New Zealand Coal Mining 448 
Mining Health, Safety and 
Prevention Review 
N/A 
December 
2013 
201March 
2015 
Canada  
Metalliferous 
Mining  
108 
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4.3.2 Development of Safety Culture Dictionary  
 As the focus of this study is on the identification of safety culture, a dictionary was 
developed to be seeded into the Leximancer analysis.  As previously discussed, there are 
numerous definitions of safety culture available in the literature.  Therefore, throughout the 
background literature review on safety culture, various definitions were collected to build the 
Leximancer dictionary with key terminology (Table 4.2).  Based on this review, 26 key terms 
were identified: safety culture, attitude, belief, value, morals, norms, competencies, behaviour, 
characteristics, social practices, perceptions, patterns, commitment, observable, shared, rituals, 
attributes, mental, ethical, thoughts, feelings, psychological, situational, attention, experiences, 
and interpretations.   
Table 4.2 Definitions of safety culture  
Author Definition 
Mearns, Whitaker 
& Flin, 2001 
that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals, 
which establishes that, as an overview, safety culture as a shared set of beliefs 
and attitudes by employees concerning the prioritization of safety issues and 
the maintenance of safe working conditions within the organization. 
Mearns & Flin, 
1999 
safety culture has been described in terms of values, beliefs, attitudes, social 
mores, norms, rules, practices, competencies, and behavior. 
Hopkins, 2002 Safety culture is the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals which establishes that as an over-riding priority ... safety 
issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. 
Reason, 1998 safety culture: as something an organization is (the beliefs, attitudes and 
values of its members regarding the pursuit of safety), and as something that 
an organization has (the structures, practices, controls and policies designed to 
enhance safety). 
Cox & Flin, 1998 the beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices 
concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, customers 
and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
Uttal, 1983  definition of safety culture captures most of its essentials: ‘Shared values 
(what is important) and beliefs (how things work) that interact with an 
organization’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms 
(the way we do things around here).’ 
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Hale, 2000  safety culture, on the other hand, refers to ‘the attitudes, beliefs, and 
perceptions shared by natural groups as defining norms and values, which 
determine how they react in relation to risks and risk control systems.’  
Fernández-Muñiz, 
Montes-Peón & 
Vàzquez-Ordás, 
2007 
 
A set of values, perceptions, attitudes and patterns of behavior with regard to 
safety shared by members of the organization; as well as a set of policies, 
practices and procedures relating to the reduction of employees' exposure to 
occupational risks, implemented at every level of the organization, and 
reflecting a high level of concern and commitment to the prevention of 
accidents and illnesses. 
Pidgeon, 1997 Sometimes culture is discussed in terms of observable behaviours (`the way 
we do things around here') and sometimes more as a system of symbols or 
meanings (for example, as a shared cognitive model, or as the assemblage of 
stories, arguments, myths, rituals and symbols that permeate organizational 
life). Note that the two approaches are to some extent interdependent, in that 
meaning often both constructs the `object' of inquiry and is in turn constructed 
itself through observable behaviour and material life. 
Turner, Pidgeon, 
Blockley, & Toft, 
1989 
 
The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices 
that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, 
customers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious.  
International 
Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group, 
1986 
Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations 
and individuals, which establishes that, as an overriding priority, nuclear plant 
safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.  
Advisory 
Committee for 
Safety in Nuclear 
Installations 
(ACSNI), 1993  
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, 
competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine commitment to, and the 
style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety management.  
 
Zohar, 1980  A summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work 
environments.  
Glennon, 1982   Employees' perceptions of the many characteristics of their organization that 
have a direct impact upon their behaviour to reduce or eliminate danger 
(safety climate) and, safety climate is a special kind of organizational 
climate.  
Brown & Holmes, 
1986 
A set of perceptions or beliefs held by an individual and/or group about a 
particular entity.  
Cox & Cox, 1991  Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that 
employees share in relation to safety.  
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Dedobbeleer & 
Bealand, 1991  
Molar perceptions people have of their work settings. 
Pidgeon,1991 The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices 
that are concerned with minimizing the exposure of employees, managers, 
customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious.  
Ostrom, 
Wilhelmsen & 
Kaplan, 1993 
The concept that the organization's beliefs and attitudes, manifested in 
actions, policies, and procedures, affect its safety performance.  
Cooper et al., 1996 Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and beliefs that 
workers hold regarding safety in their work place.  
Geller, 1994 In a total safety culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety and 
pursues it on a daily basis.  
Niskanen, 1994 Safety climate refers to a set of attributes that can be perceived about 
particular work organizations and which may be induced by the policies and 
practices that those organizations impose upon their workers and supervisors.  
Coyle, Sleeman & 
Adams, 1995 
The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward occupational 
health and safety issues. 
Berends, 1996 The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of organization 
members.  
Lee, 1998 The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group 
values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behaviour that 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and 
organization's health and safety management.  
Cabrera & Isla, 
1998 
The shared perceptions of organizational members about their work 
environment and, more precisely, about their organizational safety policies.  
Williamson et al. 
1997 
Safety climate is a summary concept describing the safety ethic in an 
organization or workplace which is reflected in employees' beliefs about 
safety.  
Kennedy & 
Kirwan, 1998 
An abstract concept, which is underpinned by the amalgamation of individual 
and group perceptions, thought processes, feelings and behaviours, which in 
turn gives rise to the particular way of doing things in the organization. It is a 
sub-element of the overall organizational culture. 
Glendon & 
Stanton, 2000 
Comprises: attitudes, behaviors, norms and values, personal responsibilities as 
well as human resources features such as training and development.  
Guldenmund, 
2000 
Those aspects of the organizational culture, which will impact on attitudes 
and behavior related to increasing or decreasing risk.  
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Cooper, 2000  Culture is ‘the product of multiple, goal-directed interactions between people 
(psychological), jobs (behavioral) and the organization (situational); while 
safety culture is ‘that observable degree of effort by which all organizational 
members directs their attention and actions toward improving safety on a 
daily basis.’ 
Mohamed, 2003 A sub-facet of organizational culture, which affects workers’ attitudes and 
behavior in relation to an organization’s on-going safety performance.  
Richter & Koch, 
2004  
Shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and 
safety - expressed partially symbolically – which guide people’s actions 
towards risk, accidents and prevention. 
Fang et al. 2006 A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs and values that the organization owns in 
safety.  
4.3.3 Leximancer Analysis, Context Filtering & Interpretation 
 
 Leximancer (Version 4.0, 2011, Leximancer Pty Ltd., University of Queensland) was 
used to analyze the commissioned reports. Any documents that had separate files, such as: 
appendices or additional volumes, were amalgamated.   Documents unreadable by Leximancer 
were converted verbatim into readable text files using ABBYY FineReader (Version 12, 2014, 
ABBYY Group, Russia).  For analysis, all standard operational settings in Leximancer were set 
to default with the exception of: removing the identification of name-like words, turning off 
auto-paragraphing, and merging word variants (for detailed explanation of settings see 
Leximancer Manual 4.0).  Further, word-like concepts with similar semantic meaning were 
merged (i.e. workers and miners), and concepts of low semantic meaning were removed (i.e. 
mine).  The previously selected terms, to define safety culture, were then seeded into the 
Leximancer dictionary.  After the initial analysis, each concept was filtered according to Yin 
(2009) to clarify the concepts accurately reflect the meaning of the retrieved words.  
 This analysis provided a concept map that represented the 50-year data set, and assisted 
in the identification and exploration of safety culture within the data. Drilling down to the seeded 
terminology facilitated the identification of the underlying concepts, and their relative distance to 
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understand connectivity, which supports the interpretation of the context of which safety culture 
appears in the reports.  
 
4.4 RESULTS 
 Of the 26 key terms originally seeded into the Leximancer thesaurus, 24 were identified 
in the data.  Through the iterative process, Leximancer identified additional supporting words in 
the thesaurus, resulting in a total of 8,279 references on safety culture, being identified in the text 
set.  However, after filtering the text it was determined that 7,315 references could not be 
justified for inclusion.  Yin (2009) refers to filtering as the process of: removing synonyms that 
the software did not identify in the text; removing concepts where the accumulated evidence (i.e. 
text excerpts) did not justify inclusion in the discussion; and removing words that are used in a 
different context.  Therefore, 964 references were included in the analysis.  For example, the text 
excerpts regarding behaviour related to both human behaviour and the behaviour of the 
underground environment (e.g. “soil mechanics has been defined as the scientific study of the 
behaviour of an aggregation of discrete particles” (Aberfan, 1967, p.129)).  Therefore, only 
human behaviour text references were utilized in the analysis, and additional references were 
removed.   
 The analysis identified six themes: safety culture, attitude, competence, belief, patterns, 
and norms, in descending order of dominance.  Within the themes, terms that are semantically 
related are visualized within the same cluster (bubble).  For example, within the theme attitude, 
the terms: behaviour, feelings, thoughts, characteristics, perceptions, and psychological were all 
grouped (Figure 4.1).  This indicates that those terms were used in semantically similar contexts.   
From the seeded terms in each cluster (bubble), the underlying text references were then used to 
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understand the context behind each seeded term to ensure contextual relevance (Yin, 2009; 
Harpoulous, 2013).   
 Once the themes were identified, the researchers reduced them into two frames according 
to whether or not they related directly to the (a) The Individual, and (b) The Organization.  The 
frames and their sub-themes (i.e. mini frames (Altheide, 1996, p. 30) are described below using 
textual examples.   
 
Figure 4.1: Concept map of seeded safety culture terms used to develop the frames: Frame 1 – 
The Individual: attitude (yellow), competence (light green), patterns (blue), and norms (purple); 
Frame 2 – The Organization: belief (green), and safety culture (red).  
 
Safety 
Culture 
Patterns 
Competen
ce 
Norms 
Belief 
Attitudes 
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4.4.1 Frame 1: The Individual  
 The Individual frame was comprised of four themes (or mini-frames): attitude, 
competence, patterns and norms.  
Attitude  
 The attitude theme contained various descriptors including: attitude (n=162), behaviour 
(n=118), characteristics (n=46), feelings (n=20), perceptions (n=19), thoughts (n=13), and 
psychological (n=4).  The n values represent the number of times each term appeared, after 
context filtering (Yin, 2009).  
Attitude: The discussion surrounding attitude was very broad, incorporating theories on how to 
shape attitudes, how to define and measure attitude, the presence of attitudinal sub-units within 
organizations, and the various factors which influence a worker’s attitude towards safety.  The 
literature presented in Towards Safe Production (1981) identified that although there are various 
definitions of attitude, “an attitude is always directed toward some object” (vol.2, p.48); in this 
discussion, the object is safety.  Weaved throughout many of the attitude references was the 
underlying influence of management’s attitudes in shaping the manner in how a workplace 
functions (Westray, 1997).  There was also mention of ‘dangerous attitudes’ that relate to risk- 
taking behaviours, for example: “it suggests a profoundly dangerous attitude that fire bossing a 
mine is just another burden imposed by MSHA and the WVMHST. A section foreman’s failure to 
perform them diligently and honestly reflects poorly on the attitudes up the company’s chain of 
command” (Upper Big Branch, 2011, p.98).  Overall, the discussion urged the need for 
attitudinal changes to avoid future tragedies. 
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Behaviour: Similar to attitude, the term behaviour was incorporated into a broad range of 
references related to the individual worker, as it relates to unsafe behaviours, risk taking, and 
accidents.  A repeating reference was the concept of the propagation of unsafe and reckless 
behaviour, as illustrated in Westray (1997) the “mindset requires supervisory behaviour to 
counteract the nonchalant attitude often encountered in more experienced workers, who may 
have adopted hazardous shortcuts and a dangerously complacent approach to occupational 
risks” (p.94). The discussion also provided insight into the factors contributing to risk taking 
behaviour “the picture that emerges from the testimony is one of a workforce taking great risks 
of workplace accidents as the result of three major factors acting in conjunction: the behaviour 
of management, the general economic conditions in the area, and the motivations of the miners 
themselves. Management was perceived by workers as focused on production at the expense of 
safety” (Westray, 1997, p.186).  There was also evidence captured in the analysis that 
demonstrated explicit causes of unsafe behaviour, for example “the joint investigation revealed 
many reports of underground workers at Pike bypassing machine-mounted sensors by various 
means” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.141).  Lastly, there was a consistent emphasis on how 
influential behaviour can be for survival “there are few industries in which one's safety, indeed 
one's very survival, is so inextricably linked to the attitudes, practices, concerns, and behaviour 
of fellow workers. Truly, in the underground coal mining environment, you are your brother’s 
keeper” (Westray, 1997, p.vii.).  Overall, the discussion demonstrated the emphasis on 
individual’s behaviours captured as safe or unsafe acts.   
Characteristics: The term characteristics was used in relation to the “notion of the individual [as 
it] captures the characteristics that influence human behaviour, such as competence, experience, 
attitude and personality. Some of these are fixed; others are adaptable” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, 
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p.28).  Characteristics were also incorporated into the accident causation discussion as they are a 
consideration within human factors, where “human factors are the environmental, 
organisational and job factors, and human and individual characteristics, which influence 
behaviour at work in a way which can affect health and safety” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.27).  
Lastly, the term characteristics was found within the discussion on compliance strategies, where 
it was discussed that “the extent to which employers do not comply with their health and safety 
obligations, the characteristics of those employers, the drivers of non-compliance and the 
remedial action required” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.30) is a primary area of interest. This in 
turn impacts the intervention strategy an organization selects, such as: changes to regulations, 
codes of practice, and enforcement. 
Feelings: The term feelings was expressed in references from the literature or as concerns 
expressed from individuals.  For example, the literature presented in Towards Safe Production 
(1981) discussed how “attitudes only exist as a function of some object which is cognitively 
assessed, which elicits emotions and feelings, and which may generate behaviour” (vol.2, p.48).  
References specific to individuals broadened the discussion to incorporate terms such as 
‘distrust’ as evident in the Westray (1997) report: “Wayne Cheverie expressed similar concerns 
and feelings of distrust vis -àvis Westray management: Some of the people who were appointed 
to the safety committee I felt I couldn't trust not to expose any concerns that I had about safety 
back to management, and therefore making me vulnerable to the tactics of management as far as 
intimidation and harassment” (p.180).  Other terms, such as emotions were captured with this 
term, and related to stress-related anxiety stemming from mine rescue recovery efforts (Mining 
Review, 2015).  
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Perceptions: Perceptions was predominantly discussed in three forms: how perceptions are 
formed, the influence of perceptions on roles and expectations, and how perceptions can 
influence accidents.  Towards Safe Production (1981) provided the explanation that the “factors 
influencing…expectations are a combination of a range of highly complicated sources such as 
the economic conditions, management philosophy and attitudes, legislative requirements, other 
organizational issues, etc.” (vol.2, p.78).  The ways in which these perceptions manifest 
themselves transitioned the discussion to the influence of perceptions on roles and expectations.  
For example, it was discussed how frequently individuals have perceptions of the roles of others 
(i.e. supervisors perceive the role of management) which often leads to conflict and ambiguity 
when outcomes vary from the expected (Towards Safe Production, 1981).  Role ambiguity was 
further discussed to explain how expectations of another individual’s role is based on what is 
perceived to be important by the individual forming the perception.  A further illustration of how 
perceptions differ between individuals and can impact an accident was found in the Moura report 
(1995), “the Inquiry concluded that these reports may well have been coloured by differing 
individual perceptions, the passage of time and the merging of pre- and post-event knowledge” 
(p.37).  
Thoughts: The references for the term thoughts captured a broad discussion related to the 
literature available on cognitive dissonance theories and emotions. For example, “a readiness to 
assess or evaluate an object in a certain way; it is the intellectual part of an attitude and 
encompasses the thoughts of an individual” (Towards Safe Production, 1981, vol.2, p.48).  
Psychological: Similar to the term thoughts, the term psychological was primarily referenced in 
relation to the literature on psychological theories, with no references directly linked to 
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investigative findings. However, the literature directly related to how “a person’s actions are 
motivated in one way or another, consciously or unconsciously, and that no behaviour is totally 
devoid of some underlying psychological mechanism” and how “attitudes are psychological 
traits” (Towards Safe Production, 1981, p.51).  This discussion helps understand how accidents, 
originating from unsafe acts, can be viewed as a motivated behaviour, and as such can be 
identified related to accidents.   
Competence 
 The competence theme contained two descriptors including: competence (n=119), and 
values (n=8).  
Competence: The discussion around competence was multi-directional relating to the overall 
knowledge and skills of various individuals, including members of Ministerial and supporting 
agencies, researchers, workers, supervisors and management.  For example, the competence of 
engineers was frequently discussed as causal factors relating to the accident: “Amounted to a 
frank recognition of the fact that in April 1965—18 months before the disaster—there existed on 
Merthyr Mountain a situation which, had it been examined by a competent civil engineer, must 
have led to proper investigation” (Aberfan, 1967, p.76).  The commissions also focused on the 
need for individuals in the mining environment to be technically competent and risk aware: 
“With respect to training and skills development, all agree that all workers on a job-site need to 
be: trained and competent in the skills they need to perform their tasks, including the use of any 
equipment they are provided or required to use aware of the hazards and associated risks they 
may encounter in their work” (Mining Review, 2015, p.41).  The discussion surrounding 
competence also included references to the failure of the system’s ability to identify the lack of 
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competence in individuals: “The traditional testing of candidates for certification as competent 
coal miners degenerated to a perfunctory formality, revealing nothing of the candidates’ lack of 
training or experience.” “It seems almost axiomatic that an underground coal mine should retain 
the services of competent management and engineering personnel with proven experience and 
technical competence. Westray was significantly lacking in this regard.” (Westray, 1997, p.380). 
Further, there was lengthy discussion on how individuals receive their training, qualifications, 
and certifications: “the regulatory system should drive training programmes that produce a 
qualified and competent workforce which is aware of the major risks in underground coal 
mining and how to manage them. Deficiencies and gaps in the regulations are holding back the 
development of the workforce” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.338).   
Values: Values was used in the discussion of both personal values, and the perceived value 
attributed to OHS.  To describe the mindset of individuals in the workplace it was commonly 
used amongst other terms, such as: norms, beliefs, and attitudes (Pike River, 2012; Towards Safe 
Production, 1981; Ground Stability 1986).  Whereas in relation to the perceived value, it was 
indicated that management influences the value placed on safety by establishing an environment 
where workers can raise OHS concerns (Westray, 1997; Pike River, 2012).  
Patterns  
 The patterns theme contained various descriptors, including: patterns (n=12), mental (n=7), 
experiences (n=7), ethical (n=6), situation (n=4), interpretations (n=4), and attributes (n=1).  
Patterns: The references related to patterns primarily focused on inspection patterns, human 
behaviour patterns, and reoccurring patterns in accident causation, for example: “the information 
I have seen shows me recurring patterns of causal factors that I know are well established in the 
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literature to increase the likelihood of a process safety event” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.76).    
Mental: The discussions using the term mental were strongly related to how role conflicts and 
role ambiguity can affect the mental well-being of an individual worker (Towards Safe 
Production, 1981).  
Experiences: Experiences were discussed because of their influence on the attitudes and 
behaviours of an individual: “factors such as personal background, skills and abilities, and past 
experiences would play an important part in this process... a person’s experiences form the 
backbone of his attitudes” (Towards Safe Production, 1981, p.64).  It was also discussed in 
relation to how various factors (i.e. communication, attitude, group norms, etc.) can influence an 
individual’s ability to prepare for future experiences.  
Ethical: The discussion around ethics was both implicit and explicit.  Implicitly the discussion 
covered a range of assurances that the companies had implied and if acting ethically, would have 
complied too.  There were few explicit ethics references; however, those identified related 
primarily to the ethical dilemmas faced by medical supervisors (Royal Commission, 1976), and 
literature on self-reliance as it relates to striving for ethical compliance (Westray, 1997).  
Situation: The limited references referring to situation (or situational) related to how complex 
and interrelated attitudes, job behaviour, and accident circumstances are based on their 
situational nature, therefore making their measurement difficult (Towards Safe Production, 
1981).  There was also a singular reference related to the need for a “keen sense of situational 
awareness” from mobile equipment operators to minimize the risk of mobile equipment 
collisions (Mining Review, 2015, p.27).     
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Interpretations: The references related to interpretations reflected how “the individual himself, 
by his own perceptions, expectations, and interpretations [determines] how he ought to behave. 
This refers to a synthesis of personalized representations of the requirements within the 
organization, some of which may be acquired as a consequence of direct experiences and others 
may develop as a result of indirect influences” (Towards Safe Production, 1981, p.64).  There 
were also minimal references related to interpretations of the responsibilities encompassed under 
certain positions.  
 
Norms 
 The norms theme contained only one descriptor: norms (n=5).  
Norms: The references referred to the normalization of deviance, and reliance on unsafe work 
practices. For example, it was referenced in Upper Big Branch (2011) that “the not-so-subtle 
message to employees [was] that MSHA [was] costing the company money – and workers 
shouldn’t aid in that process.  In an organization where deviance is not the norm, the same 
information might be used to deliver a very different message, ‘We have some very serious safety 
problems at this mine, so much so that we’ve racked up a million dollars in penalties’” (p.101). 
This example of the reinforcement of deviant practices illustrates how a negative safety culture 
can be perpetuated through an organization, and ultimately can contribute to an accident 
occurring.   
 
4.4.2 Frame 2: The Organization 
 The Organization frame, was comprised of two themes (or mini-frames): safety culture 
and belief. 
 The attitude theme contai ned various  descriptors  inclu ding: atti tude (n= 162), behaviou r (n =118), feelings  (n= 20), psychological (n=4 ), thoughts  ( n=13),  perceptions  (n =19), and characte ris tics  (n=46 ).  The n values 
Safety Culture  
 The safety culture theme contained various descriptors, including: commitment (n=95), 
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social practices (n=83), attention (n=68), safety culture (n=53), shared (n=20), and observable. 
References within this theme broadened the discussion beyond the individual, to the larger 
organizational practices.   
Commitment: The references about commitment not only focused on the need for a 
commitment to OHS from all stakeholders (i.e. workers, supervisors, management, unions), but 
prompted the industry to broaden the view beyond the behaviour of individuals “A genuine 
commitment to safety means not just examining miners’ work practices and behaviors. It means 
evaluating management decisions up the chain of command – all the way to the boardroom – 
about how miners’ work is organized and performed” (Upper Big Branch, 2011, p.4).  The 
discussion also encompassed the forms in which commitments can be expressed within an 
organization, such as, “a policy statement confirming the organization's commitment to safety 
and the obligation upon workers, supervisors and management to contribute to a safe working 
environment” (Towards Safe Production, p.24).  Lastly, commitment was also used in relation to 
how a OHS system can be challenged, for example: “Miners’ rights to a safe workplace are 
compromised when the operator’s commitment to production comes at the cost of safety” (Upper 
Big Branch, 2011, p.112). 
 
Social Practices: The discussion around social practices largely encompassed the lack of group 
dynamics that support health and safety in the workplace, and the need for establishing such 
social practices: “industrial disease and injury is not settled simply by setting environmental 
standards. It is determined by individual, legislative, and social judgments as expressed in work 
practices and their supervision, in regulatory standards and processes of enforcement” (Report 
of the Royal Commission, 1976, p.95).  Frequently, the references of social practices were 
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accompanied with references to safety ethics and safe practices, and discussed how the poor 
practices penetrated every facet of the operation on a daily basis (Westray Report, 1997, p.188).  
The majority of these references further indicated a failure on the part of management to be a 
leader in safe practices, and instead management more often “trivialized safety issues that 
filtered down through the workforce:  The absence of a safety ethic at Westray manifested itself 
through every facet of the operation - the hazardous dust, gas, and roof conditions, the multitude 
of illegal practices, the ineffective environmental monitoring system, the lack of proper safety 
equipment for miners, the state of housekeeping in the mine, and the human relations issues such 
as management- worker relations and the ineffectiveness of the joint occupational health and 
safety committee” (Westray Report, 1997, p.137). Further, the text provided evidence of the 
disconnect between safety standards and the actual practices within the mine: “There is an 
obvious disconnect between the lofty safety standards extolled by Blankenship and the reality of 
conditions inspectors and investigators found in the Upper Big Branch mine (p.95)…Most 
objective observers would find it unacceptable for workers to slog through neck-deep water or 
be subjected to constant tinkering with the ventilation system – their very lifeline in an 
underground mine. Practices such as these can only exist in a workplace where the deviant has 
become normal, and evidence suggests that a great number of deviant practices became 
normalized at the Upper Big Branch mine” (Upper Big Branch, 2011, p.97). Overall, this 
component of the theme demonstrates how pervasive social practices can be within an 
organization, and how great the disconnect between standards and practices is.   
Attention: Attention was predominantly discussed in three forms: the diversion of attention, 
drawing attention, and communicating the need for attention.  The diversion of attention was 
evidenced through competing priorities (i.e. ground control, production pushes) of the 
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organization, resulting in the diversion away from safety concerns.  For example, “The response 
of Westray management to these continuing problems seemed to exacerbate them and divert 
attention from other serious safety concerns. In the result, the entire safety mentality at Westray 
deteriorated while management was consumed with its apparent inability to deal with ground 
control…Although it is impossible to quantify the contribution of such a major diversion to the 
disaster, it was likely significant” (Westray, 1997, p.382).  The diversion of attention resulted in 
many of the workers in these mines to be exposed to risks that could have been properly 
managed.  Drawing attention was related to the importance of conducting risk assessments to 
draw industry attention to specific hazards: “Regular risk assessments help focus attention on the 
hazards that pose the greatest risk to health and safety. They also ensure that the sector is able 
to identify new or evolving hazards and take steps to mitigate them” (Mining Review, 2015, p.6).  
Lastly, the commissions provided evidence of OHS concerns failing to be disseminated 
throughout the organizations.  These failures were both top-down, and bottom-up, as upper 
management’s lack of attention resulted in failing to make workers aware of present risks, and 
subsequently the organizational design challenged a worker’s ability to bring forward issues, 
resulting in “many high-potential incidents [not being] reported to the board” (Pike River, 2012, 
vol.2, p.55).  This component of the theme illustrated that if safety is not prioritized and allocated 
the attention it warrants the organization fails to protect its workers.    
Shared: References of sharing related to community concerns, governance responsibilities, and 
knowledge translation and exchange.  There was evidence of concerns that were widespread and 
shared by workers and members of local communities about the hazards present in the mines 
(Aberfan, 1967).  The shared responsibilities of governing bodies were also frequently 
referenced, particularly the role of management: “Although the overall responsibility for safety in 
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the workplace lies with the top management and although this responsibility cannot be shared, 
cooperation of everybody in the workplace is essential for the effective discharge of that 
responsibility” (Towards Safe Production, 1981, p.80). Lastly, the discussion incorporated the 
lack of information across the industry: “The Review heard from various sources, including the 
research community, that research is being done and/or new techniques to reduce injury and 
illness are being tested but the information is not being shared. When findings that show better 
ways to improve health and safety are not shared, they can’t make a difference” (Mining Review, 
2015, p.63).  Overall, this component of the theme illustrated that safety is a responsibility 
shared by every member of the industry.  
Safety Culture: References that more distinctly used the term safety culture were used to 
describe who is influential in changing a culture, how deviance can become normalization 
throughout an organization, competing priorities of culture, evidence of poor safety culture.  
Who influences an organizations culture was discussed through identifying that all stakeholders 
are involved in establishing and influencing an organizations culture: “all partners in Ontario’s 
mining occupational health and safety system – the Ministry of Labour, the Workplace Safety 
and Insurance Board, the relevant Health and Safety Associations, the joint occupational health 
and safety committees or representatives and workers and employers – play a critical role in 
creating a health and safety culture” (Mining Review, 2015, p.7).  The discussion also reiterates 
the role of the mine manager, as their position of leadership can influence the entire organization: 
“the role of the mine manager in creating and maintaining a culture that fosters worker 
participation and identifying and mitigating hazards is key to an effective IRS. The Review heard 
repeatedly that a single individual in a position of power and influence who is committed to 
resolving health and safety concerns and who believes in genuinely empowering a worker to 
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participate and engage, can have a dramatic impact on the strength of the IRS” (Mining 
Review, 2015, p.56).  The commissions also explored how “a culture created a climate in which 
a disaster…could occur” and how “such total and catastrophic systemic failures can only be 
explained in the context of a culture in which wrongdoing became acceptable, where deviation 
became the norm. In such a culture, it was acceptable to mine coal with insufficient air; with 
buildups of coal dust; with inadequate rock dust...” (Upper Big Branch, 2011, p.101).  There was 
also a wealth of evidence related to how a culture of production challenges a culture of safety, 
for example: “given the heightened production pressure in 2010, and problems with safety 
culture, it was not enough to assume that talking to staff and officials would result in proper 
compliance” (Pike River, 2012, vol.2, p.142).  Lastly, the reports numerous examples of 
situations leading up to the accidents which described poor safety culture within the 
organizations: “Mr. Poynter also discovered a disabled safety device on the same machine, 
which should have increased concern about the safety culture at Pike and called into question 
the need for a much firmer compliance approach from the inspectors” (Pike River, 2012, p.202).  
Therefore, the discussion inclusive of the term safety culture was focused on the organization 
and industry as a whole.  
Belief  
The belief theme contained no descriptors, other than belief (n=79).  It was interesting to 
note that the references related to beliefs were not implicitly all related to safety beliefs.  Instead, 
the term was predominantly used in three ways: to project the commissions’ opinions, in 
testimonies or quotes, and to convey assumptions of what the belief may have been.  To express 
the opinion of the commission, the term belief (or believe) was used to express unity and 
confidence in the findings, for example: “had MSHA followed the mandates of Congress, and 
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had ICG operated the mine with an eye firmly focused on miners’ safety, there is every reason to 
believe that every person underground that day would have survived” (Sago, 2006, p.1). Such 
references therefore are speaking with the knowledge of the inquiry behind them and are 
projecting the opinion of the commission’s authors.  The second use relating to beliefs is 
illustrated in testimonies or quotes, for example, “this was their stated belief…” (Upper Big 
Branch, 2011, p.89), or “it’s my firm belief that they had no intention of complying” (Westray, 
1997, p.340).  The last style of use was assumptions of beliefs, such as “there appeared a 
belief…” (Moura, 1995), or “mine tragedies gave rise to a belief that, after an explosion, there 
was a window of opportunity within which it was possible to enter the mine safely” (Pike River, 
2012, p.221).  Overall, the use of the word belief was used to express opinions, convictions, and 
confidence in findings that reflected the state of the organization.   
4.5 DISCUSSION 
 The results of this study provide a unique insight into where, and how safety culture has 
been discussed through a sample of the last 50 years, of OHS mining commissioned reports. 
Accident inquiries rely on a large body of data, from a variety of sources to reach their 
conclusions and therefore, they provide a wealth of data (Stauch, 2012; Hopkins, 2015) that can 
help improve safety related outcomes.  This study provides an opportunity to retrospectively 
analyze lessons from the past 50 years, and reflect on outcomes emerging from the context of 
individual reports, and within the dataset as a whole: 
“Lessons learned can also turn into lessons forgotten if we do not understand the concepts, 
principles and theories behind failure and emergent properties” (Dien, Dechy & Stoop, 
2012, p.1378). 
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Safety culture was discussed using various terminology in all of the reports included in this study 
(1967-2015); however, it is interesting to note when the specific term ‘safety culture’ emerged in 
the discussion.  While the term became prominent in other industries after the 1986 Chernobyl 
disaster, the reports included in this study indicate that the term did not appear to be adopted 
until the Westray investigation, in 1997.  Further, it is interesting to note that safety culture was 
the dominant seeded term in the three reports published since 2010, from three different 
countries, and both coal mining and metalliferous mining (Figure 4.3).  This is consistent with 
the evolving discussion across the safety science literature, with the widening of focus on 
organizational characteristics, as opposed to individual characteristics (Appendix 4).  
 The most dominant term related to safety culture identified was attitude.  Attitude is 
defined as a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some 
degree of favour or disfavour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  Attitudes are preceded by cognitive, 
affective and behavioural processes, and in turn, attitudes produce cognitive, affective and 
behavioural responses (Guldenmund, 2000).  Therefore, to extend this to the discussion of safety, 
safety attitudes refer to individual and collective beliefs about hazards and the importance of 
safety, together with the motivation to act on those beliefs (Pidgeon, 1991).  Largely, the 
discussion around attitude centered on the attitude of management, which influences the 
organizational environment and subsequently the attitude of frontline workers.  There were also 
numerous calls for a global change in attitude.  Within the literature, it is extensively discussed 
that organizations often try to change attitudes without consideration for organizational features 
(Atkinson, 1990).  Similarly, changes are often made to organizational systems without regard 
for individual behaviour or attitudes (Seddon, 1989).  However, it is known that individuals are 
neither deterministically controlled by their environments nor entirely self-determining (Davis & 
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Powell, 1992).  Bandura models this as a state of reciprocal determinism, where the individual 
and the environmental perpetually influence each other (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 1977).  
Bandura's model has further been adapted (Cooper & Phillips, 2004; Cooper, 1996) to reflect the 
concept of safety culture.  Researchers have applied Bandura’s model to the workplace and 
proposed that the reciprocal causal factors that form an organization’s safety culture are: the 
attitudes, perceptions and beliefs of individuals, their behaviours, and the safety management 
systems (Cooper, 2000).  Therefore, understanding the role of individual attitudes, and the 
reciprocal relationship between the organizational environment and changing attitudes, is 
important for determining in what manner we achieve the necessary attitudinal and 
organizational change.  
 Similar to attitude, safe work behaviour, are critical considerations for a safety 
management system, because culture refers to patterns of behaviour.  Therefore, modifying 
behaviour in an organizational context, by definition, modifies the culture (Hopkins, 2002, p.6): 
“if the behaviour is determined by the organization then the individual’s values will shift 
accordingly, and if the organization constrains the individual to behave safely, the individual will 
begin to value safe behaviour more highly.” Further, the behaviour of management and 
workplace leaders is instrumental in determining the culture of an organization.  Consequently, if 
the behaviour of managers is modified, there is greater potential for organizational changes 
(Hopkins, 2002).  Although behaviour modification has been shown to reduce accident rates in 
some cases, other researchers challenge that focusing on behavioural change diverts attention 
away from the deeper causes of accidents (i.e. understanding why people behave unsafely) 
(Hopkins, 2000).  Therefore, safety behaviour and accidents should be observed at the group 
level rather than the individual level (Neal & Griffin, 2006).   
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 The aim of most safe behaviour strategies is to identify behaviours that are not compliant 
with safe work procedures (Hopkins, 2002).  Behaviour models identify the worker as the main 
cause of the accident, based on the tendency of humans to make errors under various situations 
and environmental conditions (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000).  The foundation of most behaviour 
models is the accident proneness theory (Abdelhamid & Everett, 2000).  The accident proneness 
theory assumes that there are permanent characteristics in a person that make them more likely to 
have an accident.  However, behavioural interventions aimed predominantly at workers, do not 
necessarily solve the potential for a serious event and can detract attention from addressing the 
behaviours of management and supervisors.  
 An important finding was related to how unsafe behaviours became the standard practices 
within many of the mines.  This is consistent with Vaughan’s (1996) concept of the 
normalization of deviance, applied extensively in her analysis of the Challenger Launch to 
explain what happened as a socially organized phenomenon.  Cultures that accept the 
normalization of deviance often have conflicting messages, such as production over safety, 
resulting in poor safety compliance and safety participation.  Safety compliance refers to the core 
activities that individuals conduct to maintain workplace safety, and adhere to the safety 
management system (i.e. wearing personal protective equipment) (Neal & Griffin, 2006), 
whereas safety participation describes behaviour’s that do not directly contribute to an 
individual’s personal safety but assist in developing an environment that supports safety (i.e. 
attending safety meetings) (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  It is evident within many of the reports 
analyzed that safety compliance and safety participation were not normalized practices amongst 
workers, supervisors, or management, for example:  
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“The not-so-subtle message to employees is that MSHA is costing the company money – 
and workers shouldn’t aid in that process. In an organization where deviance is not the 
norm, the same information might be used to deliver a very different message, ‘We have 
some very serious safety problems at this mine, so much so that we’ve racked up a 
million dollars in penalties.’” (Upper Big Branch, 2011, p.101) 
In many of the reports, the normalization of deviance subsequently led to an increase in what is 
justified as acceptable risk.  Risk taking and accident justification are generally the product of 
how an individual perceives their working environment, and is reciprocated through their 
compliance or noncompliance to the safety management system  (Neal & Griffin, 2006; James & 
James, 1989).  Further, the normalization of deviance can be utilized to understand the presence 
of a disconnect between safety standards and actual practices expressed in the inquiries.  In many 
of the inquiries there were references to the legislation, safety systems, and standards present, 
and yet the accidents still occurred.  This is similar to findings from Antonsen (2009) and 
Strauch (2015), that indicated the presence of a gap between perceived and actual demonstrations 
of safety.  Vaughan (1996) found similar occurrences in the Challenger Launch, where the rules 
often still allowed for risk-taking and risk justification to occur. 
 Lastly, the concept of competence was consistently present throughout the entire 
timeframe.  Competence referred to a range of inter-related factors, many of which are reflected 
in Reasons (1998) safety culture model, which references: learning, informed, reporting, just, 
and flexibility.  Frequently it was referenced that there was insufficient competence amongst 
various individuals and roles in the companies that suffered the disasters.  This relates to both the 
informed culture and learning culture referenced in Reason’s model.  An informed culture is 
defined as “a culture in which those who manage and operate the system have current knowledge 
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about the human, technical, organizational and environmental factors that determine the safety of 
the system as a whole” (Reason, 1997).   Whereas, a learning culture refers to the willingness 
and competence of the organization to draw appropriate conclusions from the reporting and 
monitoring systems.  The findings of the study demonstrated consistent concerns regarding the 
training and qualification system, for ensuring individuals are fully competent within their job 
descriptions.  Further, there was evidence of a lack of an ability for the organizational structure 
to accommodate – reflecting the opposite of a flexible culture.  There were also multiple 
references related to failures to report and heed warning signals.  This relates to a reporting 
culture, which supports a feedback system between all levels of an organization that allows 
system failures to be caught prior to an accident occurring.  Reason (1998) emphasizes that in 
order for a reporting culture to function correctly, it must be supported by a just culture which 
allows employees to trust they will be treated fairly by management (Gill & Shergill, 2004).  All 
of the features discussed concern organizational practices, emphasizing that practices are the 
focal point of safety culture (Hopkins, 2002). 
 Consistent with what is widely accepted throughout the literature (Neal & Griffin, 2002; 
DeJoy, 2005), the role of management leadership emerged from the data as a dominant factor 
influencing the seeded safety culture terms.  The role of management was mentioned in 
combination with attitude, attention, and commitment, amongst others, for example:   
“Management's attitudes clearly shaped the manner in which the workplace functioned at 
Westray…Management failed to adopt and effectively promote a safety ethic underground. 
Instead, management, through its actions and attitudes, sent a different message - Westray 
was to produce coal at the expense of worker safety.” (Westray, 1997, p.188) 
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Previous research has demonstrated that management’s commitment to safety, management 
style, and management visibility, are key indicators of an organizations safety culture (Flin et al., 
2000).  Further, it was also noted in the Roben’s report (1972) that because management’s role is 
diffused vertically in organizational hierarchies the dependence on senior management can be 
challenging due to competing concerns with other areas of the organization.  This appeared 
frequently in the analysis, as it was evident that diversion of attention weakened the 
organizations ability to respond and mitigate safety issues.  Therefore, there must be 
commitment from all levels of the organizational structure, initiating with a top-down 
organizational approach (Mohamed, 2003; Choudhry, Fang & Mohamed, 2007; Mearns et al., 
2001; Antonsen, 2009; Hopkins, 2002).   
 Another concept that was consistently identified throughout the analysis was the internal 
responsibility system (IRS).  The IRS refers to the concept of all parties in the workplace 
contributing to detecting and correcting workplace issues that can lead to injury and illness 
(Plummer, Strahlendorf & Holliday, 2000).  Discussion incorporating IRS was evident within  
many of the references reviewed because of its proximity to the seeded safety culture terms, 
including: attention, attitude, behaviour, belief, competent, perceptions, and values.  The 
references frequently discussed roles and responsibilities at different levels of hierarchy. 
Research has found that individuals at different hierarchical levels have different ways of 
conceptualizing and prioritizing work safety (Clarke, 1999). Groups with a greater proportion of 
members who fail to carry out safety behaviours, consequently accumulate a greater number of 
pathogens over time (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  Therefore, noncompliance with safety procedures 
and refusal to participate in activities that enhance safety may not directly affect the person that 
fails to carry out the behaviour, but it may create the condition for someone else to be injured.  
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Responsibilities towards safety have a large influence on the overall safety culture of an 
organization.   
 Findings from the analysis also revealed similarities across the timeframe related to the 
propagation and penetration of the dominant culture throughout the organizations, which created 
various socially excepted practices.  Often this was related to the messages instilled in front line 
workers from their perceptions of management, or from experienced workers.  This relationship 
can be explained using the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964) and expectancy-valence theory 
(Vroom, 1964).  The social exchange theory predicts that if an individual perceives that the 
organization is concerned about safety, they will reciprocate through safe behaviours (Neal & 
Griffin, 2006).  The expectancy-valence theory predicts that employees are motivated to comply 
with safety procedures and participate in safety activities if they believe that these behaviours 
will lead to valued outcomes (Zohar, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006).  It is evident from the findings 
of this study that the unsafe behaviours of many of the workers can be directly linked to how the 
organization led them to believe that safety was not the primary value.  The role of management 
in the propagation of these negative cultures is further explained by Antsonsen (2009).  Antonsen 
(2009) pointed out that organizational cultures typically are bias to reflecting the values of the 
dominant group, or subculture, in the organization.  This is relevant to note because although 
organizational cultures can enhance organizational goals, they can also perpetuate negative 
behaviour, beliefs, attitudes, and values (Pidgeon, 1997).  Therefore, to address cultures, as a 
form of resistance, focus must move beyond individual attitudes to shared cognitions and 
organizational structures. 
 In summary, the findings described in this paper are largely consistent with those of studies 
on safety culture in other industries; as there was limited discussion and inclusion of concepts 
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related to safety culture present within the text. This aligns with the knowledge that it is fairly 
uncommon for safety culture to be directly addressed in investigations of accidents (Stauch, 
2012).  Although limited, the presence of the seeded terms illustrated how complex, multi-
faceted and pervasive safety culture is.  Further, the results provide evidence of a positive 
transition away from viewing safety behaviour and accidents at the individual level, to observing 
accidents from a group level (Neal & Griffin, 2006), as evident from the increasing number of 
safety culture references, and the decreasing number of individual references (i.e. attitude) over 
the samples timeframe.  Analyzing past accidents provides an opportunity to identify where the 
industry can improve its safety culture, and become a system which constantly identifies its own 
vulnerabilities.  If the organization has a positive safety culture, the limitations of the safety 
system will be less influential (Hopkins, 2002).  
4.6 LIMITATIONS 
 Although the study encompasses 50 years, 5 countries, and 10 reports, it is not without 
limitations. The development of the safety culture dictionary was conducted through a review of 
the literature, therefore there may have been additional terms throughout the evolution of the 
concept that were missed in the development of the dictionary.  As there is currently no 
commonly accepted definition of safety culture there is no standard method of assessing the 
breadth of the concept. However, during the Leximancer analysis, in addition to the seeded 
terms, any related automatically-identified terms were extracted during the Generate Thesaurus 
phase through an iterative process (Leximancer Manual, 2014); therefore, decreasing the risk of 
missing any contextually relevant discussion.  Secondly, although the sample itself was large in 
scope, including over 2,000 pages of data, there could have been a more diverse number of 
reports included.  The countries included in the study were all English-speaking countries, that 
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are considered to have good OHS standards and practices.  Therefore, having incorporated 
additional countries that may not have as robust standards for safety may have provided a more 
diverse discussion.  Further, incorporating industries, other than mining, may have provided 
useful insight.  Lastly, commissioned reports, or investigation reports, have the potential to be 
influenced by the authoring body.  This study is limited to the interpretation of what was 
published, however, there may have been discussion throughout the investigation process that 
further discussed safety culture that was not captured in this data.  
4.7 FUTURE RESEARCH 
 As this study has been a retrospective analysis, future research could focus on proactive 
measures of organizational culture.  Proactive measures of safety culture can be utilized to 
analyze potential differences in how recommendations from commissioned reports are 
implemented in the mining industry.  The results of this research could assist an organization’s 
OHS personnel to identify how safety culture may influence the disconnect between the delivery 
of the safety recommendations and the implementation of the recommendation.  Once these gaps 
have been identified, the plan to improve an organization’s safety culture can be developed and 
implemented, from the top (management) to the bottom (underground miners at the rock face).  
This would allow future implementation of recommendations to result in greater compliance and 
improved safety related outcomes.  In addition, once a report has been published and 
recommendations have been implemented within an organization, follow-up research 
incorporating measures of both the recommendation’s uptake and the safety culture towards the 
changes must be completed.  All of this information should then be used to figure out the best 
way to formulate, implement, and follow-up the implementation of recommendations.   
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 Further, although the contexts of various work environments can be different, there is an 
opportunity to learn from occupational accident investigations and recommended practices from 
other countries, industries or variations within the same sector (i.e. metalliferous and coal 
mining) (Turner, 1978; Vuorio et al., 2013; Lind & Kivistö-Rahnasto, 2008).  This research has 
further identified a new methodology for big data analysis that can assist in identifying trends 
over time, and learning opportunities from past lessons.  This type of research and analysis could 
prove useful in other industries across the broader OHS landscape.  This research is important for 
ensuring the lessons learned from previous accidents do not remain stagnant within reports, but 
instead these learnings reach and protect the miners from similar tragedies.   
4.8 IMPLICATIONS & CONCLUSIONS 
 The findings of this study are based on a sample of OHS commissions from the mining 
industry, therefore the implications that can be drawn from the results are applicable primarily to 
the countries which authored the reports.  Through the 2015 mining review, the mining industry 
in Ontario has acknowledged the role all stakeholders have in creating and maintaining a safety 
culture throughout the industry.  This recent call to focus on the industry culture provides further 
support, for the relevance of this research.  There is an opportunity to tackle the current 
recommendations with solutions that not only address hazards through engineering controls, 
regulating and legislation, but that incorporate a broader safety culture approach to eliminate 
latent organizational issues that may challenge new technologies in the future. 
 This historical analysis of the emergence and presence of safety culture in this sample of 
OHS commissioned reports in mining, reveals how the industry has progressed and adapted to 
advancements in organizational safety science.  The concept of safety culture is multi-faceted 
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and incorporates a range of dimensions and terminology.  This research provides a positive 
outlook on the broadening inclusion of safety culture in understanding accidents in the mining 
industry, and moves away from observing accidents from an individual level to an organizational 
level (Neal & Griffin, 2006).  In addition, this study has further identified a new methodology for 
continued research in this area, using big data analysis techniques to learn from lessons of the 
past, without having to endure another industry accident.          
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 
In this Chapter, the main findings of this thesis are summarized, and the implications for 
mining industry stakeholders are discussed.  The broader applicability of the research findings 
across the OHS landscape are also presented, along with a discussion on avenues for future 
research. 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS  
 The overall purpose of the studies presented in chapter 3 and 4 was to review the 
commissioned OHS reports in mining, over the past 50 years, in a two-step approach.  First, it 
was determined whether there were any recommendations that appeared to be consistently 
identified in OHS commissions and reports; and second, how safety culture has been framed in 
the reports was explored.  
 The first objective was accomplished through content analysis.  The objective of the 
initial phase was to determine if there were any recommendations that were stated in more than 
one of the ten, evaluated commissioned reports (Table 5.1).  The second objective utilized a 
seeded analysis using, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS), to 
understand how safety culture was discussed in the same ten commissioned reports (Table 5.1).     
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Table 5.1: Overview of objectives and key findings from chapter 3 and chapter 4.  
Title Objectives  Key Findings 
Chapter 3   Identify if there were any 
recommendations that were 
repeated in mining inquiries, 
over the past 50 years. 
 Determine if similar 
recommendations were 
reported in coal mining and 
metalliferous mining. 
 49 sets of recommendations were 
repeated in multiple mining inquires, 
over the past 50 years.   
 These recommendations were grouped 
into 6 frames, as representative of the 
overall discussion presented through the 
recommendations. 
 Similarities were evident between coal 
mining and metalliferous mining; with 
the exception of recommendations 
related to physical hazards.   
Chapter 4  Investigate if/how safety 
culture was discussed in the 
reports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Determine if references of 
safety culture differ between 
coal and metalliferous mining.   
 There were 964 safety culture terms 
referenced in a contextually relevant 
way.  
 6 key themes emerged within these 964 
references: safety culture, attitude, 
competence, beliefs, patterns, and 
norms. 
 The themes were reduced to define 
safety culture in two frames: the 
individual; and the organization.  
 
 Similarities were evident between coal 
and metalliferous mining.   
 
 
5.2 IMPLICATIONS  
 During the analysis, the following quote from the Sago report (2006) stood out, as it 
emphasizes the importance of this thesis: 
“The UMWA [United Mine Workers of America] made many of these same 
recommendations after the September 23, 2001 Jim Walter #5 disaster. Had they been 
implemented, the events at Sago, Alma, and Darby may have been avoided. MSHA [Mine 
Safety and Health Administration] has a responsibility to move forward with these 
recommendations immediately. The United Mine Workers of America and the nation do not 
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intend to see more miners die as a result of regulatory inaction at any level of the 
government” (p.17).     
The four mine disasters referenced in that statement alone, Sago (n=12), Alma (n=1), Darby 
(n=5), and Jim Walter #5 (n=13) took the lives of 31 miners due to electrocution, carbon 
monoxide poisoning, explosion forces; asphyxia; and thermal burns (Mine Safety and Health 
Administration, 2001, 2006, 2008).  Based on the repeating recommendations highlighted in 
chapter 3, the list of events that “may have been avoided,” had recommendations been 
implemented, could now include Upper Big Branch (2010) and Pike River (2012), amongst 
many others.  The mining industry, including the various associations, companies, regulators, 
and governments that influence it, have a collective responsibility to act on the recommendations 
and enforce compliance with legislation.  The following sections will outline how the findings of 
the presented studies are relevant to different stakeholders in the industry, and will utilize change 
management literature, learning theories, and accident investigations from other industries, to 
attempt to isolate why recommendations fail to be implemented or accepted into practice.  
Mining Legislative Review Committee  
 Established under section 21 of the OHSA, the Mining Legislative Review Committee 
(MLRC) provides assistance, advice and recommendations to the Minister of Labour, regarding 
health and safety hazards affecting the mining industry (WSN, 2017a).  The MLRC is comprised 
of representatives from both labour and management, and is facilitated by ministry staff.  
The MLRC also establishes sub-committees that focus on particular hazards, and assist in 
developing recommendations for proposed changes to regulations.  The members of the MLRC 
may have interest in the findings of this study in two respects. First, recommendations aimed at 
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legislative and regulative changes were present in all commissions analyzed in chapter 3 
(Appendix 3A), with numerous examples of overlap and repeating recommendations. Second, 
minimal safety culture concepts were identified in the chapter 4 analysis.  Although safety 
culture cannot be legislated (Wood & Bandura, 1989; Hendry, 1996), one possible approach the 
MLRC could consider, is addressing how safety culture can impact regulation compliance, and 
how that in-turn impacts the formulation of legislative or regulative recommendations.  This 
relates to the concept of the internal responsibility system (IRS).   
 
 In Ontario, the OHS act is founded on the IRS, which legislates that everyone in the 
workplace has a role in keeping the workplace safe and healthy (Government of Ontario, 2015). 
Further, it means that all employees have a statutory duty to report any unsafe situation to their 
employer or supervisor, and that the employers or supervisors are required to address the 
situation (Government of Ontario, 2015).  The three basic elements of the IRS system are: the 
right to know, the right to participate, and the right to refuse unsafe work.  Without a positive 
safety culture, the basic elements of the IRS system can be challenged.  For example, if there is a 
culture of production/production pressure in the workplace, employees are less likely to refuse 
unsafe work, thereby propagating a poor safety culture.  The 2015 Mining Review published two 
recommendations specific to the IRS (Recommendations 6.1 & 6.2).  In order to adequately 
address these recommendations, the IRS and safety culture will need to be treated as interrelated 
concepts, that have the potential to impact regulation compliance.  When a disconnect exists 
between the corporate culture and the change, culture can diminish the strength of the change 
initiative (Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer, 2002).   
 
 Of additional relevance to organizations like the MLRC, are the findings that were noted in 
the recommendation analysis (chapter 3), related to the choice of language used in the 
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formulation of recommendations.  There were occasions where an initial recommendation 
‘suggested’ a change, and the following report published x-years later would restate the 
recommendation with stronger language, such as ‘regulate’ or ‘mandate.’  For example, in 1981 
it was recommended that “that wherever practical, fall-on protection be installed on all man-
operated underground equipment” (Burkett et al., 1981, p.233), five years later in 1986 it was 
recommended that “Fall-On Protection shall be mandatory on all vehicles operating in areas 
requiring this type of protection” (Stevenson et al., 1986, p.69).  In the change management 
literature, Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer (2002) stated that the process in which change is 
introduced sets the tone for recipients with respect to acceptance or rejection.  Therefore, if a 
recommendation for change leaves room for interpretation errors, it may lead to organizational 
resistance.  This may indicate a need for the MLRC to further consider how recommendations 
are formulated, and the specific semantic considerations for how they will be interpreted by 
industry. 
 Lastly, the MLRC recently established four new subcommittees to focus on the high-risk 
health and safety hazards in the Ontario mining sector, including: ground control, traffic 
management, water management, and ventilation and industrial hygiene (WSN, 2017b).  The 
findings from chapter 3 identified recommendations from the studied reports that are relevant to 
members of each of the new subcommittees (Table 5.2 or Appendix 5A).  This highlights an 
opportunity for the MLRC to investigate or reflect on why these recommendations are 
reappearing or what can be learned from previous attempts to implement related change.    
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Table 5.2 Summary of the number of recommendations pertaining to the Mining Legislative 
Review Committee’s new subcommittees.  
 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Ground 
Control 
1  1 34  3    2 
Traffic 
Management 
      3 2   
Water 
Management 
     3     
Ventilation & 
Industrial 
Hygiene 
 73  1 8 23 16 9  3 
Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development 
 In Canada, the Constitution Act gives exclusive authority to each province to make laws in 
relation to education. In Ontario, the Minister of Education and the Minister of Advanced 
Education and Skills Development (MAESD) are responsible for the administration of laws 
relating to education and skills training (MAESD, 2017).  The MAESD is responsible for 
delivering training services, developing policy, setting standards for occupational training, 
particularly for trades under the Trades Qualification and Apprenticeship Act, and managing 
provincial programs to support workplace training and workplace preparation. Related to mining, 
workplace-based skills training is conducted through modular training delivered by the industry, 
compulsory under the OHSA, and administered by the Ministry of Labour.  The MAESD 
modular training programs are then developed and delivered by accredited organizations, such as 
Workplace Safety North, Workers’ Health and Safety Centre, and the Northern Centre for 
Advanced Technology which serve the Northern Ontario mining industry. The findings of 
chapter 3 identified recommendations related to training, education and competence in all of the 
reports analyzed (Table 3.6 and Appendix 3C) and provided insight into who, what, where, 
when, and how the industry learns.  However, there were numerous examples of 
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recommendations related to training, education and competence that overlapped between reports. 
This suggest that there may be a disconnect between how learning is approached in the industry.  
 The literature on learning theory discusses the difference between learning opportunities 
for individuals, and organizational learning, and posits that learning at the organizational level is 
not necessarily the sum of the people learning.  Instead organizational learning is captured and 
embedded in ongoing systems, practices, and structures, so that it can be shared and regularly 
used to intentionally improve changes in knowledge performance.  In contrast to the literature, 
the findings from Chapter 3 found that recommendations related to training, education, and 
competence focused on the individual learners, in structured contexts, with minimal 
consideration for organizational learning, or learning culture.  For example, recommendations 
frequently related to training for engineers or inspectors, and training specific to ground control 
and rock mechanics.  These types of recommendations for structured training are supported 
through competency models (Marsick, 1988; Watkins, 1992); however, there is an increased 
awareness that valuable learning often happens informally on the job, in groups, or through 
conversations (Huber Institute for Learning in Organizations, 2002).  This style of unstructured 
learning needs to be supported by a learning culture, that is embedded in the organization’s 
capacity to adapt or to respond in novel ways while working to remove barriers to learning.   
 A key aspect of an organization’s ability to capture new learning is how it facilitates the 
dissemination of that learning to current and future employees (Marsick & Watkins, 2003).  The 
forecasted changes with staffing in the Ontario Mining industry, provide greater emphasis on the 
importance of organizational learning.  It is projected that by 2018, approximately 50% of 
Ontario miners will exit the industry (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2009) creating 
large hiring requirements and training needs (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2013), 
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along with a loss of organizational knowledge and history that those workers may possess.  It 
was reported that the Ontario mining industry usually has 14,900 new workers over 10 years; 
however, current estimates report that the sector may require up to 59,000 new employees by 
2023 (Mining Industry Human Resources Council, 2013).  
 Kletz (1993) emphasized that “organizations have no memory; only people have 
memories and they move on” (p.4).  Learning theory tells us that individuals learn by their own 
experience; however, it is unusual for the same accident to occur to the same person twice, and 
people are slower to learn from the experience of others.  The concept of organizational memory 
is particularly relevant to the mining industry in the present because of the approaching 
retirement wave.  The individuals that experience an accident, or are even employed by an 
organization at the time of an accident, are more likely to remember it.  Therefore, changes that 
come of the accident are more likely to be understood by those workers.  However, when those 
workers leave, the memory of why the change occurred may dissipate with them.  Kletz (1993) 
suggests that to combat this dimming of memory, every instruction, code and standard should 
reference the reason why.  For example, adding accounts of accidents that would not have 
occurred if the instruction, code or standard had been followed; describing old accidents, as well 
as recent ones, in safety bulletins and newsletters and discuss them; and develop better retrieval 
systems to more easily access details of past accidents in our own and other companies.  Overall, 
what this reiterates, is that ‘why’ a recommendation is being put forward, should be connected 
and disseminated with the recommendation itself.  This also emphasizes that it is not enough to 
hold individuals accountable for learning, an organizations capacity must also be built to support, 
encourage, and make use of that learning (Marsick & Watkins, 2003).   
 Future research should more specifically measure the mining industries’ learning culture.  
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Marsick & Watkins (2003) developed the Dimensions of the Learning Organization 
Questionnaire (DLOQ) which measures shifts in an organization’s climate, culture, systems, and 
structures that influence whether individuals learn. The DLOQ is based on seven dimensions of 
the learning organization (Marsick & Watkins, 1999; Watkins & Marsick, 1993, 1996): 
1. Create continuous learning opportunities;  
2. Promote inquiry and dialogue;  
3. Encourage collaboration and team learning;  
4. Create systems to capture and share learning; 
5. Empower people toward a collective vision;  
6. Connect the organization to its environment; and  
7. Provide strategic leadership for learning. 
 Based on research conducted using the DLOQ, which measure organizations against the 
dimensions of the learning organization, a correlation between the learning organization 
dimensions and knowledge and financial performance is evident (Watkins, Selden, & Marsick, 
1997; Watkins, Yang, & Marsick, 1997; & Yang, Watkins, & Marsick, 1998).  The findings 
presented in Chapter 3 and 4, provide an initial step in seeing how the industry has learned from 
past experiences. If an organization has a strong learning culture, not only are the employees 
technically competent, but the organizational structure will be able to accommodate change, and 
identify and eliminate latent organizational issues that may challenge the system in the future 
(Reason, 1998).    
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Privy Council Office of Canada  
 In Canada, Commissions of Inquiry are established by the Cabinet, to fully and 
impartially investigate issues of national importance (Government of Canada, 2016).  There are 
several types of Commissions of Inquiry established under Part I or Part II of the Inquiries Act, 
and federal statutes. Broadly, commissions are classified as advisory or investigative 
(Government of Canada, 2016).  The findings of this study have additional relevance to how 
governments contemplating a future public inquiry and future commissions might approach it. 
Inquiries have the power to collect a wealth of information and provide opportunities to impact 
the industry in a substantial way.  However, inquiries and reports are only effective if industries 
and governments learn from them.  This thesis has shown that recommendations are reappearing 
in subsequent commissioned reports (Chapter 3, Table 3.4-3.9). Furthermore, the same themes as 
identified decades earlier reappear (Chapter 3, Figue 3.1), suggesting that the current process of 
calling for, completing, formulating, and implementing recommendations needs to be evaluated.  
The debate surrounding Royal Commission’s or Inquiries has been discussed for over 150 years, 
with references of criticism in Canada dating back to 1849 (i.e. J. Toulmin Smith, Government 
by Commissions, Illegial and Pernicious).  Lockwood (1967) pointed out, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 3, that many of the arguments advocated today, both for and against the validity and 
usefulness of Royal Commissions, are “simply a rehashing of opinions expressed more than one 
hundred years ago” (p.199).  
In 2015, the Scottish Parliament published a report on the Inquiries into Fatal Accidents 
and Sudden Deaths Bill.  This Bill was introduced with the aim of reforming the law in relation 
to fatal accident inquiries (FAIs).  One of the key elements of this Bill is that when a Sheriff 
makes a recommendation, the relevant person/organization, whom the recommendations are 
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addressed, has 8 week to respond; explaining how they will implement, or why they will not be 
implementing the recommendation.  This Bill stemmed, in part, from the results of a thematic 
review of FAIs which examined 88 cases of FAIs and involved representatives from the Mental 
Welfare Commission, British Transport Police, Air Accidents Investigation Branch, Maritime 
and Coastguard Agency, Marine Accident Investigation Branch, Health and Safety Executive, 
Healthcare Improvement Scotland, Care Inspectorate, Central Legal Office, and the Scottish 
Government.  From this study, and the consideration of the former Bill, the Scottish Justice 
Committee acknowledged that recommendations “to prevent future incidents [were] not always 
implemented and lessons [were] not being learned from those accidents” (Scottish Justice 
Committee, 2015, p.33).  Lack of implementation in the past was attributed to the lack of 
awareness of the party addressed through the recommendation. The dissemination of information 
is instrumental to the implementation of recommendations and compliance to the change.  
Organizations often fail to record and circulate the lessons learned from past accidents, or the 
recommendations never reach the recipient. The report also discussed the concept of making 
recommendations legally enforceable; however, this was overturned as it was acknowledged that 
recommendations may not always be realistic or affordable, or may cause issues with 
enforcement (Scottish Justice Committee, 2015, p.33-35).  Therefore, the system of requiring 
rebuttals from the recommendation recipients is viewed as being of a greater advantage for 
creating change, and allowing recommendations from a particular inquiry to have the potential 
for broader implications in other contexts.  The findings presented in this study, are therefore 
relevant to governments, commission counsels, lawyers, researchers, and others directly involved 
or influenced by future public inquiries.  
 Commissions are also the most expensive form of public inquiry, due to the length, 
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employment and administration fees (Prasser, 2006).  It is often viewed that governments resort 
to Commissions on the basis of perceived prestige (Prasser, 2006).  Governments have further 
been criticized for making appointments based on the electoral cycle.  For example, typically a 
government will not appoint a commission that is scheduled to report too close to an election, as 
it may result in politically damaging findings.  Lastly, Johnson (2000) reported that the use of 
obscure language often limits the ability to present information effectively.  Therefore, it is 
recognized that not all inquiries are free from external influences, such as: the political 
landscape, the terms of reference, the legislation governing safety and the investigation process 
(i.e. time and resource constraints) (Quinlan, 2014).   
 Another consideration when conducting historical analysis of such reports, is the 
influence of how investigations are shaped by the current technical knowledge, dominant 
discourses and community structures during the time period when the commission was 
completed.  Furthermore, preoccupations with certain influences can detract attention from other 
underlying failures, which can introduce bias into the final published report.  For example, the 
inquiry into the Moura mine disaster (1995), a methane gas explosion killing eleven men in 
Australia, blamed the disaster on technical failures and management neglect.  However, Hopkins 
(2000) studied the disaster using a sociological approach and identified that there was a very 
influential culture of denial, which led to misbeliefs of vulnerability to hazards, dismissing 
warning signs, and the normalization of deviance, contributing to the disasters occurrence.  This 
illustrates that the best way to “prevent recurrence is not to focus on a discrete set of causes but 
to identify some background factor that, if changed, would prevent a recurrence” (Hopkins, 
2013, p.5).  This has also been evident in other studies following accident inquiries, such as 
Vaughan’s (1996) rejection of the prevalent explanations of the cause of the NASA Challenger 
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disaster.  The Presidential Commission into the disaster attributed the cause of the accident to a 
technical failure of the O-ring, which seals a critical joint of the solid rocket booster.  Vaughan 
used a sociological approach to identify deeper root causes of the failure, including the culture at 
NASA and the normalization of deviance.  Vaughan further described that NASA’s culture 
provided “a way of seeing that was simultaneously a way of not seeing” (1996, p.394).  
Researchers must recognize that the findings identified in an investigation report are influenced 
by how the investigation was conducted and the political and social climate of the time.  
Although if done well, Commissions can help identify organizational weakness, the findings of 
repetition presented in Chapter 3, and the continued debate on the role of Commissions provokes 
additional reflection prior to establishing future Commissions.  
Ontario Mine Rescue Technical Advisory Committee  
 The formation of the Ontario Mine Rescue (OMR) association came out of a 
recommendation published in the Royal Commission of Safety in Mines (1976), with the initial 
mandate to respond to underground mine fires, under the Department of Mines.  Then, in 1986, 
the Report of the Provincial Inquiry into Ground Control and Emergency Preparedness in 
Ontario Mines recommended that the organization’s mandate expand to respond to non-fire 
emergencies as well (Stevenson et al., 1986). Within the OMR is the Mine Rescue Technical 
Advisory Committee (TAC), established to promote the continual improvement of emergency 
preparedness of Ontario mines (WSN, 2017b).  The OMR-TAC provides advice and 
recommendations regarding mine rescue emergency equipment requirements, research areas, and 
changes to the rescue handbook.  Organizations, such as the OMR-TAC may have interest in the 
findings of this study, as emergency management and mine rescue recommendations were 
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identified in almost all reports in the 50-year sample (Table 3.7 and Appendix 3D).  The OMR-
TAC is currently working on topics including: team communication, heat stress, competency 
based training, refuge station design and developing an emergency response risk assessment tool, 
many of which have been discussed before (Table 5.3 or Appendix 5B).  In approaching these 
projects, the studies presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4 provide insight into the benefit of 
looking at the lessons learned in previous accident investigations, as a starting point of 
establishing solutions that will stop the cycle of similar recommendations appearing.  Further, if 
organizations such as the OMR-TAC consider the degree of overlap of rescue related 
recommendations presented in chapter 3 (Table 3.7 and Appendix 3D), and the minimal safety 
culture discussion from chapter 4 they may be able to develop a better approach for OMR 
emergency response.  In Ontario, the OMR is the result of recommendations; this provides 
support for how valuable these recommendations can be if adopted by industry and government.     
Table 5.3 Summary of the number of recommendations pertaining to the Ontario Mine Rescue 
Technical Advisory Committee Current Projects.  
 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015 
Team 
Communication 
      6 6 2 1 
Heat Stress           
Competency 
Based Training 
   1   6 2   
Refuge Station 
Design  
   1   3  1  
Emergency 
Response Risk 
Assessment 
Tool 
     2 8 1  1 
 
Ontario Ministry of Labour 
 In 2015, the Ontario Ministry of Labour (MOL) published the Mining Health, Safety and 
Prevention review, which produced 18 recommendations, for the Ontario mining industry to 
address.  Chapter 3 provides evidence of previous recommendations that overlap with 10 of the 
18 recent recommendations (Table 5.4 or Appendix 5C).  The results presented, and the 
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methodology utilized in this study, may therefore be of interest to the MOL.  For example, the 
methodology presented in this study can be utilized for further studies incorporating other 
countries, industries, and different types of mining.  This methodology can also be utilized to 
address specific recommendations, such as Recommendation 5.4 which speaks to the need for an 
aggregate analysis of all past inquests into mining fatalities, to improve future inquests in the 
mining sector. The MOL has access to numerous reports which contain a wealth of information 
that can reveal important considerations for prevention, and this big data methodology provides a 
proven means to learn from these past reports. 
 
Table 5.4 Summary of the number of recommendations demonstrating overlap with the new 
Mining Health Safety and Prevention Review Recommendations.  
 
  1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 
Health & Safety 
Hazards 
1.1          
1.2  1        
1.3          
1.4          
1.5          
1.6  10      1  
New Tech. & 
Management of 
Change Process 
2.1          
Emergency 
Preparedness & 
Mine Rescue 
3.1     2 2  1 2 
3.2       2 3  
3.3   2 1   4   
Training, Skills 
and Labour 
Supply Issues 
4.1   1 2      
4.2    4 1 1    
Capacity of the 
OHS System  
5.1  1        
5.2 4 5 3  2 9 2 1 2 
5.3          
5.4          
Internal 
Responsibility 
System 
6.1    6      
6.2          
 
Mining Companies  
Government agencies regularly use the argument that ‘safety pays’ as a way of motivating 
employers to attend to occupational health and safety (Hopkins, 1999).  However, recent 
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approaches have attempted to use corporate social responsibility (CSR) frameworks to link 
organizations social responsibility beyond compliance with law, to investing in human capital, 
and managing relationships with social stakeholders that are affected by outcomes of the 
organization (European Commission, 2006).  CSR provides a framework to connect OHS and 
welfare to other relevant aspects, such as: human resources, work-life balance, fundamental 
rights, environmental issues, safety and public health, profitability and productivity (Segal, 
Sobczak & Triomphe, 2003).  If mining companies incorporated their business practices to 
integrate CSR-OHS, beyond legislation compliance it could potentially have a top-down 
influence that could improve the organizational safety culture.  Further, although the cost of 
making a company safer can be high, the costs of not doing so can be much higher.  The cost of 
an accident takes into consideration direct cost (i.e. medical experiences, lost time and 
production) and indirect financial costs (i.e. training replacement workers), as well as human 
costs (Reese, 2016).  Lane (2016) said “successful businesses understand the importance of cost 
control; the cost of not prioritizing safety can be staggering - in both financial and human terms” 
(p.28).  Therefore, mining companies may be interested in the findings of this study (chapter 3) 
as it highlights numerous direct and indirect costs repeating, as well as human lives being lost.   
 Through this studies analysis (chapter 3) numerous examples of the reports referencing the 
need to share information, accident data, safety equipment, etc. were identified.  For example, 
the Pike River (2012) report mandated a “compar[ison] with any similar matters in other 
countries” (p.7).  Upper Big Branch (2010) referenced that “lifelines were already general 
practice in a number of other countries” (p.47), and Sago (2006) said “MSHA did not require the 
use of tracking devices to locate trapped miners underground, even though such technology has 
been available for over 30 years and is used widely in other countries” (p.IV). The recent 2015 
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Mining Review has again recommended the need to share information on emerging injury and 
illness trends and information on incidents causing injury across the industry (recommendation 
6.1).   
 Thirdly, large organizations, or industries, are comprised of different, and sometimes 
over-lapping social sub-groupings.  Sinclair and Haines (1993) referenced examples, such as: air 
crew and ground maintenance; engineers and scientists; managers and workers; permanent staff 
and sub-contractors; site A compared to site B.  Researchers have further identified that within 
these groups there can be additional distinctions of unique safety sub-cultures (O'Leary & 
Pidgeon, 1995; Gherardi, Nicolini & Odella, 1996). These references are only a small sample of 
the learning opportunities that were missed, or learned too late, and illustrate the importance of 
mining companies, and international safety organizations advocating and collaborating on 
opportunities to ensure they are always learning from others in the industry.  
 International safety organizations, such as the International Labour Organization have 
attempted to improve the sharing of knowledge, through databases, like the International Mining 
Fatality database (IMFD).  The IMFD was created to establish a global record of all incidents, 
which caused fatalities in the last 142 years, with the majority of the data from 1980-2008 (when 
reporting regulations were strengthened) (MacNeill, 2008).  However, there was large 
discrepancies with access to information and reporting practices from different countries.  Other 
organizations like the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) publish 
‘Fatalgrams’ which are factsheets that are shared across sectors when there is a fatality.  Similar 
attempts at safety sharing have been evident in other industries, such as aviation.  In 2003, the 
Netherlands recommended the creation of a combined air accidents investigation authority with 
Belgium, Germany and Luxembourg to concentrate air traffic data in one place and allow 
  188 
 
learning to occur from each other’s accident experiences, to eliminate repeat mistakes.  
Therefore, safety organizations may have an interest in the findings of this study as it provides a 
methodology for conducting big data analysis, that can identify trends in a range of safety data, 
to hopefully prevent future accidents.  
 
5.3 FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS  
 The finding from this thesis reiterate the importance of reviewing what has already been 
published to ensure that all possible lessons have been learned, and not forgotten, from the past. 
As recently stated in the Mining Review (2015, p.7): 
“All partners in Ontario’s mining occupational health and safety system – the Ministry of 
Labour, the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, the relevant Health and Safety 
Associations, the joint occupational health and safety committees or representatives and 
workers and employers – play a critical role in creating a health and safety culture.”  
The mining industry in Ontario is acknowledging the role all stakeholders have in creating and 
maintaining a safety culture throughout the industry; providing further support for the relevance 
of these findings.  With the 2015 mining review, there is a new round of recommendations, and a 
new opportunity for researchers, and industry stakeholders to be reminded of what we can learn 
from past reports.  Further, it is an opportunity to tackle the current recommendations with 
solutions that not only address hazards through engineering controls, regulating and legislation, 
but that incorporate a broader safety culture approach to eliminate latent organizational issues 
that may challenge new technologies in the future. 
 The studies presented in chapter 3 and 4 explored repeating recommendations, and 
provided insight into the broader conversation around safety culture, in mining.  Acknowledging 
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that there were multiple sets of overlapping recommendations, paired with minimal discussion 
directly related to safety culture in the accident causation chain, suggests the need for further 
research to address this gap.  As was explored in chapter 2, models of accident causation have 
evolved over time to reflect the shift in understanding from a basic outline of the sequence of 
events, to a broader representation of the whole system (Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & 
Manatakis, 2009).  However, as is evident from the findings reported in this study (Figure 4.1), 
the concept of safety culture is only briefly discussed in the commission reports.  This may 
indicate a need to further evolve the accident causation models, and subsequently the accident 
investigation methods, to better incorporate a broader range of causal factors.  Doing so may be 
associated with different recommendations for improvement being produced (Kataskiori, 
Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 2009; Lundberg, Rollenhagen & Hollnagel, 2009).  Although this 
is a debated topic, with some researchers arguing that the direct assessment of safety culture 
during accident investigations may produce misleading results (i.e. Strauch, 2015, others, such as 
Callaghan, of the Pike River (2012) investigation, believe that “to dismiss safety culture as too 
complex and intangible [would be] to ignore a core element of the disaster” (Vol. 2, p.174).  
New accident causation models, such as that developed by Bonsu et al. (2016) presented an 
accident analysis technique applicable to the mining industry, based on the existing frameworks 
complexity, and not adequately accounting for all the factors that contribute to accidents in 
mining.  This model considers a far greater range of systemic factors (i.e. training and 
competency; contractor management; design; management of change; hazard identification; 
monitoring and auditing; maintenance management; resource provision; strategic 
decision/planning; risk management; leadership; work scheduling; and emergency response) and 
identifies ways in which the actions of top hierarchies of organizations contribute to an accident 
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process. Currently, the framework has only been applied to the investigation of the United States 
Jim Walter Coal Mine disaster in 2001.  Therefore, future research may seek to validate this 
framework’s relevance for the Ontario mining context, with the potential for becoming the 
standard of practice.   
 Further, as supported in the literature, organizational change research should be 
conducted longitudinally (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999).  The strength of conducting change 
research longitudinally, is that it captures how change emerges, develops, continues and 
terminates overtime (Van de Ven & Huber, 1990) and allows a more comprehensive 
understanding of the dynamics of change.  A recent study published by Yau (2014) utilized an 
occupational safety culture index measuring the community’s and employee’s awareness, 
attitudes, and knowledge towards workplace safety and health in the Hong Kong construction 
industry from 1986 to 2013.  The study found that the development of a safety culture noticeably 
reduced the number of accidents.  Another study by Park (2013) analyzed methods of preventing 
noise-induced hearing loss in the workplace, over 40 years, in one company’s hearing 
conservation program.  The study found that the two key factors for successful culture change in 
this case study were leadership and action learning.  Therefore, to build off the findings 
presented in chapter 4, and the success of similar studies in other industries, a longitudinal study 
would be required to determine if there is a link between organizations, an organization’s safety 
culture, and indications of improved safety-related outcomes (such as performance of safe work 
practices (DeJoy & Southern, 1993; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Mattila, Hyttinen & Rantanen, 1994), 
safety program effectiveness (Cheyne et al., 1998; Zohar, 1980), and reduction in accidents, near 
misses, and other safety incidents (Dedobbleer & Beland, 1991; Gillen et al., 2002)) in the 
mining industry.  Similarly, this could be conducted to identify specific elements of safety 
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culture, based on the Reason model (1998), such as an organization’s learning culture, measured 
through uptake of recommendations for change, or resistance to change.  Further, this study 
addressed only English language reports, therefore future studies could also examine reports 
from additional countries and mining regions, to gain an even greater global perspective.    
 Bernard Lewis (1975) distinguished three types of history: history remembered, where 
the knowledge of the past has been passed on without a break; history recovered, where 
knowledge of events have been completely forgotten but brought back to light; and history 
invented, where history is described inaccurately.  Unless changes are made to the process of 
formulating recommendations, the history of mining accidents may reflect a fourth type of 
history: history repeated.  The assessment of reactions to organizational change within the 
mining industry, following substantial reviews or commissions such as those included in this 
study, could provide insight into the consistent repetition and reframing of recommendations.  
Learning from literature relating to other industries, the culture of the organization influences its 
reaction to accepting or resisting change (Mento, Jones & Dirndorfer, 2002).  Identifying barriers 
to change could then be considered in future frameworks for planning and implementing 
organizational change, OHS or otherwise.  Further, this could assist OHS personnel in 
identifying how safety culture may influence the disconnect between the delivery of safety 
related changes and the implementation of recommendations.  Once these disconnects have been 
identified, the plan to improve an organization’s safety culture can be developed and 
implemented.  This would allow future implementation of recommendations to result in greater 
compliance and improved safety related outcomes.  Lastly, an additional component of 
commissioned reports should be a required measure of both recommendation uptake and the 
safety culture towards the change.  Therefore, future studies should address the readiness to 
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change of the mining industry to identify best practices for formulating, implementing, and 
following-up on the implementation of recommendations.  Ensuring the industries readiness to 
change would help make certain that lessons learned from previous accidents do not remain 
stagnant within reports, but instead these learnings reach and protect the miners from future 
tragedies.   
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APPENDIX 2 
Appendix 2D: Accident Investigation methods and applications as discussed by Kataskiori, Sakellaropoulos & Manatakis, 
(2009) 
Accident 
Investigation 
Method 
Year Description  Application  
Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA)  
 
 
1960 In FTA, an undesired event is selected and all possible elements that can contribute to the event are diagrammed as a 
tree in order to show logical connections and causes leading to a specified accident. The use of the tree allows 
investigators to represent graphically the logical combinations of causes of the defined top event. FTA is the most 
widely used of the tree techniques. 
Department of National 
Defence.  
Management 
oversight and risk 
tree (MORT) 
1973 In MORT, the accident is defined as an unwanted energy transfer because of inadequate energy barriers and/or 
controls. The MORT diagram is a logic tree (the accident being the top event) with three main branches: the specific 
oversights and omissions associated with the accident being investigated, the assumed risks which are risks known 
but for some reason not controlled, and factors which are general characteristics of the management system that 
contributed to the mishap. 
Large and bureaucratic 
organizations; nuclear 
industry.   
Multilinear events 
sequencing (MES) 
1975 MES is a charting technique, which shows events chronologically ordered on a time-line basis. It is based on the view 
that an accident begins when a stable situation is disturbed. The aim of the method is to help the analyst to identify 
the main actors and their actions and map the relations between the events along a flexible time line. 
National Transportation 
Safety Board.  
Bowtie Method 1979 The Bowtie method is used to analyze and demonstrate causal relationships in high risk situations.  The bowtie 
analyses chains of events.  It incorporates the fault tree, the event tree and causal factor charting. The bowtie also 
identifies control measures that an organization has in place.  
Oil & gas industry, aviation, 
mining, maritime, chemical 
and health care. 
Systematic cause 
analysis technique 
(SCAT) 
1980 SCAT is presented as a chart which contains five blocks corresponding to five stages in the accident causation 
process, including: the accident description, the most common categories of contact that could have led to the 
accident, the most common immediate causes of this contact, the underlying causes, and safety management practices 
that should be addressed to prevent accidents from occurring. 
Use in many types of 
accidents.  
Causal tree method 
(CTM) 
1978 The CTM attests that accidents result from variations or deviations in the usual process. There are four classes of 
variations: those related to the individual, the task, the equipment and the environment, respectively. The tree starts 
with the end event and works backwards. The analyst has to identify and list the variations and then display them in 
the analytic tree. 
Use in occupational 
accidents.  
Occupational 
Accident Research 
Unit (OARU) 
1981 The method has two levels of reasoning: describing the accident sequence, and finding the determining factors. The 
accident sequence has three phases: the initial, the concluding phase, and the injury phase.  The determining factors 
are technical, organizational and social properties of the production system that affect the accident sequence. 
Investigating near misses in 
the nuclear industry.  
TRIPOD 1994 TRIPOD follows Reason’s accident causation model. The idea behind TRIPOD is that organizational failures are the 
main factors in accident causation. An accident occurs when one or more barriers fail. Unsafe acts (active failures) 
are the direct reason for the failure of barriers, which do not just occur but they are generated by underlying 
Use in occupational 
accidents across all sectors 
of activity.  
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mechanisms acting in organizations. 
Accident evolution 
and barrier function 
(AEB) 
1991 The AEB approach is a stand-alone method and addresses safety barriers and their functions. An accident is modeled 
as a series of interactions between human and technical systems. The main principle is that it is possible to 
stop/interrupt the development of the sequence between any two successive errors (human or technical) through 
adequate barrier functions. 
Use in complex accidents in 
the high-tech industries, and 
particularly for the oil 
Industry. 
Integrated safety 
investigation 
methodology (ISIM) 
1998 ISIM forces the investigator to look beyond the actions and decisions of front-line operators and into the latent unsafe 
conditions in the work system that provided the opportunity for the expression of those actions. 
Use in transportation 
systems: aviation, railways, 
maritime and pipeline 
systems. 
Norske Statesbaner 
(NSB) 
2000 The method identifies the sequence of events and where barriers were broken or missing, and addresses factors such 
as procedures/documentation, training, communication, human-systems interface, tools and equipment, work 
preparation and local management, organizational management, work environment and task completion. 
Developed specifically for 
the rail industry. 
Work accidents 
investigation 
technique (WAIT) 
2003 The method comprises two sequential phases: the identification of active failures in the sequence of events and the 
consequences, and the identification and analysis of individual and job factors and it finishes with the identification 
of organizational and management deficiencies. 
Use in occupational 
accidents across all sectors 
of industrial activity. 
Health and Safety 
Executive (HSG245) 
2004 The aim of the analysis is to set out the reasons why the accident happened and find immediate, underlying and root 
causes. Immediate cause can be the agent of injury, underlying causes are unsafe acts and conditions and root cause is 
the failure from which all other failings grow, often remote in time and space from the accident. 
Use in occupational 
accidents across all sectors 
of activity. 
Control change cause 
analysis (3CA) 
2007 The 3CA views an accident/incident as sequence of events in which unwanted changes occur. The method is 
designed to identify events in the sequence which are ‘’significant” in the sense that they reduce control and allow 
further unwanted changes to occur and identify barriers and controls that could have prevented them or limited their 
effects. 
Use in occupational 
accidents across all sectors 
of activity. 
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Appendix 2E: Definitions of safety culture 
Author Definition 
Mearns, Whitaker & Flin, 
2001 
That assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals, which establishes that, as an over; safety 
culture as a shared set of beliefs and attitudes by employees concerning the prioritization of safety issues and the 
maintenance of safe working conditions within the organization. 
Mearns & Flin, 1999 Safety culture has been described in terms of values, beliefs, attitudes, social mores, norms, rules, practices, 
competencies, and behavior. 
Hopkins, 2002 Safety culture is the assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that as 
an over-riding priority ... safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance. 
Reason, 1998 Safety culture: as something an organization is (the beliefs, attitudes and values of its members regarding the pursuit of 
safety), and as something that an organization has (the structures, practices, controls and policies designed to enhance 
safety). 
Cox & Flin, 1998 The beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles and social and technical practices concerned with minimizing the exposure of 
employees, managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or injurious. 
Uttal, 1983  Definition of safety culture captures most of its essentials: ‘Shared values (what is important) and beliefs (how things 
work) that interact with an organization’s structures and control systems to produce behavioural norms (the way we do 
things around here)’. 
Hale, 2000 Safety culture, on the other hand, refers to ‘the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions shared by natural groups as defining 
norms and values, which determine how they react in relation to risks and risk control systems.’  
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-
Peón & Vàzquez-Ordás, 2007 
 
 
A set of values, perceptions, attitudes and patterns of behavior with regard to safety shared by members of the 
organization; as well as a set of policies, practices and procedures relating to the reduction of employees' exposure to 
occupational risks, implemented at every level of the organization, and reflecting a high level of concern and 
commitment to the prevention of accidents and illnesses. 
Pidgeon, 1997 Sometimes culture is discussed in terms of observable behaviour’s (`the way we do things around here') and sometimes 
more as a system of symbols or meanings (for example, as a shared cognitive model, or as the assemblage of stories, 
arguments, myths, rituals and symbols that permeate organizational life). Note that the two approaches are to some 
extent interdependent, in that meaning often both constructs the `object' of inquiry and is in turn constructed itself 
through observable behaviour and material life. 
Turner, Pidgeon, Blockley, & 
Toft, 1989 
 
The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the 
exposure of employees, managers, customers, and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious.  
 
International Nuclear Safety 
Advisory Group, 1991 
 
Safety culture is that assembly of characteristics and attitudes in organizations and individuals which establishes that, as 
an overriding priority, nuclear plant safety issues receive the attention warranted by their significance.  
Advisory Committee for 
Safety in Nuclear Installations 
(ACSNI), 1993  
 
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of behavior that determine 
commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, an organization's health and safety management.  
 
Zohar, 1980  A summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments.  
Glennon, 1982   Employees' perceptions of the many characteristics of their organization that have a direct impact upon their behaviour 
to reduce or eliminate danger (safety climate) and, safety climate is a special kind of organizational climate.  
Brown & Holmes, 1986 A set of perceptions or beliefs held by an individual and/or group about a particular entity.  
Cox & Cox, 1991  Safety cultures reflect the attitudes, beliefs, perceptions, and values that employees share in relation to safety.  
Dedobbeleer & Bealand,1991  Molar perceptions people have of their work settings. 
Pidgeon,1991 The set of beliefs, norms, attitudes, roles, and social and technical practices that are concerned with minimizing the 
exposure of employees, managers, customers and members of the public to conditions considered dangerous or 
injurious.  
Ostrom, Wilhelmsen & 
Kaplan,1993 
The concept that the organization's beliefs and attitudes, manifested in actions, policies, and procedures, affect its safety 
performance.  
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Cooper et al., 1994 Safety climate is concerned with the shared perceptions and beliefs that workers hold regarding safety in their work 
place.  
Geller, 1994 In a total safety culture (TSC), everyone feels responsible for safety and pursues it on a daily basis.  
Niskanen, 1994 Safety climate refers to a set of attributes that can be perceived about particular work organizations and which may be 
induced by the policies and practices that those organizations impose upon their workers and supervisors.  
Coyle, Sleeman & Adams, 
1995 
The objective measurement of attitudes and perceptions toward occupational health and safety issues. 
Berends, 1996 The collective mental programming towards safety of a group of organization members.  
Lee, 1998 The safety culture of an organization is the product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, 
and patterns of behaviour that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of, and organization's health 
and safety management.  
Cabrera & Isla, 1998 The shared perceptions of organizational members about their work environment and, more precisely, about their 
organizational safety policies.  
Williamson et al. 1997 Safety climate is a summary concept describing the safety ethic in an organization or workplace which is reflected in 
employees' beliefs about safety.  
Kennedy & Kirwan, 1998 An abstract concept, which is underpinned by the amalgamation of individual and group perceptions, thought processes, 
feelings and behaviors, which in turn gives rise to the particular way of doing things in the organization. It is a sub-
element of the overall organizational culture. 
Glendon & Stanton, 2000 Comprises attitudes, behaviors, norms and values, personal responsibilities as well as human resources features such as 
training and development.  
Guldenmund, 2000 Those aspects of the organizational culture which will impact on attitudes and behavior related to increasing or 
decreasing risk.  
Cooper, 2000  Culture is ‘the product of multiple goal-directed interactions between people (psychological), jobs (behavioral) and the 
organization (situational); while safety culture is ‘that observable degree of effort by which all organizational members 
directs their attention and actions toward improving safety on a daily basis.’ 
Mohamed, 2003 A sub-facet of organizational culture, which affects workers’ attitudes and behavior in relation to an organization’s on-
going safety performance.  
Richter & Koch, 2004  Shared and learned meanings, experiences and interpretations of work and safety - expressed partially symbolically – 
which guide people’s actions towards risk, accidents and prevention. 
Fang et al. 2006 A set of prevailing indicators, beliefs and values that the organization owns in safety.  
ACSNI Human Factors Study 
Group, 1993 
The product of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies and patterns of behavior that can 
determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an organization’s health and safety management system. 
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Appendix 2F: Survey of OHS in mining leaders to identify commissioned reports 
Dear: _____________ 
I am a first-year student in the Master of Human Kinetics program at Laurentian University in 
Sudbury Ontario Canada and a graduate student member of the Center for Research in 
Occupational Safety and Health (CROSH).  My research is being conducted in the field of 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) within the mining industry.   
The initial phase of my research includes a systematic analysis of past OHS Commissioned 
reports that have addressed issues of health and safety within the mining industry. The main 
objective is to identify similarities and differences amongst the recommendations stemming from 
the selected reports that will be reviewed.  I would like to include international reports that span 
several decades in my analysis.  
I currently have access to the following reports:  
• Report of the Tribunal Appointed to Inquire into the Disaster at Aberfan (1967) 
• Report of the Royal Commission on the Health and Safety of Workers in Mines (1976) 
• The Report of the Provincial Inquiry into Ground Control and Emergency Preparedness in 
Ontario Mines (1986) 
• Report of the Westray Mine Public Inquiry (1992) 
• Report on the Sago Mine Disaster (2006) 
• Upper Big Branch: A Failure of Basic Coal Mine Safety Practices (2010) 
• Royal Commission on the Pike Rover Coal Mine Tragedy (2012).   
To ensure that the selection of commissions is comprehensive I am reaching out to several 
international leaders in OHS from Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand and the United 
Kingdom to get their opinion on reports that I should consider in my analysis.  If you have a few 
minutes it would be greatly appreciated if you could answer the following questions:  
Are there any other English language OHS Commission or other OHS Reports concerning health 
and safety in mining (not listed above) that you would recommend I include in my analysis?  
If yes, can you recommend the best way for me to gain access to a copy of the suggested report.  
Thanks for considering this request.  Your assistance is greatly appreciated. 
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APPENDIX 2D:  List of experts consulted in report identification 
Dr. Tammy Eger 
Dr. Eger is an Associate Professor at Laurentian University in the School of Human Kinetics and Research Chair 
in Occupational Health and Safety with the Centre for Research in Occupational Safety and Health. Her research 
interests focus around the application of ergonomic and human factors principles in industry.   She is an author of 
over 30 journal papers and 70 conference abstracts. She has received over 2 million dollars in research fundi ng as 
a principal and co-investigator from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Canadian 
Foundation for Innovation, and the Ontario Workplace Safety and Insurance Board. Prior to joining Laurentian 
University, Tammy worked as an Ergonomist with the Mines and Aggregates Safety and Health Association (now 
Workplace Safety North), and the Occupational Health Clinics for Ontario Workers. 
 
Dr. Sandra Dorman 
Dr. Dorman completed her Bachelors’ degree in Biology from Guelph University and her doctoral degree from 
McMaster University in Physiology/Pharmacology; specializing in the area of immunology and respiratory 
physiology. Overall her research interests focus on health promotion and prevention of disease. This diversifies into 
three primary themes in the occupational setting: 1) airway physiology, specifically the link between the airways and 
the cardiovascular system in innate inflammatory responses to inhaled particles from various sources including 
smoke from forest fires, cigarette smoke, ambient pollution and diesel exhaust particles; 2) nutrition, specifically 
how Calories consumed supports energy demands on the job; 3) reproductive health in the workplace.  
 
Mr. Vic Pakalnis  
Mr. Pakalnis is the President and CEO of MIRARCO (Mining Innovation Reclamation and Applied Research) at 
Laurentian University.  MIRARCO delivers quality research and innovative solutions to the global mining industry, 
related to: Geohazard Assessment and Risk Mitigation; Ventilation and Production optimization; Environmental 
monitoring and Rehabilitation; Energy, Renewables and Carbon Management; Climate Adaptation and Sustainable 
Communities. Mr. Pakalnis has been in the mining industry for over 40 years, holding positions such as: the Ontario 
Ministry of Labour’s Chief Mining Engineer where he was heavily involved with the Provincial Inquiry into Mining 
Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Director of the Ministry of Labour’s mining program, and Kinross Professor of 
Mining and Sustainability at the Queen’s University Robert M. Buchan School of Mining.   
 
Dr. David Cliff  
Dr. Cliff was a Professor of Occupational Health and Safety in Mining and Director of MISHC from 2011 to 2016, 
and was recently appointed Professor of Risk and Knowledge Transfer. His primary role is providing education, 
applied research and consulting in health and safety in the mining and minerals processing industry.  Dr. Cliff has 
also served as the Safety and Health Adviser to the Queensland Mining Council, the Manager of Mining Research at 
the Safety in Mines Testing and Research Station. In these capacities, he has provided expert assistance in the areas 
of health and safety to the mining industry for over twenty three years. He has particular expertise in emergency 
preparedness, gas analysis, spontaneous combustion, fires and explosions, including providing expert testimony to 
the Moura No.2 Warden’s inquiry, the Hazelwood Mine Fire Inquiry and the Pike River Royal Commission.  
 
Dr. Patrick Foster 
Dr. Foster is an Associate Professor in Mine Safety at the Camborne School of Mines, at the University of Exeter. 
Dr. Foster is a lecturing and researcher in: health & safety risk management, mine ventilation, surveying and 
thermodynamics; risk assessment; human factors and control assurance in the minerals industry. Dr. Foster is also 
the Mining Industry Representative on the UK EITI Management Steering Group, and a council member of both the 
Institute of Materials, Minerals & Mining, and the Mining Industry of the United Kingdom.   
 
 
 
 
Dr. 
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Appendix 2E: Interpreting Leximancer concept maps 
 
When interpreting the concept map there are numerous elements that are considered:  
1. Concepts clustered based on their co-occurrence will represent themes within the analyzed text with similar semantic contexts 
(Indulska & Recker, 2008; Smith & Humphreys, 2006; Cretchley et al., 2010b) 
2. The size of a concept dot on the map will be indicative of the concepts strength within the body of analyzed text (i.e. the 
bigger the concept the more often it appears in the text) (Smith & Humphreys, 2006; Indulska & Recker, 2008).   
3. The brightness of a concept dot on the map will be indicative of the concepts strength within the body of analyzed text (i.e. 
the brighter the concept the more often it appears in the text) (Smith & Humphreys, 2006 Indulska & Recker, 2008).  
4. The thickness and brightness of connections between concepts will be indicative of the frequency of co-occurrence of the 
two concepts, as per the co-occurrence matrix (Smith & Humphreys, 2006; Indulska & Recker, 2008).  
5. The relative distance of concepts on the map will be indicative of the degree to which the concepts appear together in the text 
(Smith & Humphreys, 2006; Indulska & Recker, 2008).  
6. The centrality of the concepts in each map enables the identification of the most common risk concepts and themes for each 
report.  When concepts are close together or overlap in the map, it means that they also appear close together in the text.  
Concepts that are directly related but not necessarily semantically linked, will be far apart on the concept map, while concepts 
that are strongly semantically linked will be close to each other on the concept map (Martin & Rice, 2007) 
7. File tags will indicate the document that the concepts and themes originated from (Leximancer Manual, 2014). 
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APPENDIX 3  
 
APPENDIX 3A  
Table 3.4 Recommendations relating to regulation and legislation  
1967  The ambit of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, is restricted by its long title to “the management and control of mines and quarries and for 
securing the safety health and welfare of persons employed thereat; to regulate the employment thereat of women and young persons; to require 
the fencing of abandoned and disused mines and of quarries; and for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid”. Apart, therefore, from s. 
151, which requires a disused mineshaft to be “provided with an efficient enclosure, barrier, plug, or other device so designed and constructed as 
to prevent any person from accidentally falling down the shaft,” there is no requirement on the owners or manager of a mine to have regard to the 
safety of the general public. It follows that there is no obligation on the Inspectorate of Mines, in the exercise of its powers of securing the 
enforcement of the Act, to have regard to the safety of the general public. Indeed, s. 146 (1) which gives power to the Inspector to serve a notice 
for prohibiting or changing “any matter, thing, or practice at a mine” which “is or is likely shortly to become dangerous” repeats the limitation to 
the safety of persons employed at the mine. We recommend that this limitation in the Act be removed and that the owners and managers of mines, 
and also the Inspectorate of Mines, should be required to consider the safety, health, and welfare of all persons going about their lawful business 
in the vicinity of a mine, including the safety of their property. We have already indicated (ante paragraph 74) our view of the civil liability of 
mine owners to pay damages under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, but the disaster at Aberfan clearly indicates that substantially more is required 
to give that protection to the public which it is every citizen’s right to expect. [Aberfan Page 129] 
Section 86 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, (“All buildings and structures on the surface of a mine shall be kept in safe condition”) should be 
amended so as to eliminate any doubt whether tips are “structures” within the meaning of the Section. [Aberfan Page 129] 
A duty should be imposed upon the manager to take such steps to obtain necessary information in relation to the tipping process as Section 48(2) 
of the Act requires him to take in relation to matters pertinent to the support of working places. [Aberfan Page 129] 
Using the power vested in him by Section 117(1) of the Act, the Minister should make an Order extending the Mines (Notification of Dangerous 
Occurrences) Order, 1959 (S.I. 1959, No. 2117) to tip slides and fires, “whether death or serious bodily injury is thereby caused or not”, thereby 
ensuring that they are reported in accordance with Section 116 “forthwith ... to the Inspector for the District.” [Aberfan Page 129] 
In order to ensure compliance with Section 86 in the amended form which we have suggested in (1) above, statutory provision should be made for 
regular inspections of all tips by persons competent to judge of their stability and safety and for the due recording of the nature, extent, and result 
of such inspections. [Aberfan Page 129] 
In addition, all tips (whether active or disused) should be subject to regular inspections by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Mines and Quarries, 
whose resultant detailed reports should be published or otherwise made freely available to the local authorities concerned. [Aberfan Page 130] 
A statutory obligation should be imposed upon the owners and managers of mines to maintain and keep at the mine office an up-to-date plan of 
the surface area of the undertaking, to include the tipping area and contoured once the tip exceeds a height to be prescribed—say, at 20 feet. 
[Aberfan Page 130] 
The starting of a new tip or extension of an existing tip complex should be prohibited unless preceded by an adequate site investigation (i.e. in 
accordance with the normal Civil Engineer Code of Practice or the proposed new Code referred to earlier) and the submission to and approval by 
Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Mines of a tipping plan. [Aberfan Page 130] 
The existing Town and Country Planning Acts require to be amended so as to vest local planning authorities with greater control over the starting 
of new tips or the extension of existing ones. As to new sites, we favour the suggestion made by Sir Andrew Bryan that these should not be 
started until a report as to the suitability of the tipping scheme has been submitted to and approved by the planning authority. As to the continued 
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use of an existing tipping site, we recommend that the General Development Order, 1963, be revised by adding to Col. (2) of Class XIX (3) a 
condition that such continued use after a given date (say, January 1st, 1969) be subject to the production of a similar report prepared by persons 
professionally qualified and satisfactory to the planning authority. If an impasse arises, the dispute should be submitted to the appropriate 
Minister and he should be vested with power to refer to an independent expert in the manner set out in paragraph 292 above. Provision should be 
made enabling the Minister to exclude, in a proper case, any claim for compensation if in the ultimate result permission to tip or to continue 
tipping is withheld or refused on grounds of safety. [Aberfan Page 130] 
All colliery tips being treated as engineering structures. They therefore suggest that the site investigation for a new tipping area or for the 
extension of an existing tip complex should be under the direction of a civil engineer experienced in soil mechanics. This approach (with which 
we entirely agree) is of fundamental importance. From this it would follow that: Maps prepared by Ordnance Survey and Geological Survey 
should first be looked at; A site investigation by using borings, soil-testing and observations of ground-water level should be carried out by a civil 
engineer, in consultation with a geologist and mining engineer or surveyor (regarding subsidence) where necessary; On the basis of this data, 
engineering proposals should be made by the civil engineer for the tip, including (where necessary) drainage and compaction; While the tipping 
process is continuing, the stability aspect should be under the control of a civil engineer; When tipping has been completed, inspection by a civil 
engineer should continue thereafter and routine measurements and observations made and recorded; The basic information so obtained should be 
placed on permanent record and be available to the local authority or to any person reasonably requiring it. [Aberfan Page 125] 
Recommend that the appropriate Minister should consider appointing such a Committee to advise him in the exercise of his responsibility for the 
safety and inspection of all tips, whether or not they are connected with mines or quarries. We do so for the following reason: The problem of tip 
stability is not by any means confined to coal-tips or even to coal-tips in the ownership of the National Coal Board. We have read that there are 
some 16,000 acres of derelict land in Wales alone, and that privately-owned tips comprise more than one half of this wasteland. And, as Mr. 
Philip Wien, Q.C., observed, as regards tips not in the ownership of the Board, there may be several categories; (1) tips belonging to other mining 
and quarrying interests; (2) tips belonging to industries not concerned with mining at all—for example, electricity authorities, steel works; and (3) 
the abandoned tips in the ownership of local authorities or private individuals”. The proper constitution of the proposed National Tip Safety 
Committee would fall to be decided by the Ministers concerned after due consideration of the variety of interests involved. No doubt they would 
draw upon the fund of experience available in the Building Research Station and the Road Research Laboratory and the professional Institutions. 
[Aberfan Page 126] 
The National Coal Board should continue to have prime responsibility in respect of all tips in its ownership. It has within its own organization 
men of sufficient experience and qualifications to take all steps necessary for securing tip stability. Such dangers as arise are almost invariably in 
respect of active, working tips, and to take responsibility for their day-to-day management from the Board and vest it in any other body seems to 
us undesirable and even charged with dangerous possibilities. As the expert witness called on behalf of the Parents’ and Residents’ Association 
(Mr. Warded) said: “The disposal of refuse and the consequent problem of tip stability cannot be dissociated from the many other problems 
involved in the production of the nation’s coal. The National Coal Board is fundamentally involved, firstly, from a policy point of view, because 
it has to assess the economic consequences of alternative methods of refuse disposal, and, secondly, from a technical point of view, in that it has 
to provide essential information about the nature and quantity of materials which have or may have to be disposed of and (because of possible 
statutory and Common Law liabilities) to make its own investigations and judgments about refuse-tip stability”. [Aberfan Page 126] 
Accordingly, subject to the further recommendations which we hereafter set out, we consider that the public interest is best served by prime 
responsibility for National Coal Board tips remaining with the Board, which would at all times have available to it the advice of the National Tip 
Safety Committee. The Board could in return render valuable assistance to that Committee in relation to tips outside their ownership or control 
and (according to Hansard, Vol. 747, 6 June, 1967, col. 173-4) they already “have arranged courses of instruction in soil-heap management which 
are now being held throughout the country, and have offered specialist advice and assistance to local authorities and private owners in regard to 
spoil-heaps which are not the Board’s responsibility”. [Aberfan Page 127] 
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Recommend adoption of, the suggestion made by Sir Andrew Bryan that the National Coal Board should prepare for consideration by the 
National Tip Safety Committee, with a view to its thereafter being issued publicly, a Code of Practice giving guidance on (a) features and factors 
that may give rise to or reveal instability in a tip, and (b) standards of safety called for in particular locations or circumstances. We attach in 
Appendix F Sir Andrew Bryan’s suggestions as to the topics which should be covered by such a Code. But the vexed question remains: Within 
the National Coal Board itself, what organization should in future be responsible for tip safety and stability? We were told that during the Inquiry 
the lay-out of Board administration had been drastically altered, that Divisions and Groups had already been abolished and the whole country 
divided into 17 Areas, each headed by its own Area Director, and that the old South Western Division had become two Areas. And it was said in 
Parliament on June 6th last (Hansard Vol. 747, col. 173-4) that the Minister of Power had ascertained from the National Coal Board that, “A 
procedure has been established by the Board for technical and operational control over spoil heaps which includes frequent and regular 
investigations by specialists to ensure safety and stability”. Furthermore, Mr. Wien, Q.C., told the Tribunal that in South Wales: “we have 
recently established a Tip Control Unit under the direction of Mr. Gareth Jones, the civil engineer, and he has got a complete team with 
independent experts to be consulted about old tips. They will give technical guidance to Areas on active tips or on the selection of new tips, and I 
daresay that when the Tip Safety Committee comes into existence this will be a matter that will be carefully considered by that Committee ... The 
Coal Board has been proceeding assiduously with training courses which have been held quite recently and all kinds of people (from Area 
Directors downwards, and including Area Civil Engineers from the rest of the country and Her Majesty’s Divisional Inspector of Mines) have 
attended, dealing with tip stability. And in due course instruction will be given down to a very much lower level, to charge hands and foremen”. 
When these assurances are implemented, the whole attitude in relation to tip stability should soon become dramatically altered. To ensure this, 
urgent consideration should be given to the appointment of civil engineers to the Inspectorate. [Aberfan Page 127] 
Recommend adoption of the suggestion advanced by Mr. Wardell that, should a local planning authority be dissatisfied about the stability of an 
existing or proposed tip after consideration of all the available information, the matter should be submitted to the Minister of Power with a request 
for a special investigation and report. Mr. Wardell continued: “If the Minister were satisfied that a prima facie case had been made out for further 
enquiry, it is suggested that the Minister should appoint an independent expert to conduct such an enquiry. The independent expert would require 
full authority to obtain access to all documents, plans, surveys and other information in possession either of the Board or the Local Authority and 
to any of their officials or employees concerned with tipping. He would also need to have authority to make his own inspection of the tip site or 
sites concerned and to require the Board or its agents to carry out additional investigations such as boreholes, trial pits, surveys, soil tests, etc., 
which he may require. In making his report the appointed expert should include recommendations as to whether: refuse disposal on an existing tip 
should cease permanently or be suspended until satisfactory investigations had been completed; in the case of a proposed new tip, whether the site 
was suitable for a tip or could be made suitable provided that certain specified precautions were taken; and in the case of an inactive tip, what 
action, if any, should be taken to render it safe”. [Aberfan Page 127-128] 
Recommend that the appropriate Minister should consider appointing such a Committee to advise him in the exercise of his responsibility for the 
safety and inspection of all tips, whether or not they are connected with mines or quarries. We do so for the following reason: The problem of tip 
stability is not by any means confined to coal-tips or even to coal-tips in the ownership of the National Coal Board. We have read that there are 
some 16,000 acres of derelict land in Wales alone, and that privately-owned tips comprise more than one half of this wasteland. And, as Mr. 
Philip Wien, Q.C., observed, as regards tips not in the ownership of the Board, there may be several categories; (1) tips belonging to other mining 
and quarrying interests; (2) tips belonging to industries not concerned with mining at all—for example, electricity authorities, steel works; and (3) 
the abandoned tips in the ownership of local authorities or private individuals”. The proper constitution of the proposed National Tip Safety 
Committee would fall to be decided by the Ministers concerned after due consideration of the variety of interests involved. No doubt they would 
draw upon the fund of experience available in the Building Research Station and the Road Research Laboratory and the professional Institutions. 
[Aberfan Page 126] 
1976  That a Health and Safety in Mines and Plants Act, separate from the Mining Act, be prepared to replace part ix and the relevant sections of part xi 
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of the Mining Act and be administered within an Occupational Health and Safety Authority established in the Ministry of Labour [Royal 
Commission Page 254] 
That the Health and Safety in Mines and Plants Act consist of a core of general provisions supplemented by regulations the issuance of which is 
authorized by the Act [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That the general provisions of the Health and Safety in Mines and Plants Act identify the duties and responsibilities of the Mines Engineering and 
Inspection Branch and the Occupational Health and Safety Branch [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That an Occupational Health and Safety Authority, encompassing the Mines Engineering and Inspection Branch, the corresponding branches 
under the Industrial Safety Act and the Construction Safety Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Branch, be established in the Ministry of 
Labour under an assistant deputy minister [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That the Workmen’s Compensation Board require and make provision for the inclusion in non-fatal injury statistics of all non-fatal injuries in 
which the injured person fails to return to his or her regular job on the day following the date of the accident giving rise to the injury [Royal 
Commission Page 121] 
That management inform the Joint Health and Safety Committee about its policies on rehabilitative work assignment and in the context of 
independent medical consultation seek the advice of the Committee in giving wise effect to its policies [Royal Commission Page 121] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch base its patterns of audits in part on studies of the relative risks involved in different segments of mining 
operations and on the related man-years at risk [Royal Commission Page 128] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch publish biennially a critical review of factors that influence risks of accident and injury at 
workplaces in the mines and mineral plants [Royal Commission Page 130] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, in consultation with the Workmen’s Compensation Board, industry, and labour, review the 
procedures for the reporting of injuries and accidents with a view to establishing links to occupational records and thereby facilitating accident 
research by sample methods [Royal Commission Page 145] 
That the senior management of each mining operation review the performance of its internal responsibility-system, placing special emphasis on 
the delineation of 1/responsibility to detect and to report departures from standard conditions at every level of operations, 2/ location of 
responsibility for ensuring that identified departures are dealt with. 3/ procedures for committing the resources to correct anomalies, and 4/ 
procedures for checking the action already taken and still to be taken [Royal Commission Page 152] 
That statutory provision be made for the appointment in each mine and plant of worker-auditors having the authority and responsibility to 
examine and report upon conditions of work pertaining to the health and safety of workers at sets of workplaces designated by management in 
such a way as to encompass all workplaces in underground, open pit. reduction plant, and shop and surface operations [Royal Commission Page 
153] 
That worker-auditors be given released time with regular wages while performing their duties [Royal Commission Page 154] 
That the Workmen's Compensation Act be amended to make provision for the assessment of the costs of worker-auditors upon employers in class 
5 [Royal Commission Page 154] 
That worker-auditors be appointed from among qualified candidates for a period of three years through the collective bargaining unit, where such 
exists, or be elected by the workers [Royal Commission Page 155] 
That there be statutory provision for the appropriate worker-auditor to participate in the investigation of fatal accidents and serious injuries [Royal 
Commission Page 156] 
That the designated worker-auditor have the privilege of cross- examining witnesses at an inquest into any fatal accident whose circumstances he 
has participated in investigating [Royal Commission Page 156]  
That there be statutory provision for the establishment of a Joint Labour-Management Health and Safety Committee at each mine and plant 
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[Royal Commission Page 157] 
That the membership of the Committee consists of equal numbers of persons appointed by management and appointed by members of the 
collective bargaining unit(s), where such exist, and otherwise elected by the workers collectively, subject to the constraint that at least two of the 
persons selected be worker-auditors [Royal Commission Page 157] 
That the Joint Committee conduct its work as far as feasible during regular hours of work and that its members receive their regular wages while 
engaged on committee work [Royal Commission Page 157] 
That the Joint Committee meet regularly at least four times per year and not more often than once monthly [Royal Commission Page 158] 
That each mining company provide its employees with a written statement outlining its policy for health and safety and the organizational 
arrangements and responsibilities forgiving effect to it [Royal Commission Page 160] 
That on all shifts persons working alone be visited at the place of work at least three times (other than at the start of a shift) by a first-line 
supervisor [Royal Commission Page 174] 
That such visits may be reduced to once per shift (other than at the start of a shift) if 1/ work conditions are standard, and 2/ means of 
communication are provided and a record of use thereof is kept so that the person working alone reports his status to a point of supervision or to a 
designated fellow worker not less often than once every two hours [Royal Commission Page 174] 
That all fatalities and serious injuries to persons working alone underground be the subject of biennial review by the Occupational Health and 
Safety Branch [Royal Commission Page 175] 
That section 169(16)(b) be amended (and be included in a revised Act. to be recommended) to require the supervisor to make a written report 
which: 1/ states the nature of the condition of the machine or device which in the worker’s belief renders it unsafe for use; 2/ gives the 
supervisor’s comments at the time; and 3/ gives the supervisor's confirmation or otherwise that section 169(15) is, in the supervisor's view, 
satisfied [Royal Commission Page 176] 
That the worker who refers a machine or device to his supervisor under section 169(16)(b) as amended sign and receive a copy of the supervisor’s 
report [Royal Commission Page 177] 
That where a worker after due consultation with his immediate supervisor, believes that the work then assigned cannot be performed by standard 
procedures without encountering personal risks deemed by him to be unreasonable, there be a statutory requirement that the work situation be 
examined and judged by a member of senior supervision in the presence of a worker-auditor acting as an observer and that a report of the 
circumstances be made to the mines inspectorate by the manager [Royal Commission Page 178] 
That the legal framework for the health and safety of workers in mines continue to recognize the importance of a significant component of 
collective self-regulation by industry as a whole achieved through a Mines Health and Safety Association [Royal Commission Page 46] 
That the management of each mining operation or appropriate part thereof be required under clearly defined statutory authority to prepare and 
keep updated a scheme of practice for implementing the foregoing codes [Royal Commission Page 49] 
That the management be required to appoint a competent person to supervise the over-all operation of the scheme [Royal Commission Page 49] 
That under the Workmen's Compensation Act provision be made for the levying on all employers in class 5 an amount of 0.03 per cent of wages 
currently subject to levy under the Act to create a fund for research on occupational health and safety by the joint labour- management health and 
safety committees [Royal Commission Page 239] 
That Section 53 of the Workmen's Compensation Act be amended as necessary to provide clear entitlement for rehabilitative compensation based 
on the principle of work adjustment for person’s subject to exceptional exposure to environmental hazards at work [Royal Commission Page 57] 
That persons assigned to work alone be required to have specified qualifications for independent work at the job to which they are assigned 
[Royal Commission Page 174] 
1981 That the chief executive officer of each mining company operating in Ontario review his personal commitment and contribution to the safety 
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performance of his organization with a view to exercising his authority and leadership in the manner outlined. [Towards Safe Production Page 
226] 
That where the Mining Health and Safety Branch identifies an operation as substandard, the district engineer meet with the manager of the 
operation to review performance and to advise of the branch's response, and further, that the branch so notify the chief executive officer by 
registered letter. [Towards Safe Production Page 226] 
That where the Mining Health and Safety branch identifies a company as having substantial performance, the director of the Mining Health and 
Safety' Branch meet with the chief executive officer of the company to review performance and to advise of the branch’s response. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 226] 
That the Mining Health and Safety Branch review the cost indicator models being developed by the United States Bureau of Mines for metal 
mines and assess their applicability to Ontario mining operations. Using these cost indicator models, or some modification thereof, the costs of 
accidents to each mining company (by operation) be computed on an annual basis. [Towards Safe Production Page 226] 
That a company operating a mine or mining plant in Ontario include in its annual report a comprehensive statement of safety performance 
including relevant comparative data and a statement of costs incurred. [Towards Safe Production Page 226] 
That a workmen's compensation merit rating scheme, tailored specifically to the mining industry, be introduced. [Towards Safe Production Page 
226] 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario carry out independent safely audits and that each mining company operating in 
Ontario consent to having the MAPAO perform an annual safety audit. [Towards Safe Production Page 226-227] 
That the individual companies be ranked on the basis of the audit results and that the ranking be made public by the MAPAO. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 227] 
That the number of first line underground supervisors employed by each mining company he sufficient to allow for at least two workplace 
contacts with each crew per shift and that the time allotted for these visits be sufficient to allow for adequate assistance and instruction to 
inexperienced crews and crews working in difficult areas. [Towards Safe Production Page 227] 
That wherever practical, a minimum of two group leaders for each first line underground supervisor he appointed. [Towards Safe Production Page 
228] 
That individual work crews be more involved in the planning of their work and. in conjunction with group leaders, be made responsible for 
achieving short-term production targets. [Towards Safe Production Page 228] 
That first line supervisors assume an enlarged role as facilitators, resource persons, planners and safety auditors. [Towards Safe Production Page 
228] 
That the ministry adopts an even-handed and consistent practice with respect to prosecutions and make known to the industry that it will not seek 
to prosecute a first line supervisor or any other employee unless satisfied that he or she has failed to take every precaution reasonable in the 
circumstances or has otherwise clearly acted negligently in complying with the Act and regulations. [Towards Safe Production Page 228] 
That each worker review his commitment to safe work practices and undertake to work in a safe manner at all times and to assume the full range 
of his responsibilities as a member of the direct internal responsibility system. [Towards Safe Production Page 228] 
That provision be made in law for a full-time worker safety' representative in each mine or mining plant employing more than 500 workers, and 
that where the number of workers in any mine or mining plant is less than 500, provision be made for the appointment of a worker safety 
representative to spend a proportionate amount of work lime engaged in safety related activities. [Towards Safe Production Page 228] 
That a worker safety representative hold office for a two-year term and work closely with the company's safety department. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 229] 
That a worker safety representative be a member of the joint health and safety committee otherwise qualified to scene in this position, and 
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[Towards Safe Production Page 229] 
That a worker safety representative not be permitted to hold any union office or to engage in partisan union political activity of any kind. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 229] 
That a worker safety representative be paid the full amount he would have been paid had he continued in his classification. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 229] 
That a worker safety representative report all workplace anomalies to first line supervision and to the safety department and that only in the event 
that the condition is not corrected to the satisfaction of the worker safety representative within a reasonable period of time should lire matter be 
taken up with the joint health and safety committee. [Towards Safe Production Page 229] 
That the existing provisions of the Act which allows the minister to grant exemptions also apply to the election or appointment of worker safety 
representatives. [Towards Safe Production Page 229] 
That membership on joint health and safety committees be restricted to workers not holding other union positions and to line supervisors or 
managers, and that workers acting as committee members not be permitted to engage in partisan union political activities. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 229] 
That the chief executive officer and management of each mining company ensure that the joint health and safety committee is consulted on the 
full range of safety issues and that the documentation, data, materials and other information necessary for this purpose be made available to it. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
That the joint health and safety committee monitor the use of discipline as a tool in the achievement of safety objectives and make appropriate 
recommendations. [Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
That at least one of the worker members of the joint health and safety committee (preferably the full-time worker representative be given 
sufficient time to prepare the worker portion of the committee agendas and to investigate and inquire into the matters which are before the 
committee. [Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
That the worker members of the joint health and safety committee be provided with a private office (which may also double as the worker safety 
representative’s office) equipped with adequate furniture and supplies and that typing and reproduction services be made available by the 
company. [Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
That in addition to assisting the line organization, the safety department within each company be made responsible for auditing the safety 
performance of the line organization. [Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
That the manager of the safety department has direct reporting access to senior executives responsible for the line organization including the chief 
executive officer. [Towards Safe Production Page 231] 
That each local union representing workers in Ontario mines and mining plants review its approach to health and safety matters and lake the steps 
necessary to commit itself to a course of union-management co-operation in health and safety administration. [Towards Safe Production Page 
231] 
That each parent labour body actively encourage and support union-management co-operation in health and safety matters at the local level and 
co-operate with the industry in those health and safety endeavors which require the direct involvement of the parent body. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 231] 
That the Mining Health and Safety Branch advise the industry and its workers in writing of its policies and practices with respect to the 
enforcement of the Act and regulations and apprise the industry and its workers of any changes to its policies and practices or the adoption of any 
new enforcement initiatives. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That the branch inspector meet with a worker representative and employer representative before commencing a workplace inspection and that 
these representatives be required to identify, in the manner described, all unresolved health and safety concerns. [Towards Safe Production Page 
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232] 
That the branch inspector meet with these worker and employer representatives after the workplace inspection to review their previously 
identified concerns in light of the results of the inspection. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That the branch inspector review, in the presence of the worker and employer representatives, the minutes of the health and safety committee 
meetings which have occurred since the previous inspection. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That following each inspection, the branch inspector be ’required to file with his supervisor a written report on the performance of the 
responsibility systems at the particular operation. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That the Mining Health and Safety Branch develop the capability of responding to relationship difficulties that and impeding health and safety 
performance. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That the future recruitment of branch inspectors be based in part upon interpersonal dulls and that, in addition to their present duties, inspectors be 
assigned on-site monitoring or the direct and contributive responsibility systems at the workplace. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That, wherever possible, branch engineers be relieved of work place inspection and be assigned the responsibility he investigation. pre-
development review, consultation, educational activity and response to responsibility system breakdowns. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That the tripartite committee responsible for reviewing the mining regulations study all recommendations made by coroners' juries investigating 
mining fatalities for possible general application and make appropriate recommendations. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That whenever a contractor is engaged, the company meet with the contractor before commencement of the project to stipulate the safety 
requirements which must be met if the contractor is to be permitted to commence or continue the project. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
That the project be rigorously inspected by the company to ensure compliance with these requirements. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
That a mining company give preference in the awarding of contracts to contractors who have demonstrated satisfactory safety performance: and 
that the company consider a reward- penalty contract provision related to safety performance on the project. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
That the Mining Health and Safety Branch be advised by each mining company of all contract projects well in advance of the starting date of such 
projects. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
That the Mining Health and Safety Branch increase its regular inspections of these projects and. using its accident profile data, devote special 
attention to those contractors who demonstrate unsatisfactory safety performance. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
That a system of meriting for purposes of determining the amount of the Workmen's Compensation assessment for con tractors operating in the 
mining industry be established: and that separate rate groups be established for shaft sinking and mining contractors, general contractors and 
diamond drilling contractors. [Towards Safe Production Page 237] 
That the chief executive officer of each contractor engaged in projects for Ontario mines and mining plants review his personal commitment and 
contribution to the safety performance of his organization with a view to exercising his authority and leadership in the appropriate manner. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 237] 
That the Government of Canada incorporate by reference the Ontario Act and regulations, as amended from time to time, directly into the Canada 
Labour Code as a proviso covering uranium miners and plant workers, and also provide in the code that where the other provisions of the code 
and this provision arc in conflict, the latter shall apply. [Towards Safe Production Page 237] 
That the Government of Canada proceed by way of a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada by the Governor General in Council under 
section 55 of the Supreme Court Act. R.S.C. 1979 C S-19 and determine whether the federal jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. [Towards 
Safe Production Page 238] 
That the Governments of Canada and Ontario continue the arrangement under which the enforcement of statutory
1
 health and safely requirements 
in Ontario uranium mines is assigned to provincial authorities. [Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
That individual mining companies and their respective unions agree to discontinue individual (or small crew) production incentive plans. 
  213 
 
[Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
That the government make known its intention to legislate an end to direct individual (or small crew) production incentive plans in Ontario mines 
if these plans arc not voluntarily discontinued. [Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
That a follow-up inquiry into the adequacy of safety practices and arrangements in Ontario mines and mining plants be undertaken commencing 
within three years of the release of this report. [Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
1986 That the Ministry of Labour establish a Technical Support Centre with the following functions: to support an expanded role in pre-development 
review and annual mine design review as recommended elsewhere in this report; to establish facilities for training in ground control (although this 
should not conflict with existing established training programs); to develop, and provide to mines on short term loan, ground control instruments 
and testing equipment; to establish and maintain a computerized data base containing operational information on ground control and emergency 
preparedness and provide access to it to the mining industry, and to the research coordinating body recommended elsewhere in this report; to 
develop and maintain a library of computer software related to ground control technology, and especially to the interpretation of data from ground 
control monitoring devices; the specialist ground control engineers employed in the Technical Support Centre should not be involved in the 
regulatory functions of the Ministry; and the Technical Support Centre shall not be in conflict with the research coordinating body recommended 
elsewhere in this report. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 68-69] 
That these inspectors enforce ground control regulations more vigorously. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That this Committee will remain seized with this study and will reconvene as necessary to discuss matters requiring further attention and to 
monitor progress on the implementation of these recommendations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That companies reassess the effectiveness of their methods of providing information on ground control and emergency preparedness to 
employees. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
That mining companies recognize that it is the responsibility of management to establish direct and effective communication between 
management and workers, and to ensure that adequate mechanisms exist for clear and timely feedback from workers to management. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
That management should also ensure that mechanisms are in place to provide effective communication between workers on cross-shifts, and that 
these means of communication be available to both workers and supervisors. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
That once developed and available these devices be installed in underground locations as necessary. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
That any evaluations of ground conditions in areas being mined shall be given to the union representing workers in each mine, and shall also be 
communicated directly to the workers involved. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That mine design and subsequent implementation be under the direction of a technically competent person. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 
60] 
That every underground mine be required to prepare a ground control macro-environment design prior to the introduction of a new mining 
method, or the introduction of any expansion of the present mine design; such designs shall be submitted to the Ministry of Labour as required by 
Section 5 of the Mining Regulations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That technically competent personnel of the Ministry of Labour review ground control design and procedures at all Ontario mines, at the mine 
site, at least once per year, and more frequently as required. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That the principles and details underlying the mine designs referred to in Recommendation 5.3 be communicated directly to persons concerned at 
all levels of the operation, including the appropriate officials of the union representing the mine crews; and that this communication take place 
before and during the implementation of the design. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That the Ministry of Labour review and monitor the regional stability affecting underground mines in Ontario, and discuss potential problems 
with the mining companies involved. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
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That mining companies sharing a common boundary exchange information that may affect the regional stability of either or both. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That workplace mining plans be made available to miners and be discussed with them, including any indications of abnormal ground conditions, 
geological anomalies, and the location of ground monitoring instruments, as a method of ensuring worker participation in planning ground control 
procedures in the “micro” environment. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
This organization shall be funded by mining companies operating in Ontario, and by the federal and provincial governments. [Ground Control & 
Mine Rescue Page 51] 
1995 The Inquiry recommends that the Act be amended to enable either proxy or alternative members to fill temporary or permanent positions on the 
panel or for an Inquiry to continue with a reduced number of panel members. [Moura Page 73] 
It is recommended therefore, that it be made a requirement of Part 60 (Second Working Extraction) submissions that spontaneous combustion be 
specifically included as a factor to be considered and evaluated. [Moura Page 72] 
1997 Incentive bonuses based solely on productivity have no place in a hazardous working environment such as an underground coal mine. Such 
schemes should be replaced, where practical, by safety incentives that include three principles: The incentive plan should be developed 
cooperatively with the employees to whom it will be addressed; Both group safety performance and individual safety performance should be 
rewarded; All employees, whether underground or on surface — workers, supervisors, and middle managers — should be included.  If properly 
instituted, such a safety incentive plan may well have its own productivity rewards. [Westray Page 188] 
The mandate of the Department of Natural Resources should be formally reviewed and clarified vis-a- vis the mandate of the Department of 
Labour to ensure that there are no gaps in the regulatory process. [Westray Page 404] 
A formal procedure should be put in place to provide for adequate communication and cooperation between the Department of Natural Resources 
and the Department of Labour to ensure that there is adequate provision for all aspects of the regulatory process. [Westray Page 404] 
The Mineral Resources Act should be amended to identify clearly the role of the Department of Natural Resources in monitoring mine planning 
in the province. Such a role should encompass the duty to make site inspections to ensure that an operator is mining in conformity with plans 
approved by the department. [Westray Page 405 
The Mineral Resources Act should be amended to identify clearly the role of the Department of Natural Resources in ensuring the "safe" 
operation of mines in the province. [Westray Page 405] 
The province should act to ensure that deputy ministers' positions are adequately described in detailed job descriptions. Such job descriptions 
should include but not be limited to the following requirements: Upon appointment, the deputy shall forthwith familiarize himself or herself with 
all the operations of the department as set out in a current organizational chart; The deputy shall have a working knowledge of all the legislation 
and regulations the department is administering; and Where there is more than one department with responsibilities for common projects or 
interests, the deputy shall ensure that proper procedures are instituted and maintained to provide adequate liaison with the other department or 
departments, with the result that no gaps exist in the administration of the legislation. [Westray Page 431] 
The Department of Natural Resources should no longer act as both promoter and regulator of the development of mineral and energy resources in 
the province, since this dual mandate constitutes a conflict-of-interest situation. The department should assume the role of helping the developer 
to formulate a plan that ensures both the safe and the efficient exploitation of the resource. The department must, first and foremost, work to 
ensure compliance with the general structure of the legislation in keeping with the purposes for which such legislation was enacted. [Westray 
Page 437] 
The structure and staff of the Department of Natural Resources should undergo a complete and intensive review, preferably by an outside agency, 
with the objective of establishing an efficient and responsible mechanism for the supervision and husbanding of our natural resources. [Westray 
Page 449] 
Visits by the inspectorate to the industrial site should not always be subject to prior notice. The inspectorate should schedule visits irregularly, and 
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the operator should expect inspections at any time. Frequency of visits should be dictated by the safety performance of the operator. [Westray 
Page 488] 
The unacceptable performance of Claude White and Albert McLean in the conduct of their duties as mine-safety inspectors and regulators, 
coupled with their demeanour at the Inquiry hearings, must surely have destroyed any confidence the people of Nova Scotia might have had in the 
department's safety inspectorate. Accordingly, both White and McLean should be removed from any function relating to safety inspection or 
regulation. [Westray Page 506] 
The lassitude that paralyzed the inspectorate and rendered it ineffectual in dealing with Westray seems deep-seated and pervasive. Therefore, an 
independent and professional safety consultant should evaluate the inspectorate and its personnel. The consultant should make recommendations 
for the restructuring of the safety inspectorate and its staff to ensure that the workers and the people of Nova Scotia benefit from a competent, 
well-trained, and properly motivated safety inspectorate. [Westray Page 506] 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1996, should be revised to incorporate the following changes: Except in the case of a demonstrated 
emergency, any communication respecting health and safety concerns should go initially to the first-line supervisor. If the first-line supervisor is 
unable or unwilling to resolve the matter, then the complaint should be taken directly to a member of the joint occupational health and safety 
committee, for resolution by the committee as expeditiously as possible. Provisions should be adopted to clarify how interests of non-union 
employees in a union shop will be met on the joint occupational health and safety committee. No member of management whose principal duty or 
concern relates to production quotas should be eligible for membership on the joint occupational health and safety committee. No member of the 
executive of any employee organization or union, or any person who has served in such capacity within the preceding year, should be eligible for 
membership on the joint occupational health and safety committee. Provisions should be adopted to define clearly the health and safety 
obligations of employees to workers on site who are employed by contractors other than the principal employer. Those contractor employees 
should have obligations similar to those of the employees of the principal employer. For greater certainty, the terms "serious injury" and "bodily 
injury" should be replaced with the one term "serious injury," defined as any injury that requires immediate medical aid or hospitalization or 
renders the employee unable to perform his or her regular duties for a period in excess of 24 hours. [Westray Page 510] 
The province of Nova Scotia should immediately study the British approach to ministerial responsibility, as illustrated by the publication 
Questions of Procedure for Ministers (1992), and move to adopt this type of program. Other jurisdictions should be canvassed for information on 
similar programs. The program adopted should include a codified and published statement of guidelines for ministers outlining ministerial 
responsibilities. The guidelines for minister’s program should be provided to all new ministers. It should include definitions of the nature and 
extent of the responsibility and accountability for the actions of the department over which a minister presides. A minister should have clear 
guidelines to the frequency and detail of division briefings and the circumstances under which the immediate division head should participate in 
the briefing along with the deputy minister. A minister should have access to independent advice about the nature and the extent of ministerial 
responsibility in specific situations. Such advice could be provided, ad hoc, by a person with recognized expertise in the field. [Westray Page 533] 
Any applicant for an underground coal mining permit should make a clear and unequivocal commitment to the concept of mine safety in the 
context expressed in the phrase — safe mine production. This clear commitment must be manifest in mine development proposals and plans. 
Therefore, before a mining permit is granted, the applicant should have to show that it has sufficient financial and other resources to ensure a 
reasonable margin of safety. The existence of this margin of safety will minimize the possibility that safety measures may be overlooked or 
avoided to maintain production schedules. [Westray Page 537] 
All rules and regulations relating to the operation of coal mines should be contained in Regulations made pursuant to the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act. The Coal Mines Regulation Act and the portions of the Mineral Resources Act dealing with operations should be repealed. [Westray 
Page 540] 
The regulator should be given authority to grant exemptions to or variances in the regulations if satisfied that such exemptions or variances will in 
no way detract from the safety of the miners and other underground workers. The burden is on the mine operator to demonstrate to the satisfaction 
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of the regulator that safety considerations have not been prejudiced. [Westray Page 540] 
A mine developer or mine operator should submit all mine plans, including plans for the development, construction, or alteration of an 
underground coal mine, to the regulator for approval. No such plans should be acted upon or otherwise implemented until they have been 
approved in writing by the regulator. The regulator may require further detailed plans of the mine or the surrounding geological configurations. 
The regulator may require that the developer or operator have the plans, or portions of them, reviewed at the expense of the developer by mining 
consultants having expertise in any or all of the following disciplines: rock mechanics, mine ventilation, roof control, underground equipment, 
and electrical applications. [Westray Page 541] 
The province should take immediate action to reach agreement with the federal Department of Labour for the inspectorate of that department to 
assume the underground coal mine regulation and inspection functions currently under the aegis of the provincial Department of Labour. 
[Westray Page 542] 
The province should collaborate with the federal Department of Labour to draft updated underground coal mining regulations applicable to all 
coal mines in Nova Scotia. These common regulations would then be administered throughout the province by the inspectorate at present 
functioning under the provisions of the Canada Labour Code regulations. Such regulations should be drafted with the advice and assistance of 
competent coal mining professionals with demonstrated expertise in the various fields of ventilation, ground control, electrical applications, 
training, and mine rescue. [Westray Page 542] 
The province of Nova Scotia should review its occupational health and safety legislation and take whatever steps necessary to ensure that officers 
and directors of corporations doing business in this province are held properly accountable for the failure of the corporation to secure and 
maintain a safe workplace. [Westray Page 601] 
Consultants, when required, should be selected carefully to ensure that their background and expertise are consistent with the specific 
requirements of the problem to be analyzed. Any conflicts in the advice from these consultants ought to be resolved through discussion and, if 
necessary, through further advice. Conflicts in technical advice must be resolved, not ignored. [Westray Page 380] 
A legislative regime should be put in place to ensure regulatory involvement in all areas of ground control in which safety is a consideration. The 
regime should encompass planning approval, materials and equipment certification, and any other aspect of ground control having safety 
implications. [Westray Page 383] 
The legislation governing coal mines should be revised to ensure that every underground coal mine operator be required to engage, when 
required, the services of a qualified mining engineer with specialized post-graduate training in rock mechanics relating to coal mines. [Westray 
Page 385] 
Every position in amine should have a written job description setting out the duties and responsibilities of that position, with particular reference 
to safety. Each employee should be provided with a copy of his or her job description. A copy of all job descriptions should be prominently 
displayed in an area frequented by employees. [Westray Page 87] 
2006 MSHA must re-establish itself as the government’s advocate for miners. [Sago Page 17] 
Former coal industry executives should not be permitted to hold the highest offices within MSHA. [Sago Page 17] 
Future regulations must focus first on the health and safety benefits they afford miners. Considerations regarding cost benefits should not in any 
way negatively impact the protections miners enjoy. [Sago Page 17] 
In addition to the recommendations already made in this report and the MINER Act, MSHA must immediately take the following actions: Repeal 
the belt-air regulation; Require flame resistant conveyor belts in all mines; Move to increase the number and skill level of mine rescue teams; 
Lower the maximum exposure limit for respirable coal mine dust and silica; Update and expand training and retraining of miners; Develop a 
public hearing- style investigation process; Update the penalty and assessment scheme; Modify the conferencing process; Improve the 
certification and approval process; Assist NIOSH in developing the next generation SCSRs; Update permissible exposure limits for contaminants 
in the mine environment; Improve atmospheric monitoring systems; Develop a nationwide emergency communications system; Develop air 
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quality, chemical substances and respiratory protection standards; and Address issues related to working in confined spaces. [Sago Page 17] 
The agencies must immediately take enforcement action against any operator that does not comply with the mine rescue team requirements. This 
action should include issuance of a closure order that stops production at all affected operations. Facilities so affected should not be permitted to 
resume operations until all aspects of the mine rescue team requirements are met. [Sago Page 16] 
2011 Require a quarterly report certifying that all safety standards are being complied with. Sanction for knowingly or negligently falsifying the report 
would be the revocation of the mine superintendent’s certification. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
Adopt provisions similar to those contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to make a Board of Directors accountable for mine safety compliance. 
Boards of Directors should utilize existing health and safety committees or form a committee to oversee health and safety aspects of the mines 
under the company’s control. The committee would be responsible for ensuring compliance with all federal and state regulations and would be 
required to certify that the mines are in compliance each quarter. A criminal penalty should be assessed on these board members who certify, 
negligently or willfully, that the mine is in compliance when it is not. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
Existing laws and regulations must be stringently and effectively enforced.  Supervisors and managers are responsible for ensuring that front-line 
inspectors are provided equipment, tools, training and management support to succeed at their jobs.  [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
Inspectors are responsible for elevating to their supervisor’s problems or concerns that the inspectors believe impede their ability to enforce the 
law. Likewise, supervisors and district managers are responsible for elevating issues to senior officials in the agency. [Upper Big Branch Page 
111] 
When either state enforcement agencies or MSHA recognize a significant or persistent problem at a mine, the agencies should coordinate their 
responses. State and MSHA district offices should meet periodically to review problematic mines and formulate strategies to best protect miners. 
Cooperative efforts would maximize the effectiveness of the agencies against recalcitrant violators. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
MSHA should use its resources, and experienced and talented personnel to bolster its ability to notice the warning signs and see the big picture at 
mining operations with persistent health and safety problems. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
WVMHST should modify inspectors’ work assignments to ensure that mines covering a large geographic area have an appropriate number of 
inspectors assigned to them, and that all mandatory inspections are completed. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
Management and labor in the agencies must discuss and negotiate terms to provide more flexibility for the days and hours in which mine 
inspections are conducted. If inspectors’ work shifts are extended because of travel distance to the mine or demands at the mine, it is not unusual 
for the employee to complete 40 hours of work by Thursday. Currently, inspections on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays are somewhat infrequent, 
but should be encouraged. An effective mine safety enforcement system should be flexible enough to facilitate inspections any day of the week, at 
any hour of the day. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
The current law, which states that no mine operator or anyone else should provide advance notice for federal mine safety and health inspectors, 
should be strengthened. Such a violation should constitute a felony. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
Government officials must ensure that adjudicating bodies have the personnel and resources necessary for speedy resolution of contested citations 
and penalties. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
Government officials must implement alternative dispute resolution mechanisms with appropriate means for worker involvement. [Upper Big 
Branch Page 112] 
State and federal officials must ensure that miners are aware of the protections afforded under state and federal law. An ongoing effort should be 
made to re-educate miners about the existence of the MSHA hotline and the state hotline and about the protections afforded them if they report 
unsafe conditions. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
When a mine is closed by a state or federal inspector’s order, all affected miners would be entitled to full compensation by the operator at their 
regular rates of pay and work schedule for the entire period they are idled. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
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2012 To improve New Zealand's poor record in health and safety, a new Crown agent focusing solely on health and safety should be established: The 
Crown agent should have an executive board accountable to a minister; The chief executive of the Crown agent should be employed by and be 
accountable to the board; The Crown agent should be responsible for administering health and safety in line with strategies agreed with the 
responsible minister, and should provide policy advice to the minister in consultation with the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment; 
The ministry should monitor the Crown agency on behalf of the minister; The Crown agency should be funded by the current levies but the basis 
of the levies should be reviewed for high-hazard industries. [Pike River II Page 303] 
An effective regulatory framework for underground coal mining should be established urgently: The government should establish an expert task 
force to carry out the work. Its members should include health and safety experts and industry, regulator and worker health and safety 
representatives, supported by specialist technical experts; The expert taskforce should be separate from the ministerial task force that is reviewing 
whether New Zealand's entire health and safety system is fit for purpose; The expert task force should consult the Queensland and New South 
Wales frameworks as best practice; In the interests of time, the expert taskforce should consider the immediate development of approved codes of 
practice, to be replaced by regulation where appropriate; The expert taskforce should consider addressing urgently the specific issues identified by 
the commission including: the removal of the 'all practicable steps’ qualification from the mandatory provisions of the regulations, including 
those relating to ingress and egress;-the provision of better health and safety information by the employer to the regulator, including notification 
of all high-potential incidents; requiring employers to have a comprehensive and auditable health and safety management system; mandating the 
statutory positions necessary to ensure healthy and safe mining (including a statutory mine manager and ventilation officer), and identifying their 
key functions and the relevant qualifications, competencies and training; defining standards for ventilation control devices, such as stoppings; 
defining the requirements of underground gas monitoring systems; prohibiting the placement of main fans underground and requiring them to be 
protected against explosions and other hazards, in accordance with the most appropriate international standards; clarifying the restricted zone 
within which electrical equipment requires protection; and updating electrical safety requirements in the light of new technology. [Pike River II 
Page 314-315] 
Regulators need to collaborate to ensure that health and safety is considered as early as possible and before permits are issued. [Pike River II Page 
321] 
The Crown minerals regime should be changed to ensure that health and safety is an integral part of permit allocation and monitoring: The 
proposals in Review of the Crown Minerals Act 1991 Regime are endorsed; Mining permits should have a general condition requiring the need 
for compliance with the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 and regulations; The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
should provide information to prospective permit holders on health and safety laws and regulations; and The ministry should review the 
information required from applicants for mining permits and the way it assesses applications against the criteria in the minerals programme. [Pike 
River II Page 321] 
The statutory responsibilities of directors for health and safety in the workplace should be reviewed to better reflect their governance 
responsibilities. [Pike River II Page 328] 
The health and safety regulator should issue an approved code of practice to guide directors on how good governance practices can be used to 
manage health and safety risks. [Pike River II Page 328] 
Directors should rigorously review and monitor their organization’s compliance with health and safety law and best practice. [Pike River II Page 
328] 
The health and safety regulator should issue an approved code of practice to guide managers on health and safety risks, drawing on both their 
legal responsibilities and best practice. In the meantime, managers should consult the best practice guidance available. [Pike River II Page 331] 
Current regulations imposing general health and safety duties on the statutory mine manager should be extended to include detailed 
responsibilities for overseeing critical features of the company's health and safety management systems: The new regulations should have regard 
to the Queensland legislation applying to the mine's senior site executive; The statutory mine manager should be protected by new procedures 
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requiring disclosure to the regulator when the employer does not accept the manager's proposals for improving health and safety. [Pike River II 
Page 331] 
Worker participation in health and safety in underground coal mines should be improved through legislative and administrative changes. 
Legislative changes should:require operators of underground coal mines to have documented worker participation systems; ensure all workers, 
including contractors, are competent to work safely, are supervised and are included in the mine's worker participation system; empower trained 
worker health and safety representatives to perform inspections and stop activities where there is an immediate danger of serious harm; require 
the results of monitoring and investigation of health and safety in the workplace to be automatically made available to workers; and allow unions 
to appoint check inspectors with the same powers as the worker health and safety representatives. The regulator should: issue an approved code of 
practice on employee participation; promote workers’ rights and obligations through education and publicity; and ensure that inspectors routinely 
consult workers and health and safety representatives as part of audits and inspections. [Pike River II Page 336-337] 
2015 The Ministry of Labour and the relevant Health and Safety Associations to increase their capacity to ensure the health and safety system has the 
resources to address mining hazards effectively – particularly the priority hazards identified in the risk-ranking exercise. In particular: Increase 
ministry capacity in geotechnical, mining, mechanical, electrical, structural, and civil engineering; and Increase system partners’ technical 
capacity/ resources related to industrial hygiene and mechanical issues. [Mining Review Page 53] 
The Ministry of Labour to review its policies and procedures that apply to mining inspectors related to unannounced field visits, reprisals, repeat 
orders, the training of inspectors and the provision of information to workplace parties and how those policies and procedures are implemented. 
Take appropriate actions based on the findings of that review. In particular, address the following operational policies and procedures: Clarify the 
use of unannounced proactive field visits; Clarify the appropriate use of orders versus other methods to achieve compliance for priority hazards, 
especially with regard to repeated non-compliance with the same issue in a specific workplace; Clarify inspector action to be taken in situations of 
suspected reprisal; Align proactive activities, whenever possible, to the priority hazards identified in the sector level risk assessment; Clarify the 
training provided to inspectors to address priority hazards, and the inspector’s role in the inquest process; and Identify any further training 
required to support changes in policies and procedures brought about by the Review and/or changes in the regulations. [Mining Review Page 53-
54] 
The Ministry of Labour to work with the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services to enhance the information supplied to the 
Chief Coroner’s Office and build better linkages between both ministries. This collaboration includes: Conducting and regularly updating an 
aggregate analysis of all past inquests into mining fatalities; Holding information sessions with the Chief Coroner to identify opportunities for 
coroners to use the analysis to improve future inquests into fatalities in the mining sector. [Mining Review Page 54] 
The Ontario Mining Association to work with labour representatives to develop an Internal Responsibility System best practice guideline as an 
industry benchmark, to be endorsed by the Ontario Mining Association for implementation by its members. [Mining Review Page 59] 
The health and safety system to share data both on emerging injury and illness trends, and information on incidents causing serious injury across 
the industry to trigger preventative actions by workplace parties. [Mining Review Page 59] 
The Ministry of Labour to require mine operators to establish and implement a written management of change procedure, to include workers and 
the joint health and safety committee or health and safety representative. [Mining Review Page 35] 
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APPENDIX 3B  
Table 3.5 Recommendations relating to occupational health and safety hazards  
1967 None 
1976 That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch of the province conduct or have conducted and publish on a regular cycle not exceeding five-years 
status reports on the evolution of occupational diseases among miners [Royal Commission Page 32] 
That the radiological status of silicosis in the dust-exposed population currently employed in the Elliot Lake uranium mines and all other uranium 
mines be reviewed by the Occupational Health and Safety Branch on a biennial basis for a period of at least ten years [Royal Commission Page 33] 
That the radiological status of silicosis among the persons on record on the Uranium Nominal Roll be reviewed on a biennial basis for a period of at 
least ten years [Royal Commission Page 33] 
That the functional purpose, measuring procedures, and measured results relating to all environmental monitoring at the workplace be made known in 
understandable language to all affected workers and their representatives by the employer and as appropriate by the Mine Inspection Branch [Royal 
Commission Page 40] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch within the Occupational Health and Safety Authority conduct annually, or have conducted by an independent 
agency, sample measurements at representative workplaces of all environmental quantities whose values are audited by the branch in carrying out its 
role [Royal Commission Page 43] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority publish at least biennially a critical review of its appraisal of environmental conditions at the 
workplaces in the mines and mineral plants [Royal Commission Page 44] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch within the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, in consultation with industry and the representatives of 
workers, prepare, under clearly defined statutory authority, codes of practice applicable to all mines relating to: 1/ the prevention and confinement of 
dust at each distinctive class of workplace; 2/ the provision of ventilation in the breathing zone of workers that is effective for purposes of protecting 
health at each distinctive class of workplace (including vehicles) [Royal Commission Page 49] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority establish by regulation a dust standard for personal exposure to free silica in mine and plant 
aerosols based on a time-weighted average of respirable dust intensity over a working shift and a stipulated lifetime period of exposure [Royal 
Commission Page 50] 
That the dust standard for time-weighted average exposure be established on a statutory basis [Royal Commission Page 50] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority immediately establish by regulation an initial threshold limit value (11 v) for the mass of 
respirable free silica in milligrams per cubic metre [Royal Commission Page 50] 
That the interim has the status accorded by the Occupational Health and Safety Authority to threshold limit values as issued by the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists [Royal Commission Page 51] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch prepare a code of requirements for the gravimetric measurement of dust in all mines suited to 
determining personal exposure to dust [Royal Commission Page 51] 
That all steps necessary to render effective a gravimetric standard of dust measurement, including those listed herein, be implemented immediately 
[Royal Commission Page 51] 
That to provide a basis for establishing a statutory standard or standards for time-weighted average respirable dust exposure in Ontario mines and 
plants, the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission epidemiological research on the relation of the incidence of silicosis and of other 
pulmonary effects to the structure and quantity of aerosols respired in Ontario mines [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That where more than one recognized toxic component is present in the aerosols the standard specifies how an effective combined exposure limit is 
to be determined [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That the existing code of requirements for dust measurement in the uranium mines as issued by the chief engineer of the Mines Engineering Branch 
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remain in force [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That the system of measurement and reporting being conducted by the Mines Accident Prevention Association continue in operation and be subject 
to independent monitoring as recommended [Royal Commission Page 54] 
That the current employees in the Elliot Lake uranium mines who are silicosis or exhibit dust effects (radiographic 4) in their lungs be eligible fora 
voluntary programme of work adjustment; that this programme be supported by management and unions; and that the Workmen's Compensation 
Board provide rehabilitative compensation and supportive counselling services to assist the persons involved [Royal Commission Page 57] 
That any employer who rotates job assignments for workmen with the intent of limiting the occupational exposure of any persons to any hazardous 
environmental condition be required to obtain the formal approval of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and to maintain permanent 
occupational records which clearly define the persons, tasks, locations, hazardous conditions, and time intervals involved [Royal Commission Page 
57] 
That during a programme of personal rehabilitation through work adjustment, and for a minimum period of two years thereafter, the income of the 
worker be maintained in accordance with the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation Act for full compensation which allow the Board to pay in 
non-taxable compensation 75 per cent of the difference between the current rate of pay and the rate of pay applicable at the date of entry into the 
programme [Royal Commission Page 58] 
That in addition to wage maintenance, the worker in a work adjustment programme be eligible for rehabilitation training allowances as provided for 
in the Workmen’s Compensation Act [Royal Commission Page 58] 
That, further, the worker be entitled to reasonable costs for medical and personal counselling beyond that provided by the Workmen's Compensation 
Board, and to reasonable moving, travelling, and related relocation costs when these are applicable [Royal Commission Page 58] 
That when the lungs of a worker exhibit dust effects and the worker seeks the opportunity through work adjustment to take employment with a new 
employer, the new employer not be held liable for any disability pension or other costs for silicosis or disease conditions related thereto that may be 
levied as a consequence of the person becoming a silicotic at a future date [Royal Commission Page 59] 
That persons on the Uranium Nominal Roll who exhibit dust effects (radiographic 4) within twenty years of entry into Ontario dust exposure, and 
who have been employed in dust exposure in the uranium mines fora cumulative interval of five or more years from 1954 to 1975 inclusive, be 
eligible for rehabilitation assistance under a programme of work adjustment [Royal Commission Page 60] 
That where there is evidence that the exposure of any person to silicaladen dust has been substantially in excess of established dust guidelines or 
standards and the person has exhibited dust effects in his or her lungs within twenty years of first exposure to dust in Ontario, the person be eligible 
for work adjustment rehabilitation assistance [Royal Commission Page 60] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board confirm the extent to which thoron gas and its daughter products contribute to the irradiation of the 
respiratory system and other organs of workers in Ontario uranium mines [Royal Commission Page 68] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority be given by statute the authority and responsibility to conduct a full and expeditious review of 
any emergent situation in which the health and safety of workers in mines are believed to be at unexpected risk [Royal Commission Page 78] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a review of the mortality experience of persons on the Ontario Uranium Nominal Roll 
on a biennial basis for at least ten years [Royal Commission Page 80] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board review the basis for and issue explicit regulations establishing the maximum permissible annual exposure to 
ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure delineate how all significant components of external and internal irradiation are to be 
accounted for and indicate how total exposure and related dose is to be evaluated [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure and related dose be interpreted in units that can be monitored by practical means in uranium 
and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
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That the Province of Ontario, through the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, establish by statute a standard for maximum permissible annual 
exposure to ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills, and that this standard be in conformity with the regulatory 
standards of the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 87] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch be assigned by provincial statute the responsibility to direct: the establishment and review of 
occupational health records for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills, for regulatory and epidemiological purposes; the preparation of a 
code of practice for the sampling and measurement of ionizing radiation in a manner suited to the determination of the exposures of individual 
workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills and that this code of practice be in conformity with the code of guidance issued by the Atomic 
Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 87] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch prepare regulations defining the kinds and frequencies of measurements of ventilation, dust and radiation 
necessary to enable it to audit the engineering operational characteristics of uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 88] 
That these regulations be in conformity with the related code of guidance established by the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 
88] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority specify: a level of radiation in mine or mill air measured at any time in any occupied workplace 
which, if exceeded, requires that corrective action be taken immediately; and a level of radiation in mine or mill air measured at any time in any 
occupied workplace which, if exceeded, requires closure of the related workplace until the level of radiation is reduced below that specified in 1 
[Royal Commission Page 88] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a study of the mortality experience of the Ontario Uranium Nominal Roll relative to 
appropriately matched sample populations of non-uranium miners and non-miners in Ontario [Royal Commission Page 91] 
That persons who work in exposure to ionizing radiation in uranium mines cease smoking both at home and at work for their own sakes and in 
consideration of their families [Royal Commission Page 96] 
That each uranium mine install a central monitoring system for its ventilation network to monitor air flow and air quality as indicated by dust, 
radiation, and other contaminants [Royal Commission Page 102] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch audit the engineering records of performance of mine ventilation systems [Royal Commission Page 102] 
That job rotation within mines conducted to meet the standard foi maximum permissible annual exposure to ionizing radiation be permitted only in 
exceptional circumstances with the explicit approval on a case-by-case basis of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and with the knowledge 
of the representatives of the workers [Royal Commission Page 105] 
That records of personal exposure to ionizing radiation maintained by the mines be keyed to Miner’s Certificate numbers in sequence and to social 
insurance numbers in sequence and arranged in a format that facilitates linking to the Mining Master File [Royal Commission Page 107] 
That the frequency of regular radiographic examination of dust- exposed mine workers be reduced to once every two years unless a radiographic 
change was apparent at the last examination [Royal Commission Page 107] 
That tests using sputum cytology be conducted every two years on all persons who have worked in radiation exposure at the uranium mines for five 
or more years [Royal Commission Page 108] 
That the Workmen’s Compensation Board of Ontario, in collaboration with other provincial boards as provided for in interprovincial agreements, 
seek out and advise the families of all ascertained deaths due to lung cancer on the Nominal Roll that a claim for compensation should be entered 
[Royal Commission Page 109] 
That there be a statutory requirement fora metallurgical audit of origin, holdup, and destination of potentially dangerous minor elements such as lead, 
mercury, arsenic, selenium, tellurium, cadmium, and antimony to be conducted quarterly in all reduction plants on the basis of extended standard 
monthly sampling and analytical procedures, and that a copy of this audit be sent to the Occupational Health and Safety Authority [Royal 
Commission Page 200] 
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That there be a statutory requirement for an annual audit of use by mass of toxic and hazardous reagents and that a copy be sent to the Occupational 
Health and Safety Authority [Royal Commission Page 200] 
That there be a statutory requirement for each mining company to maintain a register of servicing chemicals involved in any personal encounter 
associated with a medical aid or compensable injury; that the register specify both trade name and chemical composition and identify all known toxic 
chemical constituents; that the register include an audit by mass of annual use; and that a copy of this register be provided to the Occupational Health 
and Safety Authority [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That there be a statutory requirement for each mining company to give the Occupational Health and Safety Authority notice of intent to introduce any 
new reagent or servicing chemical whose toxic characteristics are not known [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That with respect to codes of practice and schemes of practice the principles of recommendations 8, 9, and 10 be extended 1/ to the maintenance and 
operation of mills and metallurgical plants as these activities relate to the leaking and spilling of toxic substances and hot materials into workplaces; 
2/ to the handling and use of reagents and servicing chemicals and to the consequences of their leaks and spills [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That at any location of regular work where acute encounters with toxic substances repeatedly occur as a result of leaking, recirculating, or spilling 
from metallurgical and milling processes, there be a statutory requirement for the installation and use of equipment for the continuous monitoring of 
the substances involved [Royal Commission Page 206] 
That a record of the substances and human effects of acute encounters with toxic substances leading to medical aid and compensable injuries be 
maintained in the occupational health records of each worker at the company level [Royal Commission Page 207] 
That at five-year intervals the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a review of the status of the health of samples of persons who are 
at high risk from acute encounters with toxic substances, including as necessary intensive medical surveillance [Royal Commission Page 207] 
That epidemiological reviews of selected populations subject to chronic exposure to toxic substances in reduction plants and mines matched to 
suitable control groups be conducted on a five-year cycle by or under the guidance of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and that the 
essential results of such studies be summarized and published upon completion [Royal Commission Page 212] 
That a nominal roll of workers at risk of exposure to nickel carbonyl in reduction plants and pilot plants be established by the Occupational Health 
and Safety Authority, in co-operation with the industry and that the morbidity and the mortality experience of this nominal roll be reviewed at least 
every five years [Royal Commission Page 213] 
That the appropriate substance or intent of recommendations 8, 9, 10, 39(2), 40, 42, and 46 be made applicable to asbestos mines and plants [Royal 
Commission Page 215] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority establish, with the co-operation of the Workmen's Compensation Board and the mining industry, 
a nominal roll of all persons who have worked one or more months in exposure to asbestos dust in asbestos mines and plants [Royal Commission 
Page 215] 
That workers in reduction plants who have been exposed for twenty years or longer to sulphur dioxide at levels approaching the current Threshold 
Limit Value and to associated dust and fumes, and who exhibit the clinical diagnosis of chronic bronchitis and impaired pulmonary function as 
identified by objective tests, be considered for compensation at up to a maximum of 20 per cent disability [Royal Commission Page 219] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, in co-operation with the industry and labour, prepare a code of requirements for diesel emissions 
[Royal Commission Page 222] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch prepare a code of practice for the provision of ventilation and for the fuelling, operation, and maintenance of diesel 
engines [Royal Commission Page 222] 
That each mine using diesel equipment be required to file with the Mines Inspection Branch a scheme of practice for the short-term and long-term 
maintenance of its diesel engines [Royal Commission Page 222] 
That each mining operation maintain noise maps based on full-scale conditions of operation which delineate all areas of work at which the noise level 
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is 85 dB(A) or higher [Royal Commission Page 229]  
That the mining industry and equipment manufacturers, with the Canadian Standards Association, expedite the development of standards for the 
assessment of noise from mining equipment, and for the performance of personal safety equipment and cab enclosures in attenuating noise, and that 
such standards be invoked by the industry in specifying noise performance requirements for new equipment [Royal Commission Page 230] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority issue a code of practice for the selection and use of personal hearing protection and for 
communicating in the presence of noise [Royal Commission Page 231] 
That, by statute, each mining company be made responsible for maintaining effective audiometric records for each employee who in the absence of 
hearing protection regularly encounters noise at levels of 85 dB(A) or higher, and that such audiometric records be required to be keyed 1/ to social 
insurance numbers, 2/ to Miner’s Certificate numbers where such have been assigned, and 3/ to a code number of noise-profile-encounter as 
previously recommended [Royal Commission Page 232] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission on a five-year cycle statistical assessments of the state of hearing among sample 
populations of workers in mines, and that the first review be of production crews in underground operations, including diesel operators [Royal 
Commission Page 232] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch regularly inspect all audiometric testing facilities not under the supervision of a designated medical 
specialist, and that any designated medical specialist be required to certify biennially in writing that the facilities under his supervision conform to the 
minimum standards of the Branch as then current [Royal Commission Page 233] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority be assigned by statute the responsibility to establish standards or guidelines for personal exposure 
to all toxic substances and hazardous physical agents and that, subject to any statutory standards and in consultation with industry and labour, the 
Authority issue a code of practice for the application in mines and plants of the Threshold Limit Values of the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists [Royal Commission Page 235] 
That the mining industry establish for its employees, where such is not now provided, occupational health surveillance by a supervising medical 
director or consultant experienced in occupational medicine [Royal Commission Page 237] 
That the labour unions individually or in consort appoint to their staff a consulting specialist in occupational medicine [Royal Commission Page 237] 
1981 That wherever practical, fall-on protection be installed on all man-operated underground equipment. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That a planned and systematic program of visual inspection of each active work area be conducted in each mine. [Towards Safe Production Page 
234] 
That the inspections be carried out by persons who have specialized knowledge in rock mechanics. [Towards Safe Production Page 234] 
That these inspections be carried out under an auxiliary source of high intensity lighting. [Towards Safe Production Page 234] 
That the persons making these inspections be required to file regular written reports with the supervisor of the inspection program. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 234] 
That work crews lie formally and systematically made aware of ground conditions in the areas in which they are working. [Towards Safe Production 
Page 234] 
That inadequate lighting be investigated as a possible cause of all reportable underground accidents and that in all eases of serious underground 
accidents, photometric valves he recorded by persons trained in the use of photometric equipment. [Towards Safe Production Page 234] 
That Ontario mining companies and the unions representing workers in the mining industry seriously consider adoption of an approach to the 
management of alcohol and drug abuse in the workplace along the lines suggested. [Towards Safe Production Page 236] 
1986 That auxiliary high-intensity lighting be available in all active work areas to assist in ground-control- related activities such as inspection and scaling. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 64] 
That within one year of the release of this report lighting standards - as they relate to ground control and emergency preparedness - shall be 
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established for use in all underground mines. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 64] 
That Fall-On Protection shall be mandatory on all vehicles operating in areas requiring this type of protection. This recommendation shall be referred 
to the established FOPS sub-committee which will develop standards for its implementation. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That soft rock mining operations be considered separately from hard rock mining in setting standards related to ground control practices. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 68] 
1995 It is recommended that mines be required to develop and implement protocols for the setting, resetting, and the noting and acceptance of alarm 
conditions raised by any gas monitoring system in use at the mine. In particular, such protocols should define: who is authorized to set or change 
alarm levels and the recording of those settings or changes; who is responsible for the acknowledgment of alarms and recording of acknowledgments; 
who is responsible for communicating the occurrence of alarms and initiating action as a result of those alarms; and how the actions of responsible 
persons, and the identity of those persons, are to be recorded. [Moura Page 68] 
It is recommended that all mines be required to develop and implement a spontaneous combustion management plan along the lines outlined to 
provide effective long term control of that risk and which satisfies any requirements of the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines as a condition for continued 
operation of the mine. [Moura Page 62]  
In respect of the design, installation and maintenance of seals, the Inquiry recommends that: the location of final seals be subject to approval by the 
District Inspector of Mines; it be a requirement that seals be constructed using only materials that have been approved for the purpose by the Chief 
Inspector of Coal Mines; and the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines should determine and then apply requirements appropriate for the design and 
installation of seals and for their long-term stability. [Moura Page 69] 
The Inquiry recommends that minimum requirements provide for: the continuous and effective sampling and monitoring of the atmosphere in a 
sealed area including a minimum number of sampling points and suitable location(s); means whereby the pressure difference between the inside and 
outside surfaces of seals can be measured; the effective ventilation of the outside surfaces of seals; and regular inspection and periodic auditing on 
the long-term performance of seals and sealed areas. [Moura Page 69] 
It is for these reasons that the Inquiry further recommends that it be a requirement that no part of a mine be sealed without the prior written approval 
of the District Inspector of Mines (other than in an emergency, whereupon the inspector must be informed as soon as practicable thereafter). [Moura 
Page 69] 
It is further recommended that funds to be made available through the Queensland Government in order to obtain such a system, such that equipment 
for the inertisation of a coal mine or parts of a mine, with appropriately trained people and operating systems, be readily available for use in 
Queensland Coal Mines. This equipment should be maintained and operated by the Queensland Mines Rescue Service in a central location such that 
it can service all the mines in Queensland on a fee for service basis. [Moura Page 70] 
1997 The overriding principle in mine ventilation must be that the mine is properly ventilated at all working times. It is the primary duty of the mine 
manager to ensure this proper ventilation: All active working places should be ventilated by a current of fresh air containing not less than 19.5 per 
cent by volume of oxygen and not more than 0.5 per cent by volume of carbon dioxide; and Each working face should receive fresh air of sufficient 
volume and velocity to dilute and render harmless all noxious or flammable gases and maintain all working and travelling areas in a safe and fit 
condition. [Westray Page 276] 
No mine should start up without a comprehensive ventilation plan approved by the regulator. The ventilation plan should be subject to at least an 
annual update, and any changes in the interim should be subject to approval by the regulator. [Westray Page 276] 
The ventilation plan should contain details of the system proposed, or of amendments to the existing approved system, and should indicate: the limits 
of the mine property and any adjacent workings, as well as any abnormal conditions; the location and detailed specifications of all surface fans and 
all surface openings; the direction, velocity, and volume of air at each mine opening; all underground workings, including location of all stoppings, 
overcasts, undercasts, regulators, doors, and seals; the method of sealing worked-out areas, provisions for air sampling behind any such seals, and the 
manner in which such sealed areas will be vented into return air passages (ensuring that no intake air is or could be passing any sealed-off area); the 
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location of all splits and the volume of fresh air entering each split and of return air at each cross-cut in a room-and-pillar mine and at each working 
face; and the locations for the measurement of air in the mine to ensure the proper ventilation at all times. [Westray Page 276] 
The regulator may submit plans or amendments to a qualified mine ventilation engineer for review, and any fee for such review should be the 
responsibility of the mine operator. The regulator may require modifications to the plan in the interests of safety. [Westray Page 277] 
The regulator, in consultation with a qualified ventilation engineer, should draft regulations dealing with main fans and auxiliary fans. These 
regulations should include: details of the design, installation, operation, maintenance, and inspections of such fans; and requirements for 
instrumentation, the recording of data from such instrumentation, and the filing of this data with the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
No booster fan should be installed underground without the approval of the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
Every main ventilating fan should be mounted above ground in a fireproof fan house located at a safe distance from any mine opening and offset 
from any such openings or connections. The fan house should be equipped with a weak wall or explosion door located in a direct line with any 
possible explosion forces. Every main fan should be equipped with an audible alarm that sounds automatically if the fan stops or slows down. 
[Westray Page 277] 
Where any fan used in ventilating a mine stops for any reason, the area affected should be immediately evacuated. No auxiliary fan should be 
restarted until a qualified person has inspected the area and found it to be safe and free of gas. The area should not be re-entered until the ventilation 
has been restored to the required level and the area has been found to be safe and free of gas by a qualified person. If any fan remains stopped for 
more than 30 minutes, the mine operator should report the relevant circumstances to the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
The regulator, in consultation with a qualified ventilation engineer, should draft regulations dealing with requirements for ducting, brattice, 
stoppings, locations of measuring devices, and sealing of abandoned sections of the mine. All brattice cloth, ducting, and materials used for 
constructing stoppings should be of fire-resistant material. [Westray Page 277] 
Equipment used to ventilate an underground coal mine should be of a type approved by the regulator and should be installed in an approved manner. 
Equipment, materials, or procedures not previously approved may be approved if the regulator is satisfied that the same measure of protection is 
provided to the underground worker. [Westray Page 277] 
Unless specifically approved in writing by the regulator, no more than one mechanized coal mining unit should operate in each ventilation split. Each 
split should be provided with a separate supply of fresh air. [Westray Page 278] 
Ventilating air should not be recirculated without the written consent of the regulator. [Westray Page 278] 
The mine operator should employ a qualified mine ventilation technician to be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the ventilation 
system. The ventilation technician should measure the airflow and sample the air quality in the mine at approved intervals of at least once a month for 
the whole mine and weekly for working areas. The results of ventilation and air quality tests should be recorded and a copy of such record should be 
filed with the regulator. [Westray Page 278] 
Workers should be removed from any area in a mine where the concentration of dust or noxious gases in the air exceeds the standards set out by the 
American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). [Westray Page 278] 
Devices used for testing air quality, velocity, and volume should be of a type certified and approved for such use by the Canada Centre for Mineral 
and Energy Technology (CANMET), the Approval and Certification Center of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the Canadian 
Standards Association (CSA), or other such equivalent testing body. [Westray Page 278] 
The level of methane in an air intake to the working face of the mine should not exceed 0.5 per cent by volume: If the methane level exceeds 0.5 per 
cent by volume, the ventilation technician or other qualified person must take steps to adjust the ventilation system to dilute the methane to 
acceptable levels; If the methane level in any part of a mine reaches or exceeds 2 per cent by volume, all workers must be evacuated from the 
affected area; The airflow throughout the mine, including the mine face, should be such that methane will be diluted to a level below 0.5 percent by 
volume, as measured at least 30 cm from the roof or ribs; The velocity of air throughout the mine should be sufficient to prevent the formation of 
methane layers. [Westray Page 313] 
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The mine operator should provide suitable testing and calibrating facilities on the mine surface. Methanometers should be tested for accuracy before 
each shift and calibrated as required. [Westray Page 313] 
If the locked flame safety lamp is used at all, it should be handled only by persons who have received adequate training in its assembly and operation. 
No lamp should be reignited underground unless the methane content in the ambient air is 0 per cent, as determined by a methanometer. [Westray 
Page 313] 
If the methane level in the area reaches or exceeds 1 per cent by volume, any electrically operated equipment in use should be shut down, and any 
shot firing being carried out should be discontinued: In addition to other safety devices, any electrical equipment operating at the mine face or in 
reasonable proximity, as established by the regulator, should be equipped with a methane monitoring device capable of continually monitoring the 
methane content of the air; If the methane content exceeds 1 per cent by volume, the methane monitoring device should automatically shut down the 
electrical equipment; The electrical equipment should not be re-energized until a qualified person certifies that the methane content in the air has 
been diluted to a safe level. (30 CFR sets out this requirement as it applies to mines under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.); The methane monitors installed on electrical equipment should be kept operative at all times and tested weekly for accuracy. 
Sensors should be affixed to the equipment as close to the working face as practicable. [Westray Page 313] 
The operation of mobile diesel-powered equipment underground should be regulated to ensure that the health and safety of the workforce is not 
endangered or impaired by such operation. [Westray Page 314] 
The regulator may require, as part of the mine development plan, a plan for the installation of a remote system for monitoring the mine atmosphere, 
with appropriate audible alarms and recording devices. Such a monitoring plan should include the provision that a qualified person must be at the 
remote monitoring station at all times that the mine is operating. [Westray Page 314] 
Every mine development plan should include complete details of any program or process designed to drain methane from the coal seam before, 
during, and after mining. The regulator could waive this requirement if satisfied that the program or process would be impractical and that general 
mine safety would not be compromised. [Westray Page 314] 
Every coal mine operator should prepare a program for the regular clean- up and removal of coal dust and other combustibles from the floor, roof, 
and ribs of roadways and work areas in the mine. A copy of the program should be filed with the regulator, who may require changes in the clean-up 
program if it does not comply with accepted industry standards. [Westray Page 348] 
Sufficient water should be provided in the mine to ensure that an adequate supply is available to wet the coal being mined and transported within the 
mine: All coal-cutting picks should be equipped with water-spray jets of sufficient number and size to ensure that the areas of the coal face being 
worked are maintained in a damp condition so as to render any coal dust incombustible; and All transfer points where coal is moved from one mode 
of transport to another should be equipped with water-spray devices sufficient to render any coal dust incombustible. [Westray Page 349] 
All underground areas of a coal mine should be stonedusted to within 12 m of the working face and all cross-cuts less than 12 m distant from the face 
should be stonedusted. This would not apply to those areas within the mine containing sufficient moisture to render the coal dust incombustible or for 
which the regulator, after examination, has granted exemption. [Westray Page 349] 
A mine operator should file with the regulator a copy of the stonedusting program for the mine, including the method and frequency of testing; the 
type of testing equipment used; the type and number of dust-spreading machines used; the frequency of dusting; and the location and quantity of 
stonedust stored in the mine for emergencies (as opposed to normal usage). [Westray Page 350] 
The material used for stonedusting should be of a type approved by the regulator for that purpose and should meet accepted industry standards as to 
size, composition, and incombustibility. [Westray Page 350] 
Dust samples should be taken at least once a week using a method approved by the regulator for that purpose. Samples should be taken according to a 
regularly updated and approved plan. The regulator may require additional testing and may grant exemptions, providing that the overall safety of 
underground workers is not compromised. [Westray Page 350] 
The regulations should specify the following at a minimum: Ground control plans and any revisions to those plans should be prepared by the mine 
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operator and submitted to the regulator for approval prior to the implementation of any such plans; The ground control plan should show the existing 
geological conditions and the mining system to be used. The plan should also indicate any unusual hazards and outline the manner in which these 
will be handled; Approved plans should be available to miners and other underground workers and should be posted in the mine at the area affected 
by the plan; and What the plan is required to specify should be set forth by the regulator from time to time, and should include: a columnar section of 
mine strata; planned width of openings and size of pillar (if required); thickness of seam; method of support to be used; type, sequence, and spacing 
of support materials; requirements for temporary roof support systems; and type and thickness of strata in the roof and in the floor for a depth of 3 m 
below the coal bed. The regulator may require further and better information on the plan and may require that the plan be reviewed by a qualified 
specialist in rock mechanics. The regulator may require revisions to the plan at any time if satisfied that conditions or accident experience indicate 
that such revisions are necessary or conducive to safety. The ground control plan should be reviewed at least once every six months by the regulator. 
The mine operator should record on the plan and report to the regulator any unplanned fall of roof or rib or any significant rock burst (more than 0.3 
m in thickness) that occurs above the bolt anchorage area, impairs ventilation, impedes the passage of persons, causes injury to miners, causes miners' 
withdrawal from the area, or disrupts activities for more than one hour. All roof control materials should conform with standards as established by 
various testing agencies such as the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) or the American Society for Testing and Materials Specifications 
(ASTMS). In the absence of standards, such materials could be approved by the regulator. The regulator should from time to time issue directions, 
such as found in 30 CFR, respecting the use of roof bolts, torquing requirements for roof bolts, and testing requirements for roof bolts and for other 
types of roof support systems. All entries and drives where roof bolting is the main means of roof support should have imbedded warning devices 
that monitor any downward movement in the roof strata. Such warning devices should be of a type approved by the regulator and should be placed at 
intervals specified on the plan. Installation of such devices should not relieve the operator from making regular inspections as prescribed. (The type 
of device referred to here is that generic category in which the "tell-tale" extensometer — the simple mechanical gauge produced at the CANMET 
Coal Research Laboratory in Cape Breton — would be included.) [Westray Page 384] 
Each crew at the working face of a mine should include a person trained in the use of a methanometer. This person should carry, while in the mine, 
an approved device or devices capable of testing for both methane and oxygen, and capable of testing at the roof and in roof cavities for layering. 
[Westray Page 313] 
The mine operator should employ or retain the services of a qualified ventilation engineer to assist in the preparation of all ventilation plans or 
amendments to such plans. The ventilation engineer should sign any ventilation plans or amendments before they are submitted to the regulator. 
[Westray Page 277] 
2006 Inspections of the construction of seals must be conducted by a certified engineer. The inspection must include monitoring the construction for a 
sufficient time, as well as evaluating the completed seal, to insure each seal is properly installed. The certified engineer should record the findings in 
an appropriate book. [Sago Page 8] 
The regulatory agencies should routinely inspect the seal during the construction and at the completion of each seal. Sufficient time for this 
inspection must be permitted to determine that all seals are properly constructed. [Sago Page 8] 
The use of Omega Blocks should not be permitted as a ventilation control in any underground mining operation. [Sago Page 8] 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recently released a draft report entitled, “Explosive Pressure Design Criteria for 
New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The UMWA fully endorses the report and its recommendations, as follows: For unmonitored seals where there is a 
possibility of methane-air detonation behind the seal, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 640 psi; For unmonitored seals 
with little likelihood of detonation, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 120 psi; For monitored seals where the amount of 
potentially explosive methane-air is strictly limited and controlled, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 50 psi, if monitoring 
can assure that the maximum length of explosive mix behind a seal does not exceed 15 feet and that the volume of the explosive mix does not exceed 
40 percent of the total sealed volume. [Sago Page 8] 
The method of seal construction submitted by the operator in the ventilation plan and approved by the agencies must include: Seals must be hitched 
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into the ribs and bottom a minimum of 6 inches; A method to continually monitor the atmosphere in by the seals from a remote location on the 
surface; Sealed areas must be treated as an integral part of the mine’s overall ventilation system, and be specifically designed and approved for each 
installation at each mine. The seal requirements must be based on several factors, including area to be sealed, special conditions within the area to be 
sealed and methane liberation; and Seals must be constructed of solid, incombustible material as prescribed in the 1977 Mine Act. [Sago Page 8] 
The agencies should no longer permit areas of the mine that are sealed to self-inert without continuous monitoring as recommended by NIOSH. 
[Sago Page 8] 
Areas of the mine that are to be sealed must be free of all debris that is not permanently installed during the mining process. Materials and supplies 
such as unused roof support material, posts, oil and hydraulic containers, cables, equipment, belt structure, message or other cables and electrical 
components or cables must be retrieved and placed in a safe area outside the seals. [Sago Page 8] 
Seals in worked-out or abandoned areas of the mine should be visually inspected and tested each shift with an approved methane detector to insure 
their structural integrity and to check for methane leakage. [Sago Page 9] 
Seals that do not pass this inspection must be immediately leak-tested utilizing the same methodology currently used for this purpose at NIOSH’s 
Lake Lynn experimental mine. Any leaks or damage to the seal must be repaired immediately. [Sago Page 9] 
Adequate rock dusting of the area prior to sealing must be required. Operators must be required to bulk dust each entry and crosscut prior to the start 
of the sealing process. The final seals should not be installed until the area is inspected and the agencies are satisfied the area has been sufficiently 
rock dusted. [Sago Page 9] 
The agencies should consider future sealing methods that require approval of smaller, more manageable areas of the mine. These smaller sequentially 
sealed areas will eliminate large areas where enormous volumes of explosive gases can accumulate, allowing better control within the area. 
Successively sealing these areas will afford additional protections to miners. [Sago Page 9] 
The agencies should not approve ventilation plans that utilize blowing ventilation where active working areas are in-by. [Sago Page 9] 
The practice of second mining should not be approved. [Sago Page 10] 
The Union calls for the immediate and permanent ban on the use of all Omega or similar-type blocks and material in any underground area of all coal 
mines. [Sago Page 10] 
MSHA should rescind its regulation that permits alternative materials and methods for constructing seals, and immediately require that all seals be 
explosion-proof seals or bulkheads, as is required by Section 303(y)(2) and (3) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977. [Sago Page 10] 
The Union believes the current protocol used for testing and approving seals is flawed. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) recently issued a draft report entitled “Explosion Pressure Design Criteria for New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The report addresses two 
critical issues: What explosion pressures can develop during an explosion within a sealed area, and What are the appropriate design criteria for seals 
that will withstand these pressures? [Sago Page 10] 
2011 Specifically use a “pattern of violation” and/or “flagrant violation” authority for violations of key standards designed to prevent explosions, and 
apply meaningful sanctions, such as revoking the operator’s ventilation plan. If an operator’s plan is revoked for reckless or repeated behaviour, he 
should be offered a brief period of time (e.g., five days) to make the safety case to MSHA as to why the mine’s ventilation plan should not be 
revoked. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
A procedure should be adopted that would require mine operators repeatedly cited for failing to follow their own approved ventilation plan to notify 
MSHA and WVMHST when subsequent ventilation changes are completed and before miners are allowed back underground. Affected miners would 
be entitled to full compensation by the operator at their regular rates of pay and work schedule for the entire period they are idled. [Upper Big Branch 
Page 109] 
Each mine should be required to maintain and continuously update records of the amount of rock dust purchased and the amount used daily.  Failure 
to maintain adequate records would result in a citation with a monetary fine. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
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WVMHST and MSHA should undertake reorganization on their ventilation approval system to ensure that plans and requirements are known and 
understood by both the ventilation specialists as well as the inspectors. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
WVMHST, NIOSH, MSHA and the mining industry should adopt before the end of 2011 rules to: reduce the permissible exposure limit (PEL) for 
coal mine dust to 0.09 mg/m3; reduce the PEL for crystalline silica to 0.05 mg/m3; and mandate continuous dust monitoring, verification of mine 
operators’ dust control plans at normal production (e.g., at least equal to the average production recorded for the most recent 30 production shifts), 
and single-shift sampling. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
Mechanized rock dusting must be conducted in all portions of underground mines, as well as the installation of “passive barriers” to help stop 
ignitions from turning into large explosions, such as occurred at Upper Big Branch. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
2012 None 
2015 The Ministry of Labour to require employers in the mining sector to conduct risk assessments, which would include measures and procedures to 
control the risks identified in the assessment as likely to expose a worker to injury and illness. The joint health and safety committee, health and 
safety representative, union or workers be consulted on the risk assessment. Employer risk reassessments are to be done as often as necessary to 
ensure programs that result from the assessment continue to protect workers. [Mining Review Page 29] 
The Ministry of Labour to require that mining employers to address the priority hazards identified in the risk ranking exercise: Enhance ground 
control protection by identifying key elements in the control of these hazards, and requiring employers to maintain a record of significant seismic 
events in addition to incidents of ground instability; Require employers to prepare a formal plan to manage hazards that cause occupational illness, 
including requirements for worker and supervisor training and communication; and Require all underground mines employers to have in place a 
formal water management program; Specify that precautions be taken by employers to guard against the accumulation of water in bins, ore and waste 
passes and chutes; and Require all underground mines to have in place a formal traffic management plan. [Mining Review Page 29-30] 
The Ministry of Labour to review existing occupational exposure limits for a number of key airborne and chemical hazardous substances in 
underground mines with a view for giving further consideration to the limits for those substances and, if appropriate and advisable, amend Regulation 
833. Priority to be given to a review of the occupational exposure limits for silica, nitrogen dioxide and diesel particulate matter (DPM). Other 
hazards to be considered include: sulfur dioxide, and radon. [Mining Review Page 30] 
The Ministry of Labour, supported by all relevant health and safety system partners and subject matter experts, to undertake a Mining Sector Risk 
Assessment with employers and labour every 3 years. [Mining Review Page 28] 
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APPENDIX 3C  
Table 3.6 Recommendations relating to training, education and competence  
1967 Present managers and surveyors should as soon as possible receive training in ground-water conditions and the rudiments of soil mechanics so as to be 
able to appreciate the significance of the reports of, and opinions expressed by, the experts in these subjects. The statutory qualifications for managers 
and surveyors should in future include awareness of the elements of soil mechanics and hydrogeology, in addition to the geology which is already 
comprised in the syllabus. The Unit Mechanical Engineer and charge hand should be instructed in the significance of tip deformation and of the 
appearance or disappearance of water-courses. In addition, the charge hand should be trained to record at frequent intervals on a pro-forma a simple 
questionnaire dealing with such matters as toe-movement, crest-sinking, cracks and breaks. These records should be kept at the Unit Office and 
inspected regularly by the manager and mechanical engineer. They should also be produced to the civil engineer charged with tip responsibility and to 
Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Mines on the occasion of each visit to the tip. [Aberfan Page 128] 
Professor Bishop further recommended that, in order to ensure that only suitably qualified engineers are employed for site investigation, a Panel of 
Approved Engineers should be established on lines similar to those set up under the Reservoirs (Safety Provisions) Act, 1930, as amplified in a Report 
on Reservoir Safety by the Institution of Civil Engineers in 1966. We place on record this latter representation, but we do not ourselves either endorse 
or reject it. We had described to us a little of the operation of the 1930 Act, but not enough to justify us in inviting Ministers to follow it as a precedent; 
indeed, we were told that the Act requires amendment in a number of respects and that the 1966 Report just referred to contains provisions for its 
revision. [Aberfan Page 126] 
1976 That engineering schools review and redefine their responsibility to the profession to ensure that graduates are more keenly aware of and responsive to 
the impact of technological design upon the occupational health and safety of workers [Royal Commission Page 205] 
That profiles of risk-encounter for toxic substances be developed by examining the work patterns of maintenance workers, and that modular training be 
adapted to such profiles [Royal Commission Page 206] 
That the core of the staff of the Mines Inspection Branch continue to be based on persons of exceptional professional experience in mining, and related 
fields of engineering, supplemented by special training in occupational health and safety and in the principles of the administration of work [Royal 
Commission Page 163] 
That the industry, government, and labour give high priority to the development, standardization, and accreditation of modular training and 
qualification for workers in mines and plants [Royal Commission Page 169] 
That resources for joint research and teaching by specialists in occupational health and safety in faculties of medicine and engineering be given high 
priority by both the universities and government [Royal Commission Page 205] 
1981 That upon implementation of the modular training program in specialized skills for underground miners, a modular training program for surface 
operations be developed. [Towards Safe Production Page 235] 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario investigate and develop appropriate screening tests for prospective underground miners 
and make these available to the industry. [Towards Safe Production Page 235] 
That the common core modular training program be augmented by a formal program of on-the-job training leading to full production capability. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 235] 
That each mining company undertake a comprehensive audit of the skills of its underground miners with a view to using modular training to upgrade 
skills. [Towards Safe Production Page 235] 
That joint training tor members of joint health and safety committees be undertaken and where possible, supervisors also be involved. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 229] 
That, in the absence of agreement to the contrary, the costs of such programs be charged back to the company or union on a per participant basis. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 230] 
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That the allocation of government monies to health and safety training be on condition that joint training be carried out wherever possible. [Towards 
Safe Production Page 230] 
That first line supervisors receive the requisite training and carry out workplace safety inspections as pan of a planned program of rotation of first line 
supervisors through the safety department. [Towards Safe Production Page 231] 
That branch inspectors be given the training necessary to carry out these responsibilities. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That the future recruitment of branch engineers be based in part upon interpersonal skills and the potential to act in a meditative mode, and that the 
training and development of branch engineers include these aspects. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That each mining company operating in Ontario employ at least one professional engineer with post-graduate qualification in rock mechanics and that 
a person holding such qualification be used in the design and planning of a mine or mine expansion and that a person holding such qualification be 
made responsible for the company’s ground control program. [Towards Safe Production Page 233] 
That a committee be struck, with representatives of the mining companies, the unions representing workers in mines and mining plants and the 
government, for the purpose of developing a modular training program for first line supervisors in both underground and surface operations and that 
individuals be certified by the company conducting the program as competent to supervise in a mine or mining plant upon successful completion. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 227] 
That from the date the program commences, only persons who have such certification be appointed to fill regular first line supervisory positions. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 227] 
That persons occupying first line supervisory positions as of the date the program commences, be required to complete the program and become 
certified within a reasonable lime period stipulated by the tripartite committee. [Towards Safe Production Page 227] 
1986 That a separate section on ground control be added to the skills included in the Common Core training for new underground miners. [Ground Control 
& Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That the present tripartite committee established to approve modular training programs shall expand those programs to include specialist modules on 
ground control for all underground miners. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That all miners receive periodic refresher courses in ground control if required. Labour shall be encouraged to participate in the development of the 
curriculum. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That miners who have been off the job for one year or more should be evaluated with respect to their knowledge of current ground control practices, 
and should receive appropriate training where necessary before they return to regular underground work. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That non-miners working underground be trained in the fundamentals of ground control, including the recognition of potential hazards. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 53] 
That all mining supervisory staff receive adequate training in ground control. The ground control module for supervisors being developed by the 
tripartite committee on modular training shall be deemed adequate for this purpose. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 53] 
That health and safety committee members shall receive the same training in ground control as supervisory staff. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue 
Page 53] 
That colleges and universities training mining engineers recognize that good undergraduate teaching in a subject such as rock mechanics demands 
lecturers who have a deep understanding of the subject, solid practical experience in its application in real mining situations, and the ability to present 
their material in clear and simple terms which will enable the students to apply their knowledge to the solution of the problems they will encounter in 
the industry. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 55] 
That the teaching staff in colleges and universities with rock mechanics programs shall have strong practical experience in underground hard rock 
mining. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 55] 
That qualified personnel from the mining industry participate in teaching graduate and undergraduate programs at colleges and universities with rock 
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mechanics programs. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 55] 
That additional funding be made available to colleges and universities to provide the improved facilities and instruction necessary to permit adequate 
training in ground control. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 545] 
That the mining industry shall establish a special chair in ground control at an Ontario university to improve the standard of teaching in rock mechanics 
for graduate and undergraduate students, and to conduct research projects directly related to the mining industry. This chair shall be closely identified 
with the Ontario mining industry, and shall take direction from the industry. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 55] 
That instruction in ground control be integrated into the undergraduate programs in mining engineering. The Rock Mechanics and Strata Control 
Committee of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy shall be asked to effect this change through the organization of a National Forum on 
mining-related ground control education. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That community colleges and universities offering mining programs be encouraged to develop additional short courses in ground control, targeted to 
specific groups in the mining industry. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That the mining industry in Ontario be encouraged to sponsor their employees’ attendance at existing short courses and other programs as they become 
available. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That these short courses be designed so that adequate training can be given in various locations, including remote regions of the province. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That certification courses be developed in practical ground control for practising ground control engineers and other technical personnel. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That the mining industry be encouraged to sponsor qualified employees who seek post-graduate degrees in rock mechanics. [Ground Control & Mine 
Rescue Page 56] 
That worker-inspectors, where they exist, be given the same training in ground control as that recommended for supervisory staff elsewhere in this 
report. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That the Workers’ Compensation Board re-evaluate the qualifications required for mine first-aid attendants. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That all underground workers be encouraged to take first aid training, and to keep their training current. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That the necessary additional training in non-fire emergencies be developed by a tripartite committee consisting of representatives of mine 
management, unions, and government. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That the Ministry of Labour, through training and recruitment, ensure that its ground control staff be at a world-class level in their discipline, and have 
the credibility to relate effectively to the international ground control community. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 68] 
That Ministry of Labour inspectors be provided with such additional training as may be required to enable them to deal effectively with site-specific 
ground control problems. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
1995 It is recommended that all employees be effectively trained to: recognize indicators of specific mine hazards, such as spontaneous combustion, and 
their control; and become sufficiently familiar with mine gases, and associated risks. [Moura Page 64] 
It is further recommended  that all persons holding statutory appointments, including inspectors must undertake: training in communications by 
completing an approved training course that deals will all aspects of communications; and completion of a retraining course each year, progressively 
covering and periodically revisiting mine gases, spontaneous combustion, mine fires, emergency procedures and communications, as they impact on 
the mine where they are employed, or over which they have jurisdiction. [Moura Page 64] 
It is recommended therefore, that the procedures for granting statutory certificates for underground coal mining and the conditions under which they 
are awarded, be reviewed. [Moura Page 64] 
In particular, it is recommended that certificates not be granted for life and that a system needs to be developed and put into effect as soon as 
practicable that requires certificate holders to demonstrate their fitness to retain  the certificate of competency on a regular basis, at intervals of not less 
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than three and not more than five years. [Moura Page 64] 
In particular it recommends that: the handbooks on spontaneous combustion, commonly referred to as the red and blue books, be revised, updated and 
republished for education and training use, particularly at colliery level; a supply of the handbooks be maintained with provision of periodical review 
of content for updating; appropriate audio-visual aids be produced for education and training purposes, particularly at colliery level; and as part of their 
safety training facilities, coal mines establish a reserved area accommodating a basic library of safety literature and other learning materials available 
for mine officials and mineworkers to consult at any time. [Moura Page 72] 
We recommend, therefore, that to be accredited as satisfying the academic pre-requisites for the granting of manager's, undermanager's, and deputy's 
certificates of competency in coal mining, all courses of instruction be required to include adequate instruction on spontaneous combustion (its nature, 
cause, detection and management) using appropriate supporting literature, case study material and other learning aids. [Moura Page 73] 
It is recommended that a position of ventilation officer be established as a statutory position at all underground coal mines. The ventilation officer 
appointed must have demonstrated competencies appropriate to the duties and responsibilities of the position and would be directly responsible to the 
mine manager for the planning, design and implementation of the mine ventilation system and for the establishment of effective standards of 
ventilation for the mine, methods for its control and protection, monitoring of performance, reporting procedures, maintenance of ventilation records 
and plans, and emergency action plans. [Moura Page 65] 
1997 One regulatory organization (such as the Department of Labour or a board of examiners) should be responsible for certifying workers in underground 
coal mines in Nova Scotia. [Westray Page 132] 
Before approving the start-up of any underground coal mine, the regulator should review and amend the standards of certification to ensure the 
following: Standards of certification fit the mining methods and technology of the proposed mine; All positions in the mining operation are filled by 
people with the qualifications and experience necessary to do their jobs safely; The system of certification applies to every person required to work 
underground. Categories of certification should include (at a minimum) coal miner, electrical tradesperson, mechanical tradesperson, surveyor, 
engineer, mine rescue person, and the various levels of supervisors and managers; Trainers have the necessary qualifications and experience. [Westray 
Page 132] 
The regulator should establish a model curriculum consistent with established standards and practices in the coal mining industry. [Westray Page 132] 
The mine operator should be required to have in place a training program, approved by the regulator, for every position in the workplace. The mine 
operator's training proposal must: conform to or be more rigorous than the model curriculum; show when, how, and what training will be done; 
incorporate annual refresher training and safety education; provide for adequate orientation to the mine for all new employees, including those with 
experience in coal mines; and include complete and sufficient training for operators of individual pieces of mining equipment prior to their being 
assigned operating positions. [Westray Page 133] 
The mine operator should be required to keep training and work history records for applicants for certification. The regulator should: check applicants' 
records, making sure that training is taking place; and test applicants for certification in a manner that establishes whether underground workers are 
trained sufficiently to work safely. [Westray Page 133] 
The mine's joint occupational health and safety committee should periodically review training standards, policies, and programs to make sure that they 
adequately reflect changing technology and mining conditions and practice within the mine. [Westray Page 133] 
No provisional mining certificates should be issued in any circumstance. The process of granting certification based on status in other jurisdictions 
must be refined to ensure that qualifications are consistent with provincial requirements. The burden should be on the applicant to establish that his or 
her qualifications are sufficient to support the requirements for the certification sought. Any person granted certification based on status in another 
jurisdiction should be required to be examined in Nova Scotia for such certification at the earliest reasonable time. [Westray Page 87] 
The legislation and regulations governing coal mines should be reviewed to ensure that all personnel working underground receive training in ground 
control as appropriate to their activities and responsibilities. In particular: Coal miners should receive a course on ground control as part of their basic 
mine training, plus annual refresher courses on ground control; Mining supervisory staff, including mine managers, underground managers, and 
  235 
 
overmen, should receive extensive training in ground control; Non-mining personnel employed underground should receive sufficient training in 
ground control to enable them to recognize potential hazards; Training programs for these three categories of employee should be developed by mine 
management in cooperation with the joint occupational health and safety committee and the regulator. The regulator should review these training 
programs to ensure that they reflect changing technology and mining practices. [Westray Page 385] 
If it is decided to pattern the Nova Scotia coal mine regulation regime after that of the United Kingdom, all mine inspectors should have at least a 
degree in mining engineering, with some specialist training in both rock mechanics and ventilation relating to underground coal mining. If the U.S. 
Mine Safety and Health Administration approach is adopted, all mine inspectors should receive adequate initial training. In either case, all mine 
inspectors should be required to take periodic training, of at least one week per year, at an institute specializing in mine inspection and safety. [Westray 
Page 543] 
Labour and management should work together to educate and regulate the underground miner with a view to eradicating the practice of smoking in the 
coal mining environment. The following requirements should apply: Tobacco smoking and the possession of smoking materials and lighters by any 
person underground should be grounds for immediate dismissal from employment, the reason for dismissal to be recorded in the employee's record. 
Proof of tobacco smoking underground or possession of smoking materials underground should provide sufficient grounds for dismissing any 
grievance taken by an employee for unjust dismissal, and any arbitrator should be prohibited from substituting any other penalty in lieu of dismissal. 
Labour and management, with the cooperation of the Department of Labour, should investigate the feasibility of acquiring tobacco detection devices 
that would monitor miners entering the mine. [Westray Page 545] 
A legislative review committee should be established to review periodically the underground coal mine regulations to ensure that the regulations reflect 
current technology and that the use of such technology is consistent with mine safety. The committee should have the power to engage mining 
consultants with specific expertise consonant with the technical matters being considered. This committee could be modelled after the Mining 
Legislative Review Committee of the province of Ontario and should contain representation from the provincial departments involved in the planning 
and regulation of underground coal mines. [Westray Page 540] 
2006 Training for SCSR donning and escape must be wholly separate from all other types of training miners currently receive. This training must be 
repeated every 90 days. [Sago Page 12] 
SCSR and escape training must be done in actual conditions underground and, to the extent possible, reflect real-life emergency situations. Miners 
must don the SCSR training model and walk at least a portion of the escape way. [Sago Page 12] 
Training for mine rescue teams should be required frequently, but at least every quarter (three months). Training should be done at each mine the 
rescue team is charged with covering. This will require surface as well as underground exercises to ensure the team members are familiar with the 
facility. [Sago Page 16] 
Mine rescue teams should be certified by MSHA to ensure competence. Certification should be directly tied to the team’s demonstrating proficiency 
and skill in all aspects of mine rescue. Teams that do not pass the certification may continue to practice, but shall not be permitted to perform any 
actual mine rescue. [Sago Page 16] 
Training of all miners who work on seal construction must be given by a certified person with knowledge of why each construction requirement is 
necessary to the process. All information in the approved plan must be passed on during the training session. [Sago Page 8] 
“Tailgate” or descriptive training cannot be permitted for these types of tasks. Training must be comprehensive and clear. The trainer and trainee(s) 
must also be required to sign documentation that proper training was completed. [Sago Page 8] 
MSHA must immediately hire and train a sufficient number of inspectors to fill vacant positions and better prepare for the retirement of its aging 
workforce. [Sago Page 17] 
Training for SCSR donning and escape must be wholly separate from all other types of training miners currently receive. This training must be 
repeated every 90 days. [Sago Page 12] 
2011 SCSR training should be realistic and conducted in actual mining situations, such as riding in a man trip and working on a longwall. It should 
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incorporate a variety of actual in-mine scenarios for which the SCSR must be donned and activated. The training should emphasize the importance of 
activating the SCSR at the very first warning of an emergency. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
SCRS training should be conducted quarterly, instead of annually. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
MSHA, WVMHST and NIOSH should develop a program to measure and evaluate the effective- ness of training provided by certified trainers. [Upper 
Big Branch Page 113] 
The West Virginia Office of Miner’s Health Safety and Training should re-double its efforts to ensure that all examiners are trained, and tested as 
many times as necessary, including in-mine demonstrations of their skills, to ensure the examiners understand their duties and perform them as they 
should be performed. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
The West Virginia Office of Miners’ Health, Safety and Training should focus training efforts on those mines in which operators are found to be lax on 
safety training.  MSHA and the state should have the authority to revoke the licenses of habitual offenders, for those who falsify records and for 
flagrant violations. [Upper Big Branch Page 110-111] 
MSHA and the State agency should provide annual training to miners on their statutory rights under the Mine Act and applicable state mine safety 
laws. This curriculum should outline the benefits of designating a miners’ representative. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
Digital photographs from recent inspections and other appropriate visual aids should be used to demonstrate to miners, managers and inspectors 
acceptable and non-acceptable mining equipment and conditions. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
Federal and state agencies should undertake an aggressive campaign to undermine the “safety myths” or inaccuracies that emerged during the UBB 
investigation. Agencies should dispel these inaccuracies on federal and state agency websites and incorporate “myth busters” into miners’ training. A 
few examples of the inaccuracies that emerged during interviews with miners and bosses include: a proper air velocity reading can be taken 
instantaneously; a CH4 monitor on a mining machine can be disconnected if it is defective or keeps alarming, and the operator is allowed to run coal 
for up to 24 hours while  waiting for a new monitor to be installed; a miner should not don an SCSR until he knows it’s really an emergency or when a 
boss tells him to don it; a miner can make a run by himself, without a CH4 detector, because only a boss can be certified to carry a spotter; red hat 
miners can be left by them- selves while a boss goes ahead of them to check for hazardous conditions. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
2012 The regulator should supervise the granting of mining qualifications to mining managers and workers: The regulator should lead the work to strengthen 
standards so that they are comparable with those of Australia; The regulator should work with Australian counterparts towards developing a joint 
accreditation process with Australia and an Australia/New Zealand board of examiners; Additional statutory roles and qualifications are required in 
new regulations, including a statutory ventilation officer and an agreed level of industry training and supervision for all new or inexperienced workers; 
The regulator should work with the Accident Compensation Corporation and others on raising the standards of health and safety consultants. [Pike 
River II Page 341-342] 
Managers in underground coal mines should be appropriately trained in health and safety. [Pike River II Page 331] 
2015 Enhance supervisor and management training by: Requiring the Mining Tripartite Committee, which supports the development of Common Core 
training, to present to the Ministries of Labour and Training, Colleges and Universities options and recommendations to enhance supervisor and 
management health and safety training; and Requesting the Mining Tripartite Committee to review the pre-requisites for Supervisor Common Core 
training and determining the best format for this training (e.g. classroom learning, hands-on experience). [Mining Review Page 47] 
The Ministry of Labour to engage in discussions with the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities about the quality and consistency of 
Common Core training delivery in the underground mining sector, evaluate the current state of that training, and identify circumstances where 
refresher training may be appropriate. [Mining Review Page 47] 
The Ministry of Labour and its partners to review the health and safety system’s ability to meet the needs of the mining sector especially related to 
providing services to remote communities, training small numbers of trainees, and aligning their training activities to the priority hazards. Take 
appropriate actions based upon the findings of that review. [Mining Review Page 54] 
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APPENDIX 3D  
Table 3.7 Recommendations relating to emergency management and mine rescue 
1967 None 
1976 None 
1981 That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario sever its ties with the Ontario Mining Association, retain the services of a full-time 
executive director, establish its own offices separate and apart from the Ontario Mining Association offices, make provision tor its own support staff 
and services, and continue to be financed by levies against its member companies. [Towards Safe Production Page 231] 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario establish labour-management advisory committees at both the provincial and regional 
levels and that it moves to include representatives of labour and the public on its board of directors. [Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
That the Ministry of Labour, in consultation with management, labour and the Mines Accident & Prevention Association of Ontario, determine the 
specific information required to maintain an occupational accident data base for mines and mining plants which satisfies the prerequisites identified, 
and provide the Occupational Health and Safety Division of the Ministry with the resources and expertise necessary to collect this information, 
analyze and disseminate it. [Towards Safe Production Page 237] 
1986 That the current mine rescue organization be expanded to handle all underground emergencies. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That a tripartite committee also be established to advise on all aspects of mine rescue equipment and emergency warning systems. [Ground Control & 
Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That mine rescue personnel suffer no loss of income as a result of injuries arising from mine rescue activities. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 
63] 
That the Ministry of Labour mine rescue organization be responsible for identifying and introducing specialized equipment needed for use in non-fire 
emergencies, and for developing or finding sources for such equipment. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
That manway sizes, escape routes and refuge stations be sufficient to accommodate rescue operations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
1995 It is recommended that mines be required to put in place Mine Safety Management Plans to cater for key risk areas. [Moura Page 62] 
It is further recommended that Mine Safety Management Plans be based on detailed risk/hazard analyses. [Moura Page 62] 
It is, therefore, recommended that a representative industry working party, containing appropriate expertise, be convened by the Chief Inspector of 
Coal Mines and that group be charged with the development of guidelines for the industry covering life support for escape. [Moura Page 66] 
Accordingly, it is recommended that the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines set up a working party, comprising persons with appropriate knowledge and 
experience, to examine and report on a range of issues relating to emergency escape facilities. [Moura Page 67] 
The Inquiry recommends that underground mines develop a surface area plan showing the location of mine entries, ventilation fan(s), access roads, 
surface installations, administration buildings and other infrastructure. Copies of the plan should be provided to the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines and 
lodged with the mines rescue brigade and local police station. [Moura Page 72] 
It is further recommended that both new and existing mines make provision for the rapid sealing of the mine from the surface through the installation 
of an air lock facility in at least one of the mine intakes for ready access to re-enter the mine. The plan should also indicate the location of any surface 
boreholes that may facilitate the monitoring of the underground atmosphere. [Moura Page 72] 
It is recommended that mines be required to develop and implement protocols, as a statutory requirement, for the withdrawal of persons when 
conditions warrant such action. [Moura Page 70] 
It is recommended that the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines convene an appropriate industry working party to develop guidelines for the use, in turn, of 
mines in the development of protocols for the withdrawal of persons. Developed and implemented protocols should be required to conform with the 
guidelines. [Moura Page 70] 
1997 Every mine operator, indeed, every industrial plant or facility, should have a well-defined and comprehensive emergency procedures manual 
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containing a complete and up-to-date list of all persons involved in any emergency operation. This list should contain an organization chart listing the 
individuals and their respective tasks, and a current telephone listing for each person. The manual should be prepared by the company in consultation 
with both the joint occupational health and safety committee and the safety coordinators with the appropriate government departments. The manual 
should set out, in detail, the quantity and location of all emergency supplies and equipment and the details of the deployment of these materials. A 
current copy of any such approved emergency procedures manual should be filed with the director of occupational health and safety, and copies 
should be provided to each person assigned any duty under the manual. [Westray Page 560] 
The Department of Labour, in consultation with the operator, should establish such rules and regulations that would ensure the department a full and 
active role in every mine-related emergency procedure or rescue operation in the province. The rules and regulations should set out the duties and 
responsibilities of each department inspector or safety examiner in any mine-related emergency or rescue operation. [Westray Page 561] 
Rescue and emergency equipment should be standardized so that those persons trained in rescue procedures will be completely familiar with the 
equipment available. Similarly, the various testing devices should be standardized so that the rescuers are able to use these devices without losing 
valuable time and without the danger of mistaken or inaccurate readings. [Westray Page 561] 
Every community at or near which underground mining operations are carried out should have a plan to provide emergency medical, fire, and other 
support services. The plan should include providing emergency training to the appropriate people in those communities. Some familiarity with the 
underground environment could be helpful in the event of a disaster. [Westray Page 561] 
Mine-rescue competitions, long a fixture in the underground mining industry, provide a valuable training incentive for miners. These competitions 
should be continued. [Westray Page 561] 
2006 Mine ventilation systems must be designed to offer miners the greatest possible protection to enhance their ability to escape. Air used to ventilate seals 
must be coursed away from working sections, and immediately to the return. This is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the intake escape ways are 
not compromised. [Sago Page 11] 
All man doors must be clearly marked on both sides. [Sago Page 11] 
Steps must be taken immediately to significantly increase the number of qualified mine rescue teams nationwide. [Sago Page 16] 
MSHA should immediately require all mine operators to have two rescue teams readily available at all times when miners are underground. These 
teams should be made up of miners working at the operation who are familiar with the mine layout and conditions and those team members must 
perform all required training together. [Sago Page 16] 
All mine rescue teams should be required to participate in at least two mine rescue contests every year. Failure to participate must result in the team’s 
certification being revoked. [Sago Page 16] 
Composite and contract mine rescue teams should not be permitted under any circumstances. [Sago Page 16] 
A member of the mine rescue team actively working in a mine or acting as backup should be immediately available when requested in the command 
center. [Sago Page 16] 
Additional oxygen devices must be readily available where miners are working to ensure there is an adequate supply to begin an escape in an 
emergency situation. Oxygen must be available for all miners to effectively escape from the deepest penetration of the mine to the surface. [Sago Page 
11] 
Additional oxygen devices in protective cases must be stored at strategic locations in both the primary and secondary escape ways for miners to access 
as they travel out of the mine. These caches must be placed at a distance not to exceed 30 minutes normal walking distance. [Sago Page 11-12] 
Flame-resistant directional reflective lifelines must intersect every oxygen storage location in the escape way. [Sago Page 12] 
SCSR storage caches should include a communication system to the surface, first aid supplies and tethers as well as oxygen. [Sago Page 12] 
SCSRs currently deployed in the nation’s coal mines must be immediately subjected to random testing to ensure they are working effectively. MSHA, 
with the assistance of NIOSH, should immediately begin a random testing of all units currently deployed in the field. [Sago Page 12] 
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MSHA, with the assistance of NIOSH, should conduct a mandatory random sampling of all SCSRs deployed in the field annually. The annual sample 
size should be no less than three percent of all units deployed in the industry. [Sago Page 12] 
The cost of SCSR replacement units selected for testing must be borne by the mine operator as a normal cost of business. [Sago Page 12] 
The test protocol for approval of SCSRs must be re-evaluated and changed to ensure the adequacy and duration of the units. Testing of devices must 
take into consideration the temperature, age or other condition that may affect the unit’s performance [Sago Page 12] 
Shelf life of stored and carried SCSRs must be re-evaluated and if necessary shortened, so that each unit can be relied upon to perform in an 
emergency. [Sago Page 12] 
New SCSRs should be positive-pressure units with full face masks. [Sago Page 12] 
Mine management must be required to contact the proper regulatory authorities and the mine rescue teams for their operation immediately, but at least 
within 15 minutes of the onset of the emergency. The operator should have enough responsible people physically on the mine site or immediately 
available by phone to handle these duties without delay. [Sago Page 14] 
MSHA must create a Mine Emergency Response Office (MERO) within the Agency. The MERO must be staffed 24 hours a day, seven days a week, 
by experienced full-time MSHA employees with extensive mining knowledge. Emergency contact to MSHA by mine management personnel should 
be available using a toll-free phone number. [Sago Page 14] 
The federal and state agencies should be responsible for immediately notifying and deploying all government rescue personnel, equipment and other 
necessary assets to the mine site after being notified that an emergency situation exists. [Sago Page 14] 
Every effort should be made to coordinate the emergency response of the federal, state and local agencies. [Sago Page 14] 
Mine rescue teams required to be first responders must be notified immediately, but at least within 15 minutes of the onset of an emergency. This 
notice should be made by mine management personnel immediately after notifying the regulatory agency. [Sago Page 14] 
Mine management must ensure that appropriate arrangements have been made to guarantee their designated mine rescue teams are available 24 hours 
a day, seven days a week, to cover any situation that may require their services. [Sago Page 14] 
Two (2) mine rescue teams designated as first responders must be employees of the mining company who routinely train together at the affected mine, 
but under no circumstance less than four times per year. These teams must be readily available at all times when miners are underground. [Sago Page 
14] 
MSHA and NIOSH must update and test new, easily deployable, reliable and accurate seismic- type devices to locate trapped miners. At least one of 
these devices should be maintained in each MSHA District office. [Sago Page 13] 
“Safety chambers” and “safe havens” should be required in all mining operations. The Union notes that these are two distinct systems and they cannot 
be used interchangeably. [Sago Page 13] 
MSHA must take immediate control of all aspects of the rescue and recovery. It must create plans and implement them to facilitate the immediate use 
of all mine rescue assets as soon as possible. MSHA should exercise the authority mandated by Congress and not delay before implementing a plan to 
safely enter the mine and facilitate rescue activity. [Sago Page 15] 
Flame-resistant reflective directional lifelines must be required from the face areas in both the primary and secondary escape ways. These lifelines 
should direct miners from their workplace to the nearest surface escape, shaft, slope or capsule. [Sago Page 11] 
Tethers for linking miners together when necessary during escape should be available in every section at the in-by end of the lifeline. They should be 
of sufficient length to eliminate the possibility that miners will become entangled while they are walking or crawling to safety. Additional tethers 
should be located at strategic locations throughout the mine. [Sago Page 11] 
All mobile equipment entering the mine during rescue and recovery efforts must be equipped with two- way communications. [Sago Page 15] 
All evidence or materials that may become part of the official investigation must be secured immediately by MSHA. [Sago Page 15] 
MSHA must establish a rigid chain of custody for all evidence and see that it is followed to ensure accurate and credible results are obtained during 
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testing procedures. [Sago Page 15] 
Representatives of the miners must be afforded full rights to participate in all aspects of the rescue and recovery operations and the subsequent 
accident investigation. [Sago Page 15] 
The mine operator must be on-site to provide logistical and general mine information necessary to facilitate rescue and recovery operations. [Sago 
Page 15] 
The federal and state regulatory agencies must secure the surface area of the mine and limit access by individuals who have no right to enter the 
property or are not involved in the rescue efforts. This will ensure rescue teams, fire crews, police, miners’ representatives and other necessary 
personnel understand their roles in the disaster response and are not delayed in beginning the rescue effort. [Sago Page 15] 
Communications with family members, the press and general public should be handled by an independent arm of the federal government, much like 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Surface Transportation Board (STB) do with air, rail or highway incidents. They should also 
make necessary arrangements for family members as they arrive at the site. These requirements should be specifically laid out in the mine emergency 
response plan. [Sago Page 15] 
Information from the command center to any sources not immediately involved in the rescue efforts should be carefully monitored and verified to 
ensure accuracy. In the event miscommunications occur, they must be immediately corrected. [Sago Page 15] 
2011 The mining industry, MSHA, and West Virginia should adopt the National Incident Management System (NIMS) Incident Command Model, a 
nationally recognized emergency incident management system, to improve coordination, cooperation and communication between public and private 
entities. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
Protocols should be established and followed with regard to mine rescue and recovery, using lessons learned and best practices identified from other 
emergency response events. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
The one-to-one backup system for mine rescue personnel, which is already established protocol, is absolutely critical for the safety of these volunteers. 
[Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
The mine rescue community should convene a summit of mine rescue team members, in particular, individuals who responded to the mine emergency 
incidents from 2006 to the present, to discuss the state of the U.S. mine rescue system. Advisory guidelines should be written for mine rescue teams. 
[Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
MSHA and West Virginia should require a digital recording of the activities and communications in a mine emergency command center. Briefings and 
debriefings of mine rescue team personnel also should be recorded. The current paper and pencil method fails to produce a thorough record of key data 
and decision points. Such a record is necessary to conduct a thorough investigation, assess the effectiveness of existing mine rescue operations and 
contribute to training curriculum for advanced mine rescue personnel. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
Mine operators’ emergency response plans (ERPs) must be treated more than just more paperwork. ERPs should be developed collaboratively with 
miners, their families, local responders, and mine rescue team members, and revised based on mine-specific drills and table-top exercises. [Upper Big 
Branch Page 112] 
The U. S. Department of Labor should adopt a public investigation process for major mine disasters. Procedures should be established to provide for 
public hearings, including interviews of witnesses. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
If the investigations continue to be under the MSHA’s direction, the agency should have subpoena power to compel witnesses to appear to testify 
under oath and for companies and individuals to produce evidence, including documents, data, correspondence and physical evidence. [Upper Big 
Branch Page 112] 
Explicit rights should be provided to any individual who is willing to speak with or provide a statement to MSHA, the state agency or the independent 
panel during an accident investigation, to do so without the presence, involvement or knowledge of the operator or the operator’s agents or attorneys. 
[Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
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Rights should be granted to a deceased miner’s immediate next-of-kin to name an individual to serve as a miners’ representative in such 
investigations. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
A coordinated, formal debriefing of all mine rescue team members who respond to a major mine emergency should be conducted within a month of 
the event. The objectives of the assembly would include offering counsel on post-traumatic stress, discussing what worked well and what didn’t in 
their mine emergency response, and identifying team members whose testimony would be helpful to accident investigators. [Upper Big Branch Page 
113] 
MSHA and NIOSH should develop an approved rescue vehicle for removing injured miners safely from the mines.  State and federal agencies should 
have a vehicle for removing injured miners and victims from a mine in a safe and efficient manner.  Rescue workers should not have to carry miner’s 
great distances underground. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
2012 Emergency management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention: Operators of underground coal mines should be required by legislation to 
have a current and comprehensive emergency management plan that is audited and tested regularly; The emergency management plan should be 
developed in consultation with the workers and the Mines Rescue Service; The emergency management plan should specify the facilities available 
within the mine, such as emergency equipment, refuges and changeover stations, and emergency exits; The emergency management plan should 
contain a strategy for notifying next of kin and ensuring that genuine enquirers receive appropriate information; The mining operator must keep and 
regularly update a comprehensive list of emergency contact details for all workers; The emergency management plan needs to be compatible with 
CIMS, the co-ordinated incident management system used by New Zealand's emergency services and the police; and The regulator should include the 
emergency management plan in its audit programme. [Pike River II Page 354] 
The implementation of the co-ordinated incident management system (CIMS) in underground coal mine emergencies should be reviewed urgently: The 
implementation of CIMS should be reviewed to ensure that emergencies in underground coal mines are well managed; The review team should 
include the mining industry, police, emergency services, the Mines Rescue Service and the regulator; The CIMS framework should be rigorously 
tested by regular practical exercises at underground coal mines; and The incident controller at an underground coal mine emergency must have mining 
expertise and, together with the incident management team, must be responsible for co-ordinating the emergency effort and approving key decisions. 
This does not prevent a government agency such as the police from being the lead agency or from maintaining its command structure. [Pike River II 
Page 354-355] 
The activities of the New Zealand Mines Rescue Service need to be supported by legislation: The Mines Rescue Trust Act 1992 should reflect the 
functions performed by the Mines Rescue Service; and the adequacy and fairness of the current levies imposed on mines to fund the service need to be 
reviewed. [Pike River II Page 355] 
To support effective emergency management, operators of underground coal mines should be required to have modern equipment and facilities: 
Operators should be required to have equipment and facilities suitable for self-rescue by workers during an emergency; Operators should be required 
to include, in their emergency management plans, provisions for continued monitoring of underground atmospheric conditions during an emergency; 
and Operators should be required to install facilities that will support emergency mine sealing and inertisation. [Pike River II Page 365] 
2015 The Ministry of Labour to require mining companies to conduct risk assessments to establish Emergency Response Plans for exploration sites, new 
mines, surface mines and mining plants. [Mining Review Page 40] 
Workplace Safety North to revise the Mine Rescue Handbook to include guidelines for fitness of crew members, critical incident stress management 
and acclimatization of emergency responders. [Mining Review Page 40] 
The Ministry of Labour to work with stakeholders to develop proposed recommendations regarding the responsibilities of mine rescue crew members 
and mine owners/employers, with respect to mine rescue operations. [Mining Review Page 40] 
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APPENDIX 3E  
Table 3.8 Recommendations relating to technology  
1967 The National Coal Board should forthwith examine afresh its lines of communication so as to ensure that essential knowledge passes easily and 
automatically to those whose business it is to become possessed of it and to eliminate those breakdowns and omissions which undoubtedly played a 
big part in bringing about the Aberfan disaster. [Aberfan Page 128-129] 
1976 That task groups set up by the Occupational Health and Safety Authority to advise on codes of practice and statutory regulations relating to 
technological change in mining include representatives of labour [Royal Commission Page 163] 
That where the location of work is sufficiently remote to warrant the use of technical means of communication and where no illumination other than 
that of the miner's cap lamp is normally available, an auxiliary source of illumination powered by means other than the miner's lamp battery be 
provided at the workplace [Royal Commission Page 175] 
1981 None 
1986 That mine design continue to be recognized as the sole responsibility of management, and that management accept the need to use appropriate 
technology in designing mines. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That guidelines be developed for the interpretation of data produced by ground monitoring devices. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That all information obtained from ground monitoring devices at a particular mine be provided to the union representing workers in that mine. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That mines experiencing on going rock bursting problems install instruments, such as micro-seismic monitoring devices, to monitor seismicity in the 
affected areas. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
1995 None 
1997 None 
2006 Current SCSR technology is almost 20 years old. The federal and state governments, through MSHA and NIOSH, should actively pursue new SCSR 
technology. All stakeholders must be closely involved in the design, development and testing of these devices. The new generation of SCSRs must be 
longer-lasting, more reliable units that require single donning with dockable oxygen canisters. This will eliminate the chance of breathing 
contaminated irrespirable air when changing units. [Sago Page 12] 
Tracking devices that can identify the location of miners at all times underground must be required at all operations. Such technology is currently 
available and MSHA must require mine operators to provide these devises to all miners working underground. Any system that can increase the ability 
for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must be utilized. [Sago Page 12] 
MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund and continue to pursue technology to greatly increase the capabilities of wireless tracking devices. The 
goal of the agencies must be to create a unit that will allow pre- and post-accident tracking of all miners underground. [Sago Page 12-13] 
MSHA must be required to pursue new technologies that will increase the effectiveness of wireless two-way communication in underground mines. 
As new technology becomes available, mine operators must be required to install it in all their operations. [Sago Page 11] 
Current communication systems must be hardened (reinforced to withstand the forces of an explosion) to increase their survivability. [Sago Page 11] 
A second (redundant) communication system, independent of the mine’s current primary system, must be installed in a separate isolated entry. This 
second communication system must run from the surface to additional phones completely separate from the phones currently underground and must be 
hardened to increase survivability. [Sago Page 11] 
Current communication technology, including one-way text messaging and two-way wireless systems, must be immediately installed in all mines. Any 
system that can increase the ability for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must be utilized. [Sago Page 11] 
“Black box” technology must be instituted for mining equipment, including shearers, continuous miners, roof bolters, shuttle cars, motors, conveyors 
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and shields.  The black boxes should provide information regarding methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide and coal dust levels. [Upper Big Branch Page 
109-110] 
Immediate implementation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel-recording system to formally identify and locate all personnel who are 
underground at a given time, including supervisory personnel.  Redefine the state and federal regulations to ensure that no one, including management, 
goes underground without a tagging device. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Each mine must be required to institute a “Communication and Information Recording Center” outside the underground portions of underground 
mines and away from the working areas of surface mines.  This communication enters would provide instantaneous communication to MSHA, to state 
agencies, to company officials and state and country emergency management officials regarding safety and health. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Mine operators should be required to adopt computer-based monitoring of air quality, quantity and direction of flow throughout a mine. A suitable 
system would alert not only the mine operator and miners to impending danger, but it would also alert the state and federal regulatory agencies. 
Regulatory agencies would have the authority to shut down an operation based on data provided by the system. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Current monitors for methane, carbon monoxide and coal dust must be upgraded to include memory chips, as well as instant communication to the 
communications center. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Operators must be required to use real-time continuous monitoring for explosive methane gas and respirable dust in coal mines. [Upper Big Branch 
Page 110] 
Operators must assess the adequacy of rock dust through direct readout explosibility meters and submit these results electronically to regulatory 
agencies. 
The state inspector system for writing violations must be converted from paper and pencil to a computerized system.  This system must be capable of 
generating reports for individual mines. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Electronic records should be maintained regarding methane, intake and return air levels on all coal producing sections for no less than seven 
years.  Had this information been available, investigators would have had data related to the previous methane inundation at UBB.  [Upper Big Branch 
Page 110] 
The regulatory agencies should use ventilation simulation models as part of their plan approval and modification process.  The simulation model 
results for each mine would be part of the mine file and available to inspectors for review before commencing an inspection. [Upper Big Branch Page 
110] 
Mine operators should be required to install equipment, such as seismographs, to monitor geologic activity at or near their mining operations. [Upper 
Big Branch Page 110] 
Pre-shift and on-shift examinations must be computerized with the information transmitted to regulatory agencies, much like coal truck weights are 
transmitted to the Department of Transportation on a daily basis. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
2012 None 
2015 None 
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APPENDIX 3F  
Table 3.9 Recommendations relating to research   
1967 None 
1976 That the epidemiological research includes a study of 1/ the amount and type of exposure effective in raising cancer mortality, 2/ the pathology of 
lung cancer in miners, and 3/ the effects of cigarette smoking and of other conjoint occupational factors [Royal Commission Page 96] 
That the mining industry, in co-operation with labour and the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, have conducted research to determine shift-
profiles of noise encounter for representative occupations in mines and plants both in the absence and in the presence of actual and best-available 
hearing protection, that such profiles be codified and published, and that a code be assigned to each worker who regularly encounters areas of work in 
which noise levels of 85 dB(A) or higher exist [Royal Commission Page 230] 
That pilot plant studies used to develop processes and preliminary operating procedures be extended to include the measurement of factors likely to 
have an impact on the health and safety of the environment for work [Royal Commission Page 200] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission research on the radiographic records related to Miner’s Certificates to assess the 
relative rate of progression of persons in and out of dust [Royal Commission Page 59] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority of the province, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Control Board, have conducted further 
epidemiological research based on the exposure to ionizing radiation among Ontario uranium miners [Royal Commission Page 96] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board:  have research conducted relevant to current circumstances a l  on means for measuring all components of 
ionizing radiation effective in contributing significantly to the irradiation of the lungs, other organs, and tissues of workers in Ontario uranium and 
thorium mines and mills; and h i  o n  the spatial and temporal distribution of ionizing radiation and related particulates in these mines and mills; 
issue codes of guidance a l  for the frequency and location of sampling required to determine both the radiation exposure of individual workers in 
Ontario mines and mills and the general state of the mine and mill environment; for the selection, use, maintenance, and calibration of instruments for 
measuring ionizing radiation both for the determination of individual exposures and for the monitoring of the general mine and mill environment; c l  
for the identification of persons for whom records of radiation exposure should be kept; and e l l  for the form, preservation, and use of occupational 
records for exposure to all significant components of ionizing radiation;3/facilitate, with the assistance of the federal Department of Health and 
Welfare, epidemiological research on a national basis [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a review of the radiographic record and of the mortality experience for the asbestos 
nominal roll on a five-year cycle [Royal Commission Page 215] 
1981 That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario, in conjunction with the industry, undertake a comprehensive research program to satisfy 
the needs which have been identified. [Towards Safe Production Page 234] 
That an independent authority in the field of mine lighting be retained to direct and co-ordinate the research effort [Towards Safe Production Page 
234] 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario obtain the concurrence of the managements of three major mining operations and 
commission a study to determine the extent of the relationship between alcohol and drug use and accidents at each of these operations. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 235] 
That the results of this study be compared with the results of a survey of the accident report forms submitted to the Workmen’s Compensation Board 
by each of these operations; and that, if the results differ significantly, appropriate changes be made in the manner in which alcohol and drug use is 
identified and reported as a cause of accidents. [Towards Safe Production Page 235] 
That the study includes an analysis of the organizational arrangements and the systems of control and communication at each of these operations with 
a view to determining if these factors contribute to the degree of alcohol or drug use by workers within each operation. [Towards Safe Production 
Page 236] 
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1986 That mining companies be encouraged to continue conducting independent research programs as they see fit. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 
50] 
That mining companies, with the support of labour and government, establish a research organization to act as a central body to co-ordinate research 
into ground control and rock mechanics in Ontario mines. This co-ordinating body shall be managed by a Board of Directors made up of members 
currently active in the industry and representing all facets of it - management, labour and government. The Board would appoint an Executive 
Director who, with an appropriate staff, would manage the research coordination and be accountable to the Board. The initial program would cover at 
least the following areas: Identify ground control problems in Ontario mines; Identify needed research and the appropriate agencies to conduct it; 
Contract for the necessary research to be done, and supervise its quality; Ensure that the results of the research are published on a regular basis so that 
mine management, appropriate labour representatives and government agencies are fully informed; and Participate in the development of guidelines 
for the implementation of safe ground control practices. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 50-51] 
Among the subjects the organization shall consider for funding are the following: Rock bursts, Destressing, Backfill (including quality monitoring 
and backfill testing methods), Scaling, Pillar design and recovery, Blasting (including vibration damage and drilling controls), Ground support 
(including rock bolting and mechanical supports), Monitoring and testing of ground conditions, Mine Lighting, Computer modelling, and Equipment 
design and mechanization as it applies to hazardous ground conditions. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 51] 
That research into improved rock mechanics instrumentation of all types be undertaken. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That specific research to develop improved, reasonable-cost measuring devices be pursued. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That research to perfect the development of an effective radio communication device for use underground be continued and accelerated, with active 
government support. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
1995 It is recommended that funds be made immediately available to undertake an exhaustive international literature and data search, to critically review 
the literature and data and to prepare a comprehensive state-of-the-art report on the subject of spontaneous combustion in coal mines. [Moura Page 
71] 
It is recommended that the research which has been previously undertaken by the committee which was instigated as a result of the Moura 1986 
Inquiry be evaluated as soon as possible by representatives from the Inspectorate, Miner's Union, and Coal Operators, in order to determine the most 
appropriate method of inertisation for Queensland coal mines. [Moura Page 70] 
1997 As a prerequisite to the resumption of underground coal mining at Westray or elsewhere in the Pictou coal basin, the province should require the 
completion of a study into the safety and economic factors involved in drainage of the coalbed methane in the mining area concerned. [Westray Page 
314] 
The Department of Labour and the Department of Natural Resources should consider active research in the development and use of passive and 
triggered stonedust and water barriers for the drives and entries of underground coal mines. This research should be aimed at the development of such 
techniques for use in room-and-pillar mining operations. If the development of barrier technology indicates that substantial safety benefits may 
accrue, the regulator could order a mine operator to install water or stonedust barriers in the mine. [Westray Page 349] 
The Government of Canada, through the Department of Justice, should institute a study of the accountability of corporate executives and directors for 
the wrongful or negligent acts of the corporation and should introduce in the Parliament of Canada such amendments to legislation as are necessary 
to ensure that corporate executives and directors are held properly accountable for workplace safety. [Westray Page 601] 
2006 MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund and direct continued studies and research to develop a new generation of wireless communications 
technology. [Sago Page 11] 
2011 None 
2012 None 
2015 The Mining Legislative Review Committee to align the majority of its work with the major hazards identified in the sector level risk assessment 
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exercise. [Mining Review Page 29] 
The Ministry of Labour to work with its Research Advisory Council to focus its grants and research on topics that address the priority hazards 
identified in the Mining Sector Risk Assessment, and disseminate and act upon the findings where appropriate. In particular, the Review identified 
several research opportunities: Defining the scientific basis for de-stressing practices, and developing guidance materials that define best practices for 
de-stressing; Exploring options for collaborating with technology developers to mitigate risks associated with seismicity and rock bursting (i.e. 
similar to the Australian Centre for Geomechanics model); and Defining and quantifying the harmful health and safety effects of worker fatigue in 
the Ontario Mining Sector, and researching other sectors (e.g. transportation, health care and the military) to see how the mining sector compares, 
and how the problem has been managed. [Mining Review Page 29] 
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APPENDIX 4 
Table 4.3: Number of references for each seeded safety culture term over a 50-year timeline 
 1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 2015  
Attention 0 2 23 0 0 26 0 1 13 3 68 
Attitude 0 2 123 1 2 27 0 2 5 0 162 
Attributes 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Behaviour 2 4 88 0 0 12 0 0 11 1 118 
Belief 3 7 31 1 1 19 3 4 7 3 79 
Characteristics 0 0 38 0 0 0 0 1 6 1 46 
Commitment 0 4 55 0 0 20 0 5 11 0 95 
Competencies 8 5 18 6 0 61 0 1 17 3 119 
Ethical 0 1 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 6 
Experiences 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 7 
Feelings 0 0 16 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 20 
Interpretations 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Mental 0 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 
Morals           0 
Norms 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 1 0 5 
Observable 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Patterns 1 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 12 
Perceptions 0 1 11 0 3 4 0 0 0 0 19 
Psychological 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Rituals           0 
Safety culture 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 8 37 7 53 
Shared 1 0 8 0 0 3 0 1 6 1 20 
Situational 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 
Social 
practices 1 7 22 1 1 33 0 8 8 2 83 
Thoughts 0 0 12 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 13 
Value 0 0 2 1 0 2 0 1 2 0 8 
TOTALS 16 35 478 11 9 214 3 36 128 24  
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APPENDIX 5 
APPENDIX 5A Recommendations pertaining to the Mining Legislative Review Committee’s new subcommittees. 
 
Ground Control 
1967 Present managers and surveyors should as soon as possible receive training in ground-water conditions and the rudiments of soil mechanics so as to 
be able to appreciate the significance of the reports of, and opinions expressed by, the experts in these subjects. The statutory qualifications for 
managers and surveyors should in future include awareness of the elements of soil mechanics and hydrogeology, in addition to the geology which is 
already comprised in the syllabus. The Unit Mechanical Engineer and charge hand should be instructed in the significance of tip deformation and of 
the appearance or disappearance of water-courses. In addition, the charge hand should be trained to record at frequent intervals on a pro-forma a 
simple questionnaire dealing with such matters as toe-movement, crest-sinking, cracks and breaks. These records should be kept at the Unit Office 
and inspected regularly by the manager and mechanical engineer. They should also be produced to the civil engineer charged with tip responsibility 
and to Her Majesty’s Inspectors of Mines on the occasion of each visit to the tip. [Aberfan Page 128] 
1981 That work crews are formally and systematically made aware of ground conditions in the areas in which they are working. [Towards Safe Production 
Page 234] 
1986 That soft rock mining operations be considered separately from hard rock mining in setting standards related to ground control practices. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 68] 
That within one year of the release of this report lighting standards - as they relate to ground control and emergency preparedness - shall be 
established for use in all underground mines. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 64] 
That auxiliary high-intensity lighting be available in all active work areas to assist in ground-control- related activities such as inspection and scaling. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 64] 
That the Ministry of Labour review and monitor the regional stability affecting underground mines in Ontario, and discuss potential problems with 
the mining companies involved. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That mining companies sharing a common boundary exchange information that may affect the regional stability of either or both. [Ground Control & 
Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That workplace mining plans be made available to miners and be discussed with them, including any indications of abnormal ground conditions, 
geological anomalies, and the location of ground monitoring instruments, as a method of ensuring worker participation in planning ground control 
procedures in the “micro” environment. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That every underground mine be required to prepare a ground control macro-environment design prior to the introduction of a new mining method, 
or the introduction of any expansion of the present mine design; such designs shall be submitted to the Ministry of Labour as required by Section 5 of 
the Mining Regulations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That technically competent personnel of the Ministry of Labour review ground control design and procedures at all Ontario mines, at the mine site, at 
least once per year, and more frequently as required. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That companies reassess the effectiveness of their methods of providing information on ground control and emergency preparedness to employees. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 58] 
That these inspectors enforce ground control regulations more vigorously. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That the Ministry of Labour establish a Technical Support Centre with the following functions: to support an expanded role in pre-development 
review and annual mine design review as recommended elsewhere in this report; to establish facilities for training in ground control (although this 
should not conflict with existing established training programs); to develop, and provide to mines on short term loan, ground control instruments and 
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testing equipment; to establish and maintain a computerized data base containing operational information on ground control and emergency 
preparedness and provide access to it to the mining industry, and to the research coordinating body recommended elsewhere in this report; to develop 
and maintain a library of computer software related to ground control technology, and especially to the interpretation of data from ground control 
monitoring devices; the specialist ground control engineers employed in the Technical Support Centre should not be involved in the regulatory 
functions of the Ministry; and the Technical Support Centre shall not be in conflict with the research coordinating body recommended elsewhere in 
this report. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 68-69] 
That any evaluations of ground conditions in areas being mined shall be given to the union representing workers in each mine, and shall also be 
communicated directly to the workers involved. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That all miners receive periodic refresher courses in ground control if required. Labour shall be encouraged to participate in the development of the 
curriculum. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That miners who have been off the job for one year or more should be evaluated with respect to their knowledge of current ground control practices, 
and should received appropriate training where necessary before they return to regular underground work. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That a separate section on ground control be added to the skills included in the Common Core training for new underground miners. [Ground Control 
& Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That non miners working underground be trained in the fundamentals of ground control, including the recognition of potential hazards. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 53] 
That additional funding be made available to colleges and universities to provide the improved facilities and instruction necessary to permit adequate 
training in ground control. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 545] 
That the mining industry shall establish a special chair in ground control at an Ontario university to improve the standard of teaching in rock 
mechanics for graduate and undergraduate students, and to conduct research projects directly related to the mining industry. This chair shall be 
closely identified with the Ontario mining industry, and shall take direction from the industry. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 55] 
That community colleges and universities offering mining programs be encouraged to develop additional short courses in ground control, targeted to 
specific groups in the mining industry. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That the Ministry of Labour, through training and recruitment, ensure that its ground control staff be at a world-class level in their discipline, and 
have the credibility to relate effectively to the international ground control community. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 68] 
That Ministry of Labour inspectors be provided with such additional training as may be required to enable them to deal effectively with site-specific 
ground control problems. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That health and safety committee members shall receive the same training in ground control as supervisory staff. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue 
Page 53] 
That worker-inspectors, where they exist, be given the same training in ground control as that recommended for supervisory staff elsewhere in this 
report. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
That instruction in ground control be integrated into the undergraduate programs in mining engineering. The Rock Mechanics and Strata Control 
Committee of the Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy shall be asked to effect this change through the organization of a National Forum on 
mining-related ground control education. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That the present tripartite committee established to approve modular training programs shall expand those programs to include specialist modules on 
ground control for all underground miners. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That all mining supervisory staff receive adequate training in ground control. The ground control module for supervisors being developed by the 
tripartite committee on modular training shall be deemed adequate for this purpose. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 53] 
That certification courses be developed in practical ground control for practicing ground control engineers and other technical personnel. [Ground 
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Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That guidelines be developed for the interpretation of data produced by ground monitoring devices. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That all information obtained from ground monitoring devices at a particular mine be provided to the union representing workers in that mine. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That mines experiencing on going rockbursting problems install instruments, such as micro-seismic monitoring devices, to monitor seismicity in the 
affected areas. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That mining companies, with the support of labour and government, establish a research organization to act as a central body to co-ordinate research 
into ground control and rock mechanics in Ontario mines. This co-ordinating body shall be managed by a Board of Directors made up of members 
currently active in the industry and representing all facets of it - management, labour and government. The Board would appoint an Executive 
Director who, with an appropriate staff, would manage the research coordination and be accountable to the Board. The initial program would cover at 
least the following areas: Identify ground control problems in Ontario mines; Identify needed research and the appropriate agencies to conduct it; 
Contract for the necessary research to be done, and supervise its quality; Ensure that the results of the research are published on a regular basis so 
that mine management, appropriate labour representatives and government agencies are fully informed; and Participate in the development of 
guidelines for the implementation of safe ground control practices. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 50-51] 
That specific research to develop improved, reasonable-cost measuring devices be pursued. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
That research into improved rock mechanics instrumentation of all types be undertaken. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 66] 
Among the subjects the organization shall consider for funding are the following: Rock bursts, Destressing, Backfill (including quality monitoring 
and backfill testing methods), Scaling, Pillar design and recovery, Blasting (including vibration damage and drilling controls), Ground support 
(including rock bolting and mechanical supports), Monitoring and testing of ground conditions, Mine Lighting, Computer modelling, and Equipment 
design and mechanization as it applies to hazardous ground conditions. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 51] 
1997 The legislation and regulations governing coal mines should be reviewed to ensure that all personnel working underground receive training in ground 
control as appropriate to their activities and responsibilities. In particular: Coal miners should receive a course on ground control as part of their basic 
mine training, plus annual refresher courses on ground control; Mining supervisory staff, including mine managers, underground managers, and 
overmen, should receive extensive training in ground control; Non-mining personnel employed underground should receive sufficient training in 
ground control to enable them to recognize potential hazards; Training programs for these three categories of employee should be developed by mine 
management in cooperation with the joint occupational health and safety committee and the regulator. The regulator should review these training 
programs to ensure that they reflect changing technology and mining practices. [Westray Page 385] 
If it is decided to pattern the Nova Scotia coal mine regulation regime after that of the United Kingdom, all mine inspectors should have at least a 
degree in mining engineering, with some specialist training in both rock mechanics and ventilation relating to underground coal mining. If the U.S. 
Mine Safety and Health Administration approach is adopted, all mine inspectors should receive adequate initial training. In either case, all mine 
inspectors should be required to take periodic training, of at least one week per year, at an institute specializing in mine inspection and safety. 
[Westray Page 543] 
The regulations should specify the following at a minimum: Ground control plans and any revisions to those plans should be prepared by the mine 
operator and submitted to the regulator for approval prior to the implementation of any such plans; The ground control plan should show the existing 
geological conditions and the mining system to be used. The plan should also indicate any unusual hazards and outline the manner in which these 
will be handled; Approved plans should be available to miners and other underground workers and should be posted in the mine at the area affected 
by the plan; and What the plan is required to specify should be set forth by the regulator from time to time, and should include: a columnar section of 
mine strata; planned width of openings and size of pillar (if required); thickness of seam; method of support to be used; type, sequence, and spacing 
of support materials; requirements for temporary roof support systems; and type and thickness of strata in the roof and in the floor for a depth of 3 m 
below the coal bed. The regulator may require further and better information on the plan and may require that the plan be reviewed by a qualified 
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specialist in rock mechanics. The regulator may require revisions to the plan at any time if satisfied that conditions or accident experience indicate 
that such revisions are necessary or conducive to safety. The ground control plan should be reviewed at least once every six months by the regulator. 
The mine operator should record on the plan and report to the regulator any unplanned fall of roof or rib or any significant rock burst (more than 0.3 
m in thickness) that occurs above the bolt anchorage area, impairs ventilation, impedes the passage of persons, causes injury to miners, causes 
miners' withdrawal from the area, or disrupts activities for more than one hour. All roof control materials should conform with standards as 
established by various testing agencies such as the Canadian Standards Association (CSA) or the American Society for Testing and Materials 
Specifications (ASTMS). In the absence of standards, such materials could be approved by the regulator. The regulator should from time to time 
issue directions, such as found in 30 CFR, respecting the use of roof bolts, torquing requirements for roof bolts, and testing requirements for roof 
bolts and for other types of roof support systems. All entries and drives where roof bolting is the main means of roof support should have imbedded 
warning devices that monitor any downward movement in the roof strata. Such warning devices should be of a type approved by the regulator and 
should be placed at intervals specified on the plan. Installation of such devices should not relieve the operator from making regular inspections as 
prescribed. (The type of device referred to here is that generic category in which the "tell-tale" extensometer — the simple mechanical gauge 
produced at the CANMET Coal Research Laboratory in Cape Breton — would be included.) [Westray Page 384] 
2015 The Ministry of Labour to work with its Research Advisory Council to focus its grants and research on topics that address the priority hazards 
identified in the Mining Sector Risk Assessment, and disseminate and act upon the findings where appropriate. In particular, the Review identified 
several research opportunities: Defining the scientific basis for de-stressing practices, and developing guidance materials that define best practices for 
de-stressing; Exploring options for collaborating with technology developers to mitigate risks associated with seismicity and rock bursting (i.e. 
similar to the Australian Centre for Geomechanics model); and Defining and quantifying the harmful health and safety effects of worker fatigue in 
the Ontario Mining Sector, and researching other sectors (e.g. transportation, health care and the military) to see how the mining sector compares, 
and how the problem has been managed. [Mining Review Page 29] 
The Ministry of Labour to require that mining employers to address the priority hazards identified in the risk ranking exercise: Enhance ground 
control protection by identifying key elements in the control of these hazards, and requiring employers to maintain a record of significant seismic 
events in addition to incidents of ground instability; Require employers to prepare a formal plan to manage hazards that cause occupational illness, 
including requirements for worker and supervisor training and communication; and Require all underground mines employers to have in place a 
formal water management program; Specify that precautions be taken by employers to guard against the accumulation of water in bins, ore and waste 
passes and chutes; and Require all underground mines to have in place a formal traffic management plan. [Mining Review Page 29-30] 
Traffic Management 
2006 Tracking devices that can identify the location of miners at all times underground must be required at all operations. Such technology is currently 
available and MSHA must require mine operators to provide these devises to all miners working underground. Any system that can increase the 
ability for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must be utilized. [Sago Page 12] 
MSHA and NIOSH must be mandated to fund and continue to pursue technology to greatly increase the capabilities of wireless tracking devices. The 
goal of the agencies must be to create a unit that will allow pre- and post-accident tracking of all miners underground. [Sago Page 12-13] 
All mobile equipment entering the mine during rescue and recovery efforts must be equipped with two- way communications. [Sago Page 15] 
2011 Immediate implementation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel-recording system to formally identify and locate all personnel who are 
underground at a given time, including supervisory personnel.  Redefine the state and federal regulations to ensure that no one, including 
management, goes underground without a tagging device. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
“Black box” technology must be instituted for mining equipment, including shearers, continuous miners, roof bolters, shuttle cars, motors, conveyors 
and shields.  The black boxes should provide information regarding methane, oxygen, carbon monoxide and coal dust levels. [Upper Big Branch 
Page 109-110] 
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Water Management 
1997 As a prerequisite to the resumption of underground coal mining at Westray or elsewhere in the Pictou coal basin, the province should require the 
completion of a study into the safety and economic factors involved in drainage of the coalbed methane in the mining area concerned. [Westray Page 
314] 
The Department of Labour and the Department of Natural Resources should consider active research in the development and use of passive and 
triggered stonedust and water barriers for the drives and entries of underground coal mines. This research should be aimed at the development of 
such techniques for use in room-and-pillar mining operations. If the development of barrier technology indicates that substantial safety benefits may 
accrue, the regulator could order a mine operator to install water or stonedust barriers in the mine. [Westray Page 349] 
Sufficient water should be provided in the mine to ensure that an adequate supply is available to wet the coal being mined and transported within the 
mine: All coal-cutting picks should be equipped with water-spray jets of sufficient number and size to ensure that the areas of the coal face being 
worked are maintained in a damp condition so as to render any coal dust incombustible; and All transfer points where coal is moved from one mode 
of transport to another should be equipped with water-spray devices sufficient to render any coal dust incombustible. [Westray Page 349] 
Ventilation & Industrial Hygiene 
1976 That the epidemiological research includes a study of 1/ the amount and type of exposure effective in raising cancer mortality, 2/ the pathology of 
lung cancer in miners, and 3/ the effects of cigarette smoking and of other conjoint occupational factors [Royal Commission Page 96] 
That the mining industry, in co-operation with labour and the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, have conducted research to determine shift-
profiles of noise encounter for representative occupations in mines and plants both in the absence and in the presence of actual and best-available 
hearing protection, that such profiles be codified and published, and that a code be assigned to each worker who regularly encounters areas of work 
in which noise levels of 85 dB(A) or higher exist [Royal Commission Page 230] 
That pilot plant studies used to develop processes and preliminary operating procedures be extended to include the measurement of factors likely to 
have an impact on the health and safety of the environment for work [Royal Commission Page 200] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a study of the mortality experience of the Ontario Uranium Nominal Roll relative to 
appropriately matched sample populations of non-uranium miners and non-miners in Ontario [Royal Commission Page 91] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority of the province, in collaboration with the Atomic Energy Control Board, have conducted further 
epidemiological research based on the exposure to ionizing radiation among Ontario uranium miners [Royal Commission Page 96] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board: have research conducted relevant to current circumstances and on means for measuring all components of 
ionizing radiation effective in contributing significantly to the irradiation of the lungs, other organs, and tissues of workers in Ontario uranium and 
thorium mines and mills; and hi on the spatial and temporal distribution of ionizing radiation and related particulates in these mines and mills; issue 
codes of guidance al for the frequency and location of sampling required to determine both the radiation exposure of individual workers in Ontario 
mines and mills and the general state of the mine and mill environment; for the selection, use, maintenance, and calibration of instruments for 
measuring ionizing radiation both for the determination of individual exposures and for the monitoring of the general mine and mill environment; cl 
for the identification of persons for whom records of radiation exposure should be kept; and ell for the form, preservation, and use of occupational 
records for exposure to all significant components of ionizing radiation;3/facilitate, with the assistance of the federal Department of Health and 
Welfare, epidemiological research on a national basis [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission research on the radiographic records related to Miner’s Certificates to assess the 
relative rate of progression of persons in and out of dust [Royal Commission Page 59] 
That profiles of risk-encounter for toxic substances be developed by examining the work patterns of maintenance workers, and that modular training 
be adapted to such profiles [Royal Commission Page 206] 
That resources for joint research and teaching by specialists in occupational health and safety in faculties of medicine and engineering be given high 
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priority by both the universities and government [Royal Commission Page 205] 
That the radiological status of silicosis in the dust-exposed population currently employed in the Elliot Lake uranium mines and all other uranium 
mines be reviewed by the Occupational Health and Safety Branch on a biennial basis for a period of at least ten years [Royal Commission Page 33] 
That the radiological status of silicosis among the persons on record on the Uranium Nominal Roll be reviewed on a biennial basis for a period of at 
least ten years [Royal Commission Page 33] 
That the functional purpose, measuring procedures, and measured results relating to all environmental monitoring at the workplace be made known 
in understandable language to all affected workers and their representatives by the employer and as appropriate by the Mine Inspection Branch 
[Royal Commission Page 40] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch within the Occupational Health and Safety Authority conduct annually, or have conducted by an independent 
agency, sample measurements at representative workplaces of all environmental quantities whose values are audited by the branch in carrying out its 
role [Royal Commission Page 43] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority publish at least biennially a critical review of its appraisal of environmental conditions at the 
workplaces in the mines and mineral plants [Royal Commission Page 44] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority establish by regulation a dust standard for personal exposure to free silica in mine and plant 
aerosols based on a time-weighted average of respirable dust intensity over a working shift and a stipulated lifetime period of exposure [Royal 
Commission Page 50] 
That the dust standard for time-weighted average exposure be established on a statutory basis [Royal Commission Page 50] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority immediately establish by regulation an initial threshold limit value (11 v) for the mass of 
respirable free silica in milligrams per cubic metre [Royal Commission Page 50] 
That the interim have the status accorded by the Occupational Health and Safety Authority to threshold limit values as issued by the American 
Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists [Royal Commission Page 51] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch prepare a code of requirements for the gravimetric measurement of dust in all mines suited to 
determining personal exposure to dust [Royal Commission Page 51] 
That all steps necessary to render effective a gravimetric standard of dust measurement, including those listed herein, be implemented immediately 
[Royal Commission Page 51] 
That to provide a basis for establishing a statutory standard or standards for time-weighted average respirable dust exposure in Ontario mines and 
plants, the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission epidemiological research on the relation of the incidence of silicosis and ofother 
pulmonary effects to the structure and quantity of aerosols respired in Ontario mines [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That the existing code of requirements for dust measurement in the uranium mines as issued by the chief engineer of the Mines Engineering Branch 
remain in force [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority be assigned by statute the responsibility to establish standards or guidelines for personal exposure 
to all toxic substances and hazardous physical agents and that, subject to any statutory standards and in consultation with industry and labour, the 
Authority issue a code of practice for the application in mines and plants of the Threshold Limit Values of the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists [Royal Commission Page 235] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board confirm the extent to which thoron gas and its daughter products contribute to the irradiation of the 
respiratory system and other organs of workers in Ontario uranium mines [Royal Commission Page 68] 
That any employer who rotates job assignments for workmen with the intent of limiting the occupational exposure of any persons to any hazardous 
environmental condition be required to obtain the formal approval of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and to maintain permanent 
occupational records which clearly define the persons, tasks, locations, hazardous conditions, and time intervals involved [Royal Commission Page 
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57] 
That workers in reduction plants who have been exposed for twenty years or longer to Sulphur dioxide at levels approaching the current Threshold 
Limit Value and to associated dust and fumes, and who exhibit the clinical diagnosis of chronic bronchitis and impaired pulmonary function as 
identified by objective tests, be considered for compensation at up to a maximum of 20 per cent disability [Royal Commission Page 219] 
That when the lungs of a worker exhibit dust effects and the worker seeks the opportunity through work adjustment to take employment with a new 
employer, the new employer not be held liable for any disability pension or other costs for silicosis or disease conditions related thereto that may be 
levied as a consequence of the person becoming a silicotic at a future date [Royal Commission Page 59] 
That the current employees in the Elliot Lake uranium mines who are silicotics or exhibit dust effects (radiographic 4) in their lungs be eligible fora 
voluntary programme of work adjustment; that this programme be supported by management and unions; and that the Workmen's Compensation 
Board provide rehabilitative compensation and supportive counselling services to assist the persons involved [Royal Commission Page 57] 
That persons on the Uranium Nominal Roll who exhibit dust effects (radiographic 4) within twenty years of entry into Ontario dust exposure, and 
who have been employed in dust exposure in the uranium mines fora cumulative interval of five or more years from 1954 to 1975 inclusive, be 
eligible for rehabilitation assistance under a programme of work adjustment [Royal Commission Page 60] 
That where there is evidence that the exposure of any person to silicaladen dust has been substantially in excess of established dust guidelines or 
standards and the person has exhibited dust effects in his or her lungs within twenty years of first exposure to dust in Ontario, the person be eligible 
for work adjustment rehabilitation assistance [Royal Commission Page 60] 
That the Workmen’s Compensation Board of Ontario, in collaboration with other provincial boards as provided for in interprovincial agreements, 
seek out and advise the families of all ascertained deaths due to lung cancer on the Nominal Roll that a claim for compensation should be entered 
[Royal Commission Page 109] 
That where more than one recognized toxic component is present in the aerosols the standard specify how an effective combined exposure limit is to 
be determined [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That tests using sputum cytology be conducted every two years on all persons who have worked in radiation exposure at the uranium mines for five 
or more years [Royal Commission Page 108] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board review the basis for and issue explicit regulations establishing the maximum permissible annual exposure to 
ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure delineate how all significant components of external and internal irradiation are to be 
accounted for and indicate how total exposure and related dose is to be evaluated [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure and related dose be interpreted in units that can be monitored by practical means in uranium 
and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the Province of Ontario, through the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, establish by statute a standard for maximum permissible annual 
exposure to ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills, and that this standard be in conformity with the regulatory 
standards of the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 87] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch prepare regulations defining the kinds and frequencies of measurements of ventilation, dust and radiation 
necessary to enable it to audit the engineering operational characteristics of uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 88] 
That these regulations be in conformity with the related code of guidance established by the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 
88] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority specify: a level of radiation in mine or mill air measured at any time in any occupied workplace 
which, if exceeded, requires that corrective action be taken immediately; and a level of radiation in mine or mill air measured at any time in any 
occupied workplace which, if exceeded, requires closure of the related workplace until the level of radiation is reduced below that specified in 1 
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[Royal Commission Page 88] 
That job rotation within mines conducted to meet the standard for maximum permissible annual exposure to ionizing radiation be permitted only in 
exceptional circumstances with the explicit approval on a case-by-case basis of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and with the knowledge 
of the representatives of the workers [Royal Commission Page 105] 
That, by statute, each mining company be made responsible for maintaining effective audiometric records for each employee who in the absence of 
hearing protection regularly encounters noise at levels of 85 dB(A) or higher, and that such audiometric records be required to be keyed 1/ to social 
insurance numbers, 2/ to Miner’s Certificate numbers where such have been assigned, and 3/ to a code number of noise-profile-encounter as 
previously recommended [Royal Commission Page 232] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission on a five-year cycle statistical assessments of the state of hearing among sample 
populations of workers in mines, and that the first review be of production crews in underground operations, including diesel operators [Royal 
Commission Page 232] 
That a record of the substances and human effects of acute encounters with toxic substances leading to medical aid and compensable injuries be 
maintained in the occupational health records of each worker at the company level [Royal Commission Page 207] 
That a nominal roll of workers at risk of exposure to nickel carbonyl in reduction plants and pilot plants be established by the Occupational Health 
and Safety Authority, in co-operation with the industry and that the morbidity and the mortality experience of this nominal roll be reviewed at least 
every five years [Royal Commission Page 213] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority establish, with the co-operation of the Workmen's Compensation Board and the mining industry, 
a nominal roll of all persons who have worked one or more months in exposure to asbestos dust in asbestos mines and plants [Royal Commission 
Page 215] 
That at five-year intervals the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a review of the status of the health of samples of persons who are 
at high risk from acute encounters with toxic substances, including as necessary intensive medical surveillance [Royal Commission Page 207] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch commission a review of the radiographic record and of the mortality experience for the asbestos 
nominal roll on a five-year cycle [Royal Commission Page 215] 
That epidemiological reviews of selected populations subject to chronic exposure to toxic substances in reduction plants and mines matched to 
suitable control groups be conducted on a five-year cycle by or under the guidance of the Occupational Health and Safety Branch and that the 
essential results of such studies be summarized and published upon completion [Royal Commission Page 212] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch be assigned by provincial statute the responsibility to direct: the establishment and review of 
occupational health records for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills, for regulatory and epidemiological purposes; the preparation of a 
code of practice for the sampling and measurement of ionizing radiation in a manner suited to the determination of the exposures of individual 
workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills and that this code of practice be in conformity with the code of guidance issued by the Atomic 
Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 87] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch of the province conduct or have conducted and publish on a regular cycle not exceeding five years 
status reports on the evolution of occupational diseases among miners [Royal Commission Page 32] 
That the system of measurement and reporting being conducted by the Mines Accident Prevention Association continue in operation and be subject 
to independent monitoring as recommended [Royal Commission Page 54] 
That each uranium mine install a central monitoring system for its ventilation network to monitor air flow and air quality as indicated by dust, 
radiation, and other contaminants [Royal Commission Page 102] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch audit the engineering records of performance of mine ventilation systems [Royal Commission Page 102] 
That records of personal exposure to ionizing radiation maintained by the mines be keyed to Miner’s Certificate numbers in sequence and to social 
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insurance numbers in sequence and arranged in a format that facilitates linking to the Mining Master File [Royal Commission Page 107] 
That the frequency of regular radiographic examination of dust- exposed mine workers be reduced to once every two years unless a radiographic 
change was apparent at the last examination [Royal Commission Page 107] 
That there be a statutory requirement for a metallurgical audit of origin, holdup, and destination of potentially dangerous minor elements such as 
lead, mercury, arsenic, selenium, tellurium, cadmium, and antimony to be conducted quarterly in all reduction plants on the basis of extended 
standard monthly sampling and analytical procedures, and that a copy of this audit be sent to the Occupational Health and Safety Authority [Royal 
Commission Page 200] 
That there be a statutory requirement for an annual audit of use by mass of toxic and hazardous reagents and that a copy be sent to the Occupational 
Health and Safety Authority [Royal Commission Page 200] 
That there be a statutory requirement for each mining company to maintain a register of servicing chemicals involved in any personal encounter 
associated with a medical aid or compensable injury; that the register specify both trade name and chemical composition and identify all known toxic 
chemical constituents; that the register include an audit by mass of annual use; and that a copy of this register be provided to the Occupational Health 
and Safety Authority [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That there be a statutory requirement for each mining company to give the Occupational Health and Safety Authority notice of intent to introduce 
any new reagent or servicing chemical whose toxic characteristics are not known [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That with respect to codes of practice and schemes of practice the principles of recommendations 8, 9, and 10 be extended 1/ to the maintenance and 
operation of mills and metallurgical plants as these activities relate to the leaking and spilling of toxic substances and hot materials into workplaces; 
2/ to the handling and use of reagents and servicing chemicals and to the consequences of their leaks and spills [Royal Commission Page 204] 
That at any location of regular work where acute encounters with toxic substances repeatedly occur as a result of leaking, recirculating, or spilling 
from metallurgical and milling processes, there be a statutory requirement for the installation and use of equipment for the continuous monitoring of 
the substances involved [Royal Commission Page 206] 
That the appropriate substance or intent of recommendations 8, 9, 10, 39(2), 40, 42, and 46 be made applicable to asbestos mines and plants [Royal 
Commission Page 215] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, in co-operation with the industry and labour, prepare a code of requirements for diesel emissions 
[Royal Commission Page 222] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch prepare a code of practice for the provision of ventilation and for the fuelling, operation, and maintenance of diesel 
engines [Royal Commission Page 222] 
That each mine using diesel equipment be required to file with the Mines Inspection Branch a scheme of practice for the short-term and long-term 
maintenance of its diesel engines [Royal Commission Page 222] 
That each mining operation maintain noise maps based on full-scale conditions of operation which delineate all areas of work at which the noise 
level is 85 dB(A) or higher [Royal Commission Page 229]  
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch regularly inspect all audiometric testing facilities not under the supervision of a designated medical 
specialist, and that any designated medical specialist be required to certify biennially in writing that the facilities under his supervision conform to 
the minimum standards of the Branch as then current [Royal Commission Page 233] 
That the mining industry and equipment manufacturers, with the Canadian Standards Association, expedite the development of standards for the 
assessment of noise from mining equipment, and for the performance of personal safety equipment and cab enclosures in attenuating noise, and that 
such standards be invoked by the industry in specifying noise performance requirements for new equipment [Royal Commission Page 230] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority issue a code of practice for the selection and use of personal hearing protection and for 
communicating in the presence of noise [Royal Commission Page 231] 
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That the mining industry establish for its employees, where such is not now provided, occupational health surveillance by a supervising medical 
director or consultant experienced in occupational medicine [Royal Commission Page 237] 
That the labour unions individually or in consort appoint to their staff a consulting specialist in occupational medicine [Royal Commission Page 237] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch within the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, in consultation with industry and the representatives of 
workers, prepare, under clearly defined statutory authority, codes of practice applicable to all mines relating to: 1/ the prevention and confinement of 
dust at each distinctive class of workplace; 2/ the provision of ventilation in the breathing zone of workers that is effective for purposes of protecting 
health at each distinctive class of workplace (including vehicles) [Royal Commission Page 49] 
1986 Operators must assess the adequacy of rock dust through direct readout explosibility meters and submit these results electronically to regulatory 
agencies. 
1995 It is recommended that all employees be effectively trained to: recognize indicators of specific mine hazards, such as spontaneous combustion, and 
their control; and become sufficiently familiar with mine gases, and associated risks. [Moura Page 64] 
It is recommended that a position of ventilation officer be established as a statutory position at all underground coal mines. The ventilation officer 
appointed must have demonstrated competencies appropriate to the duties and responsibilities of the position and would be directly responsible to the 
mine manager for the planning, design and implementation of the mine ventilation system and for the establishment of effective standards of 
ventilation for the mine, methods for its control and protection, monitoring of performance, reporting procedures, maintenance of ventilation records 
and plans, and emergency action plans. [Moura Page 65] 
It is further recommended that both new and existing mines make provision for the rapid sealing of the mine from the surface through the installation 
of an air lock facility in at least one of the mine intakes for ready access to re-enter the mine. The plan should also indicate the location of any surface 
boreholes that may facilitate the monitoring of the underground atmosphere. [Moura Page 72] 
It is further recommended that Mine Safety Management Plans be based on detailed risk/hazard analyses. [Moura Page 62] 
The Inquiry recommends that minimum requirements provide for: the continuous and effective sampling and monitoring of the atmosphere in a 
sealed area including a minimum number of sampling points and suitable location(s); means whereby the pressure difference between the inside and 
outside surfaces of seals can be measured; the effective ventilation of the outside surfaces of seals; and regular inspection and periodic auditing on 
the long term performance of seals and sealed areas. [Moura Page 69] 
It is recommended that mines be required to develop and implement protocols for the setting, resetting, and the noting and acceptance of alarm 
conditions raised by any gas monitoring system in use at the mine. In particular, such protocols should define: who is authorized to set or change 
alarm levels and the recording of those settings or changes; who is responsible for the acknowledgment of alarms and recording of 
acknowledgments; who is responsible for communicating the occurrence of alarms and initiating action as a result of those alarms; and how the 
actions of responsible persons, and the identity of those persons, are to be recorded. [Moura Page 68] 
It is recommended that all mines be required to develop and implement a spontaneous combustion management plan along the lines outlined to 
provide effective long term control of that risk and which satisfies any requirements of the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines as a condition for 
continued operation of the mine. [Moura Page 62]  
In respect of the design, installation and maintenance of seals, the Inquiry recommends that: the location of final seals be subject to approval by the 
District Inspector of Mines; it be a requirement that seals be constructed using only materials that have been approved for the purpose by the Chief 
Inspector of Coal Mines; and the Chief Inspector of Coal Mines should determine and then apply requirements appropriate for the design and 
installation of seals and for their long term stability. [Moura Page 69] 
It is for these reasons that the Inquiry further recommends that it be a requirement that no part of a mine be sealed without the prior written approval 
of the District Inspector of Mines (other than in an emergency, whereupon the inspector must be informed as soon as practicable thereafter). [Moura 
Page 69] 
1997 Workers should be removed from any area in a mine where the concentration of dust or noxious gases in the air exceeds the standards set out by the 
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American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH). [Westray Page 278] 
Dust samples should be taken at least once a week using a method approved by the regulator for that purpose. Samples should be taken according to 
a regularly updated and approved plan. The regulator may require additional testing and may grant exemptions, providing that the overall safety of 
underground workers is not compromised. [Westray Page 350] 
The mine operator should provide suitable testing and calibrating facilities on the mine surface. Methanometers should be tested for accuracy before 
each shift and calibrated as required. [Westray Page 313] 
If the methane level in the area reaches or exceeds 1 per cent by volume, any electrically operated equipment in use should be shut down, and any 
shot firing being carried out should be discontinued: In addition to other safety devices, any electrical equipment operating at the mine face or in 
reasonable proximity, as established by the regulator, should be equipped with a methane monitoring device capable of continually monitoring the 
methane content of the air; If the methane content exceeds 1 per cent by volume, the methane monitoring device should automatically shut down the 
electrical equipment; The electrical equipment should not be re-energized until a qualified person certifies that the methane content in the air has 
been diluted to a safe level. (30 CFR sets out this requirement as it applies to mines under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Mine Safety and Health 
Administration.); The methane monitors installed on electrical equipment should be kept operative at all times and tested weekly for accuracy. 
Sensors should be affixed to the equipment as close to the working face as practicable. [Westray Page 313] 
Each crew at the working face of a mine should include a person trained in the use of a methanometer. This person should carry, while in the mine, 
an approved device or devices capable of testing for both methane and oxygen, and capable of testing at the roof and in roof cavities for layering. 
[Westray Page 313] 
The operation of mobile diesel-powered equipment underground should be regulated to ensure that the health and safety of the workforce is not 
endangered or impaired by such operation. [Westray Page 314] 
The mine operator should employ or retain the services of a qualified ventilation engineer to assist in the preparation of all ventilation plans or 
amendments to such plans. The ventilation engineer should sign any ventilation plans or amendments before they are submitted to the regulator. 
[Westray Page 277] 
The level of methane in an air intake to the working face of the mine should not exceed 0.5 per cent by volume: If the methane level exceeds 0.5 per 
cent by volume, the ventilation technician or other qualified person must take steps to adjust the ventilation system to dilute the methane to 
acceptable levels; If the methane level in any part of a mine reaches or exceeds 2 per cent by volume, all workers must be evacuated from the 
affected area; The airflow throughout the mine, including the mine face, should be such that methane will be diluted to a level below 0.5 percent by 
volume, as measured at least 30 cm from the roof or ribs; The velocity of air throughout the mine should be sufficient to prevent the formation of 
methane layers. [Westray Page 313] 
The overriding principle in mine ventilation must be that the mine is properly ventilated at all working times. It is the primary duty of the mine 
manager to ensure this proper ventilation: All active working places should be ventilated by a current of fresh air containing not less than 19.5 per 
cent by volume of oxygen and not more than 0.5 per cent by volume of carbon dioxide; and Each working face should receive fresh air of sufficient 
volume and velocity to dilute and render harmless all noxious or flammable gases and maintain all working and travelling areas in a safe and fit 
condition. [Westray Page 276] 
No mine should start up without a comprehensive ventilation plan approved by the regulator. The ventilation plan should be subject to at least an 
annual update, and any changes in the interim should be subject to approval by the regulator. [Westray Page 276] 
The ventilation plan should contain details of the system proposed, or of amendments to the existing approved system, and should indicate: the limits 
of the mine property and any adjacent workings, as well as any abnormal conditions; the location and detailed specifications of all surface fans and 
all surface openings; the direction, velocity, and volume of air at each mine opening; all underground workings, including location of all stoppings, 
overcasts, undercasts, regulators, doors, and seals; the method of sealing worked-out areas, provisions for air sampling behind any such seals, and the 
manner in which such sealed areas will be vented into return air passages (ensuring that no intake air is or could be passing any sealed-off area); the 
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location of all splits and the volume of fresh air entering each split and of return air at each cross-cut in a room-and-pillar mine and at each working 
face; and the locations for the measurement of air in the mine to ensure the proper ventilation at all times. [Westray Page 276] 
The regulator may submit plans or amendments to a qualified mine ventilation engineer for review, and any fee for such review should be the 
responsibility of the mine operator. The regulator may require modifications to the plan in the interests of safety. [Westray Page 277] 
The regulator, in consultation with a qualified ventilation engineer, should draft regulations dealing with main fans and auxiliary fans. These 
regulations should include: details of the design, installation, operation, maintenance, and inspections of such fans; and requirements for 
instrumentation, the recording of data from such instrumentation, and the filing of this data with the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
No booster fan should be installed underground without the approval of the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
Every main ventilating fan should be mounted above ground in a fireproof fan house located at a safe distance from any mine opening and offset 
from any such openings or connections. The fan house should be equipped with a weak wall or explosion door located in a direct line with any 
possible explosion forces. Every main fan should be equipped with an audible alarm that sounds automatically if the fan stops or slows down. 
[Westray Page 277] 
Where any fan used in ventilating a mine stops for any reason, the area affected should be immediately evacuated. No auxiliary fan should be 
restarted until a qualified person has inspected the area and found it to be safe and free of gas. The area should not be re-entered until the ventilation 
has been restored to the required level and the area has been found to be safe and free of gas by a qualified person. If any fan remains stopped for 
more than 30 minutes, the mine operator should report the relevant circumstances to the regulator. [Westray Page 277] 
The regulator, in consultation with a qualified ventilation engineer, should draft regulations dealing with requirements for ducting, brattice, 
stoppings, locations of measuring devices, and sealing of abandoned sections of the mine. All brattice cloth, ducting, and materials used for 
constructing stoppings should be of fire-resistant material. [Westray Page 277] 
Equipment used to ventilate an underground coal mine should be of a type approved by the regulator and should be installed in an approved manner. 
Equipment, materials, or procedures not previously approved may be approved if the regulator is satisfied that the same measure of protection is 
provided to the underground worker. [Westray Page 277] 
Unless specifically approved in writing by the regulator, no more than one mechanized coal mining unit should operate in each ventilation split. Each 
split should be provided with a separate supply of fresh air. [Westray Page 278] 
Ventilating air should not be recirculated without the written consent of the regulator. [Westray Page 278] 
The mine operator should employ a qualified mine ventilation technician to be responsible for the operation and maintenance of the ventilation 
system. The ventilation technician should measure the airflow and sample the air quality in the mine at approved intervals of at least once a month 
for the whole mine and weekly for working areas. The results of ventilation and air quality tests should be recorded and a copy of such record should 
be filed with the regulator. [Westray Page 278] 
Devices used for testing air quality, velocity, and volume should be of a type certified and approved for such use by the Canada Centre for Mineral 
and Energy Technology (CANMET), the Approval and Certification Center of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA), the Canadian 
Standards Association (CSA), or other such equivalent testing body. [Westray Page 278] 
The regulator may require, as part of the mine development plan, a plan for the installation of a remote system for monitoring the mine atmosphere, 
with appropriate audible alarms and recording devices. Such a monitoring plan should include the provision that a qualified person must be at the 
remote monitoring station at all times that the mine is operating. [Westray Page 314] 
2006 Mine ventilation systems must be designed to offer miners the greatest possible protection to enhance their ability to escape. Air used to ventilate 
seals must be coursed away from working sections, and immediately to the return. This is necessary to ensure that the integrity of the intake escape 
ways are not compromised. [Sago Page 11] 
In addition to the recommendations already made in this report and the MINER Act, MSHA must immediately take the following actions: Repeal the 
belt-air regulation; Require flame resistant conveyor belts in all mines; Move to increase the number and skill level of mine rescue teams; Lower the 
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maximum exposure limit for respirable coal mine dust and silica; Update and expand training and retraining of miners; Develop a public hearing- 
style investigation process; Update the penalty and assessment scheme; Modify the conferencing process; Improve the certification and approval 
process; Assist NIOSH in developing the next generation SCSRs; Update permissible exposure limits for contaminants in the mine environment; 
Improve atmospheric monitoring systems; Develop a nationwide emergency communications system; Develop air quality, chemical substances and 
respiratory protection standards; and Address issues related to working in confined spaces. [Sago Page 17] 
The use of Omega Blocks should not be permitted as a ventilation control in any underground mining operation. [Sago Page 8] 
The agencies should not approve ventilation plans that utilize blowing ventilation where active working areas are inby. [Sago Page 9] 
The Union calls for the immediate and permanent ban on the use of all Omega or similar-type blocks and material in any underground area of all coal 
mines. [Sago Page 10] 
The Union believes the current protocol used for testing and approving seals is flawed. The National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) recently issued a draft report entitled “Explosion Pressure Design Criteria for New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The report addresses two 
critical issues: What explosion pressures can develop during an explosion within a sealed area, and What are the appropriate design criteria for seals 
that will withstand these pressures? [Sago Page 10] 
MSHA should rescind its regulation that permits alternative materials and methods for constructing seals, and immediately require that all seals be 
explosion-proof seals or bulkheads, as is required by Section 303(y)(2) and (3) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977.[Sago Page 10] 
The agencies should consider future sealing methods that require approval of smaller, more manageable areas of the mine. These smaller sequentially 
sealed areas will eliminate large areas where enormous volumes of explosive gases can accumulate, allowing better control within the area. 
Successively sealing these areas will afford additional protections to miners. [Sago Page 9] 
Inspections of the construction of seals must be conducted by a certified engineer. The inspection must include monitoring the construction for a 
sufficient time, as well as evaluating the completed seal, to insure each seal is properly installed. The certified engineer should record the findings in 
an appropriate book. [Sago Page 8] 
The regulatory agencies should routinely inspect the seal during the construction and at the completion of each seal. Sufficient time for this 
inspection must be permitted to determine that all seals are properly constructed. [Sago Page 8] 
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) recently released a draff report entitled, “Explosive Pressure Design Criteria for 
New Seals in U.S. Coal Mines.” The UMWA fully endorses the report and its recommendations, as follows: For unmonitored seals where there is a 
possibility of methane-air detonation behind the seal, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 640 psi; For unmonitored seals 
with little likelihood of detonation, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 120 psi; For monitored seals where the amount of 
potentially explosive methane-air is strictly limited and controlled, seals should be designed and built to withstand a pressure of 50 psi, if monitoring 
can assure that the maximum length of explosive mix behind a seal does not exceed 15 feet and that the volume of the explosive mix does not exceed 
40 percent of the total sealed volume. [Sago Page 8] 
The method of seal construction submitted by the operator in the ventilation plan and approved by the agencies must include: Seals must be hitched 
into the ribs and bottom a minimum of 6 inches; A method to continually monitor the atmosphere inby the seals from a remote location on the 
surface; Sealed areas must be treated as an integral part of the mine’s overall ventilation system, and be specifically designed and approved for each 
installation at each mine. The seal requirements must be based on several factors, including area to be sealed, special conditions within the area to be 
sealed and methane liberation; and Seals must be constructed of solid, incombustible material as prescribed in the 1977 Mine Act. [Sago Page 8] 
The agencies should no longer permit areas of the mine that are sealed to self-inert without continuous monitoring as recommended by NIOSH. 
[Sago Page 8] 
Areas of the mine that are to be sealed must be free of all debris that is not permanently installed during the mining process. Materials and supplies 
such as unused roof support material, posts, oil and hydraulic containers, cables, equipment, belt structure, message or other cables and electrical 
components or cables must be retrieved and placed in a safe area outside the seals. [Sago Page 8] 
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Seals in worked-out or abandoned areas of the mine should be visually inspected and tested each shift with an approved methane detector to insure 
their structural integrity and to check for methane leakage. [Sago Page 9] 
Seals that do not pass this inspection must be immediately leak-tested utilizing the same methodology currently used for this purpose at NIOSH’s 
Lake Lynn experimental mine. Any leaks or damage to the seal must be repaired immediately. [Sago Page 9] 
2011 Mine operators should be required to adopt computer-based monitoring of air quality, quantity and direction of flow throughout a mine. A suitable 
system would alert not only the mine operator and miners to impending danger, but it would also alert the state and federal regulatory agencies. 
Regulatory agencies would have the authority to shut down an operation based on data provided by the system. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Current monitors for methane, carbon monoxide and coal dust must be upgraded to include memory chips, as well as instant communication to the 
communications center. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Operators must be required to use real-time continuous monitoring for explosive methane gas and respirable dust in coal mines. [Upper Big Branch 
Page 110] 
Mine operators should be required to install equipment, such as seismographs, to monitor geologic activity at or near their mining operations. [Upper 
Big Branch Page 110] 
Electronic records should be maintained regarding methane, intake and return air levels on all  coal producing sections for no less than seven years.  
Had this information been available, investigators would have had data related to the previous methane inundation at UBB.  [Upper Big Branch Page 
110] 
WVMHST, NIOSH, MSHA and the mining industry should adopt before the end of 2011 rules to: reduce the permissible exposure limit (PEL) for 
coal mine dust to 0.09 mg/m; reduce the PEL for crystalline silica to 0.05 mg/m; and mandate continuous dust monitoring, verification of mine 
operators’ dust control plans at normal production (e.g., at least equal to the average production recorded for the most recent 30 production shifts), 
and single-shift sampling. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
WVMHST and MSHA should undertake reorganization on their ventilation approval system to ensure that plans and requirements are known and 
understood by both the ventilation specialists as well as the inspectors. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
Specifically use a “pattern of violation” and/or “flagrant violation” authority for violations of key standards designed to prevent explosions, and 
apply meaningful sanctions, such as revoking the operator’s ventilation plan. If an operator’s plan is revoked for reckless or repeated behaviour, he 
should be offered a brief period of time (e.g., five days) to make the safety case to MSHA as to why the mine’s ventilation plan should not be 
revoked. [Upper Big Branch Page 109] 
A procedure should be adopted that would require mine operators repeatedly cited for failing to follow their own approved ventilation plan to notify 
MSHA and WVMHST when subsequent ventilation changes are completed and before miners are allowed back underground. Affected miners would 
be entitled to full compensation by the operator at their regular rates of pay and work schedule for the entire period they are idled. [Upper Big Branch 
Page 109] 
2015 The Ministry of Labour and the relevant Health and Safety Associations to increase their capacity to ensure the health and safety system has the 
resources to address mining hazards effectively – particularly the priority hazards identified in the risk-ranking exercise. In particular: Increase 
ministry capacity in geotechnical, mining, mechanical, electrical, structural, and civil engineering; and Increase system partners’ technical capacity/ 
resources related to industrial hygiene and mechanical issues. [Mining Review Page 53] 
The Ministry of Labour to review existing occupational exposure limits for a number of key airborne and chemical hazardous substances in 
underground mines with a view for giving further consideration to the limits for those substances and, if appropriate and advisable, amend 
Regulation 833. Priority to be given to a review of the occupational exposure limits for silica, nitrogen dioxide and diesel particulate matter (DPM). 
Other hazards to be considered include: sulfur dioxide, and radon. [Mining Review Page 30] 
The Ministry of Labour to require employers in the mining sector to conduct risk assessments, which would include measures and procedures to 
control the risks identified in the assessment as likely to expose a worker to injury and illness. The joint health and safety committee, health and 
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safety representative, union or workers be consulted on the risk assessment. Employer risk reassessments are to be done as often as necessary to 
ensure programs that result from the assessment continue to protect workers. [Mining Review Page 29] 
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APPENDIX 5B Recommendations pertaining to the Ontario Mine Rescue Technical Advisory Committee Current Projects. 
Team Communication 
2006 
Current communication technology, including one-way text messaging and two-way wireless systems, must be immediately installed in all mines. 
Any system that can increase the ability for miners to escape a mine emergency, even if it is limited in scope, must be utilized. [Sago Page 11] 
Communications with family members, the press and general public should be handled by an independent arm of the federal government, much like 
the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and Surface Transportation Board (STB) do with air, rail or highway incidents. They should also 
make necessary arrangements for family members as they arrive at the site. These requirements should be specifically laid out in the mine emergency 
response plan. [Sago Page 15] 
Information from the command center to any sources not immediately involved in the rescue efforts should be carefully monitored and verified to 
ensure accuracy. In the event miscommunications occur, they must be immediately corrected. [Sago Page 15] 
The federal and state agencies should be responsible for immediately notifying and deploying all government rescue personnel, equipment and other 
necessary assets to the mine site after being notified that an emergency situation exists. [Sago Page 14] 
Every effort should be made to coordinate the emergency response of the federal, state and local agencies. [Sago Page 14] 
All mobile equipment entering the mine during rescue and recovery efforts must be equipped with two- way communications. [Sago Page 15] 
2011 
Immediate implementation of a computerized, real-time electronic personnel-recording system to formally identify and locate all personnel who are 
underground at a given time, including supervisory personnel.  Redefine the state and federal regulations to ensure that no one, including 
management, goes underground without a tagging device. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
Mine operators’ emergency response plans (ERPs) must be treated more than just more paperwork. ERPs should be developed collaboratively with 
miners, their families, local responders, and mine rescue team members, and revised based on mine-specific drills and table-top exercises. [Upper 
Big Branch Page 112] 
A coordinated, formal debriefing of all mine rescue team members who respond to a major mine emergency should be conducted within a month of 
the event. The objectives of the assembly would include offering counsel on post-traumatic stress, discussing what worked well and what didn’t in 
their mine emergency response, and identifying team members whose testimony would be helpful to accident investigators. [Upper Big Branch Page 
113] 
The mine rescue community should convene a summit of mine rescue team members, in particular, individuals who responded to the mine 
emergency incidents from 2006 to the present, to discuss the state of the U.S. mine rescue system. Advisory guidelines should be written for mine 
rescue teams. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
Protocols should be established and followed with regard to mine rescue and recovery, using lessons learned and best practices identified from other 
emergency response events. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
MSHA and West Virginia should require a digital recording of the activities and communications in a mine emergency command center. Briefings 
and debriefings of mine rescue team personnel also should be recorded. The current paper and pencil method fails to produce a thorough record of 
key data and decision points. Such a record is necessary to conduct a thorough investigation, assess the effectiveness of existing mine rescue 
operations and contribute to training curriculum for advanced mine rescue personnel. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
2012 
Emergency management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention: Operators of underground coal mines should be required by legislation to 
have a current and comprehensive emergency management plan that is audited and tested regularly; The emergency management plan should be 
developed in consultation with the workers and the Mines Rescue Service; The emergency management plan should specify the facilities available 
within the mine, such as emergency equipment, refuges and changeover stations, and emergency exits; The emergency management plan should 
contain a strategy for notifying next of kin and ensuring that genuine enquirers receive appropriate information; The mining operator must keep and 
regularly update a comprehensive list of emergency contact details for all workers; The emergency management plan needs to be compatible with 
  264 
 
CIMS, the co-ordinated incident management system used by New Zealand's emergency services and the police; and The regulator should include 
the emergency management plan in its audit programme. [Pike River II Page 354] 
The implementation of the co-ordinated incident management system (CIMS) in underground coal mine emergencies should be reviewed urgently: 
The implementation of CIMS should be reviewed to ensure that emergencies in underground coal mines are well managed; The review team should 
include the mining industry, police, emergency services, the Mines Rescue Service and the regulator; The CIMS framework should be rigorously 
tested by regular practical exercises at underground coal mines; and The incident controller at an underground coal mine emergency must have 
mining expertise and, together with the incident management team, must be responsible for co-ordinating the emergency effort and approving key 
decisions. This does not prevent a government agency such as the police from being the lead agency or from maintaining its command structure. 
[Pike River II Page 354-355] 
2015 The Ministry of Labour to work with stakeholders to develop proposed recommendations regarding the responsibilities of mine rescue crew members 
and mine owners/employers, with respect to mine rescue operations. [Mining Review Page 40] 
Competency Based Training 
1986 
That the Ministry of Labour, with the assistance of the Mining Legislative Review Committee, draft comprehensive first-aid regulations with specific 
reference to underground mining operations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
2006 
Training for SCSR donning and escape must be wholly separate from all other types of training miners currently receive. This training must be 
repeated every 90 days. [Sago Page 12] 
Training for mine rescue teams should be required frequently, but at least every quarter (three months). Training should be done at each mine the 
rescue team is charged with covering. This will require surface as well as underground exercises to ensure the team members are familiar with the 
facility. [Sago Page 16] 
Mine rescue teams should be certified by MSHA to ensure competence. Certification should be directly tied to the team’s demonstrating proficiency 
and skill in all aspects of mine rescue. Teams that do not pass the certification may continue to practice, but shall not be permitted to perform any 
actual mine rescue. [Sago Page 16] 
SCSR and escape training must be done in actual conditions underground and, to the extent possible, reflect real-life emergency situations. Miners 
must don the SCSR training model and walk at least a portion of the escapeway. [Sago Page 12] 
All mine rescue teams should be required to participate in at least two mine rescue contests every year. Failure to participate must result in the team’s 
certification being revoked. [Sago Page 16] 
2011 
SCSR training should be conducted quarterly, instead of annually. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
SCSR training should be realistic and conducted in actual mining situations, such as riding in a man trip and working on a longwall. It should 
incorporate a variety of actual in-mine scenarios for which the SCSR must be donned and activated. The training should emphasize the importance of 
activating the SCSR at the very first warning of an emergency. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
Refuge Station Design 
1986 That manway sizes, escape routes and refuge stations be sufficient to accommodate rescue operations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 63] 
2006 
Mine ventilation systems must be designed to offer miners the greatest possible protection to enhance their ability to escape. Air used to ventilate 
seals must be coursed away from working sections, and immediately to the return. This is necessary to insure that the integrity of the intake 
escapeways are not compromised. [Sago Page 11] 
All mandoors must be clearly marked on both sides. [Sago Page 11] 
“Safety chambers” and “safe havens” should be required in all mining operations. The Union notes that these are two distinct systems and they 
cannot be used interchangeably. [Sago Page 13] 
2012 To support effective emergency management, operators of underground coal mines should be required to have modern equipment and facilities: 
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Operators should be required to have equipment and facilities suitable for self-rescue by workers during an emergency; Operators should be required 
to include, in their emergency management plans, provisions for continued monitoring of underground atmospheric conditions during an emergency; 
and Operators should be required to install facilities that will support emergency mine sealing and inertisation. [Pike River II Page 365] 
Emergency Response Risk 
1997 
Every community at or near which underground mining operations are carried out should have a plan to provide emergency medical, fire, and other 
support services. The plan should include providing emergency training to the appropriate people in those communities. Some familiarity with the 
underground environment could be helpful in the event of a disaster. [Westray Page 561] 
Rescue and emergency equipment should be standardized so that those persons trained in rescue procedures will be completely familiar with the 
equipment available. Similarly, the various testing devices should be standardized so that the rescuers are able to use these devices without losing 
valuable time and without the danger of mistaken or inaccurate readings. [Westray Page 561] 
2006 
MSHA and NIOSH must update and test new, easily deployable, reliable and accurate seismic- type devices to locate trapped miners. At least one of 
these devices should be maintained in each MSHA District office. [Sago Page 13] 
Flame-resistant reflective directional lifelines must be required from the face areas in both the primary and secondary escapeways. These lifelines 
should direct miners from their workplace to the nearest surface escape, shaft, slope or capsule. [Sago Page 11] 
Flame-resistant directional reflective lifelines must intersect every oxygen storage location in the escapeway. [Sago Page 12] 
Tethers for linking miners together when necessary during escape should be available in every section at the inby end of the lifeline. They should be 
of sufficient length to eliminate the possibility that miners will become entangled while they are walking or crawling to safety. Additional tethers 
should be located at strategic locations throughout the mine. [Sago Page 11] 
New SCSRs should be positive-pressure units with full face masks. [Sago Page 12] 
Additional oxygen devices must be readily available where miners are working to ensure there is an adequate supply to begin an escape in an 
emergency situation. Oxygen must be available for all miners to effectively escape from the deepest penetration of the mine to the surface. [Sago 
Page 11] 
Additional oxygen devices in protective cases must be stored at strategic locations in both the primary and secondary escape ways for miners to 
access as they travel out of the mine. These caches must be placed at a distance not to exceed 30 minutes normal walking distance. [Sago Page 11-
12] 
SCSR storage caches should include a communication system to the surface, first aid supplies and tethers as well as oxygen. [Sago Page 12] 
The agencies must immediately take enforcement action against any operator that does not comply with the mine rescue team requirements. This 
action should include issuance of a closure order that stops production at all affected operations. Facilities so affected should not be permitted to 
resume operations until all aspects of the mine rescue team requirements are met. [Sago Page 16] 
2011 
MSHA and NIOSH should develop an approved rescue vehicle for removing injured miners safely from the mines.  State and federal agencies should 
have a vehicle for removing injured miners and victims from a mine in a safe and efficient manner.  Rescue workers should not have to carry miner’s 
great distances underground. [Upper Big Branch Page 110] 
2015 Workplace Safety North to revise the Mine Rescue Handbook to include guidelines for fitness of crew members, critical incident stress management 
and acclimatization of emergency responders. [Mining Review Page 40] 
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APPENDIX 5C Recommendations demonstrating overlap with the new Mining Health Safety and Prevention Review 
Recommendations. 
  1967 1976 1981 1986 1995 1997 2006 2011 2012 
Health & 
Safety 
Hazards 
1.1 
8. The Ministry of Labour supported by all relevant health and safety system partners and subject matter experts, to undertake a 
Mining Sector Risk Assessment with employers and labour every 3 years.   
1.2 
The Ministry of Labour to require employers in the mining sector to conduct risk assessments, which would include measures and 
procedures to control the risks identified in the assessment as likely to expose a worker to injury and illness. The joint health and 
safety committee, health and safety representative or workers, be consulted on the risk assessment. Employer risk reassessments are 
to be done as often as necessary to ensure programs that result from the assessment continues to protect workers.  
  1        
1976 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority be given by statute the authority and responsibility to conduct a full and 
expeditious review of any emergent situation in which the health and safety of workers in mines are believed to be at unexpected 
risk [Royal Commission Page 78] 
1.3 
The Ministry of Labour to work with its Research Advisory Council to focus its grants and research on topics that address the 
priority hazards identified in the Mining Sector Risk Assessment, and disseminate and act upon the findings where appropriate.  In 
particular, the Review identified several research opportunities:  
 Defining the scientific basis for de-stressing practices and developing guidance materials that define best practices for de-
stressing   
 Exploring options for collaborating with technology developers to mitigate risks associated with seismicity and rock 
bursting (i.e. similar to the Australian Centre for Geomechanics model)   
 Defining and quantifying the harmful health and safety effects of worker fatigue in the Ontario Mining Sector, and 
researching other sectors (e.g. transportation, health care and the military) to see how the mining sector compares, and how 
the problem has been managed.   
1.4 
The Mining Legislative Review Committee to align the majority of its work with the major hazards identified in the sector level 
risk assessment exercise.   
1.5 
The Ministry of Labour to require that mining employers to address the priority hazards identified in the risk ranking exercise:  
 Enhance ground control protection by identifying key elements in the control of these hazards and requiring employers to 
maintain a record of significant seismic events in addition to incidents of ground instability   
 Require employers to prepare a formal plan to manage hazards that cause occupational illness, including requirements for 
worker and supervisor training and communication   
 Require all underground mines employers to have in place a formal water management program   
 Specify that precautions be taken by employers to guard against the accumulation of water in bins, ore and waste passes 
and chutes   
 Require all underground mines to have in place a formal traffic management plan.   
1.6 
The Ministry of Labour to review existing occupational exposure limits for a number of key airborne and chemical hazardous 
substances in underground mines with a view for giving further consideration to the limits for those substances and, if appropriate 
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and advisable, amend Regulation 833. Priority to be given to a review of the occupational exposure limits for silica, nitrogen 
dioxide and diesel particulate matter (DPM). Other hazards to be considered include sulfur dioxide, and radon.  
  10      1  
 
1976 
That where more than one recognized toxic component is present in the aerosols the standard specify how an effective combined 
exposure limit is to be determined [Royal Commission Page 53] 
That tests using sputum cytology be conducted every two years on all persons who have worked in radiation exposure at the 
uranium mines for five or more years [Royal Commission Page 108] 
That the Atomic Energy Control Board review the basis for and issue explicit regulations establishing the maximum permissible 
annual exposure to ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure delineate how all significant components of external and internal 
irradiation are to be accounted for and indicate how total exposure and related dose is to be evaluated [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the regulations for maximum permissible exposure and related dose be interpreted in units that can be monitored by practical 
means in uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal Commission Page 86] 
That the Province of Ontario, through the Occupational Health and Safety Authority, establish by statute a standard for maximum 
permissible annual exposure to ionizing radiation for workers in uranium and thorium mines and mills, and that this standard be in 
conformity with the regulatory standards of the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal Commission Page 87] 
That the Mines Inspection Branch prepare regulations defining the kinds and frequencies of measurements of ventilation, dust and 
radiation necessary to enable it to audit the engineering operational characteristics of uranium and thorium mines and mills [Royal 
Commission Page 88] 
That these regulations be in conformity with the related code of guidance established by the Atomic Energy Control Board [Royal 
Commission Page 88] 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Authority specify: a level of radiation in mine or mill air measured at any time in any 
occupied workplace which, if exceeded, requires that corrective action be taken immediately; and a level of radiation in mine or 
mill air measured at any time in any occupied workplace which, if exceeded, requires closure of the related workplace until the 
level of radiation is reduced below that specified in 1 [Royal Commission Page 88] 
That job rotation within mines conducted to meet the standard for maximum permissible annual exposure to ionizing radiation be 
permitted only in exceptional circumstances with the explicit approval on a case-by-case basis of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Branch and with the knowledge of the representatives of the workers [Royal Commission Page 105] 
2011 
WVMHST, NIOSH, MSHA and the mining industry should adopt before the end of 2011 rules to: reduce the permissible exposure 
limit (PEL) for coal mine dust to 0.09 mg/m; reduce the PEL for crystalline silica to 0.05 mg/m; and mandate continuous dust 
monitoring, verification of mine operators’ dust control plans at normal production (e.g., at least equal to the average production 
recorded for the most recent 30 production shifts), and single-shift sampling. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
New Tech. 
& 
Manageme
nt of 
Change 
Process 
2.1 
The Ministry of Labour to require mine operators to establish and implement a written management of change procedure, to include 
workers and the joint health and safety committee or health and safety representative.  
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Emergency 
Preparedn
ess & Mine 
Rescue 
3.1 
The Ministry of Labour to require mining companies to conduct risk assessments to establish Emergency Response Plans for 
exploration sites, new mines, surface mines and mining plants.   
     2 2  1 2 
1995 
It is recommended that mines be required to put in place Mine Safety Management Plans to cater for key risk areas. [Moura Page 
62] 
It is further recommended that Mine Safety Management Plans be based on detailed risk/hazard analyses. [Moura Page 62] 
1997 
Every mine operator, indeed, every industrial plant or facility, should have a well-defined and comprehensive emergency 
procedures manual containing a complete and up-to-date list of all persons involved in any emergency operation. This list should 
contain an organization chart listing the individuals and their respective tasks, and a current telephone listing for each person. The 
manual should be prepared by the company in consultation with both the joint occupational health and safety committee and the 
safety coordinators with the appropriate government departments. The manual should set out, in detail, the quantity and location of 
all emergency supplies and equipment and the details of the deployment of these materials. A current copy of any such approved 
emergency procedures manual should be filed with the director of occupational health and safety, and copies should be provided to 
each person assigned any duty under the manual. [Westray Page 560] 
The Department of Labour, in consultation with the operator, should establish such rules and regulations that would ensure the 
department a full and active role in every mine-related emergency procedure or rescue operation in the province. The rules and 
regulations should set out the duties and responsibilities of each department inspector or safety examiner in any mine-related 
emergency or rescue operation. [Westray Page 561] 
2011 
Mine operators’ emergency response plans (ERPs) must be treated more than just more paperwork. ERPs should be developed 
collaboratively with miners, their families, local responders, and mine rescue team members, and revised based on mine-specific 
drills and table-top exercises. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
2012 
Emergency management in underground coal mines needs urgent attention: Operators of underground coal mines should be 
required by legislation to have a current and comprehensive emergency management plan that is audited and tested regularly; The 
emergency management plan should be developed in consultation with the workers and the Mines Rescue Service; The emergency 
management plan should specify the facilities available within the mine, such as emergency equipment, refuges and changeover 
stations, and emergency exits; The emergency management plan should contain a strategy for notifying next of kin and ensuring 
that genuine enquirers receive appropriate information; The mining operator must keep and regularly update a comprehensive list 
of emergency contact details for all workers; The emergency management plan needs to be compatible with CIMS, the co-ordinated 
incident management system used by New Zealand's emergency services and the police; and The regulator should include the 
emergency management plan in its audit programme. [Pike River II Page 354] 
The implementation of the co-ordinated incident management system (CIMS) in underground coal mine emergencies should be 
reviewed urgently: The implementation of CIMS should be reviewed to ensure that emergencies in underground coal mines are 
well managed; The review team should include the mining industry, police, emergency services, the Mines Rescue Service and the 
regulator; The CIMS framework should be rigorously tested by regular practical exercises at underground coal mines; and The 
incident controller at an underground coal mine emergency must have mining expertise and, together with the incident management 
team, must be responsible for co-ordinating the emergency effort and approving key decisions. This does not prevent a government 
agency such as the police from being the lead agency or from maintaining its command structure. [Pike River II Page 354-355] 
3.2 
Workplace Safety North to revise the Mine Rescue Handbook to include guidelines for fitness of crew members, critical incident 
stress management and acclimatization of emergency responders.  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       2 3  
2006 
Steps must be taken immediately to significantly increase the number of qualified mine rescue teams nationwide. [Sago Page 16] 
Composite and contract mine rescue teams should not be permitted under any circumstances. [Sago Page 16] 
2011 
A coordinated, formal debriefing of all mine rescue team members who respond to a major mine emergency should be conducted 
within a month of the event. The objectives of the assembly would include offering counsel on post-traumatic stress, discussing 
what worked well and what didn’t in their mine emergency response, and identifying team members whose testimony would be 
helpful to accident investigators. [Upper Big Branch Page 113] 
The mine rescue community should convene a summit of mine rescue team members, in particular, individuals who responded to 
the mine emergency incidents from 2006 to the present, to discuss the state of the U.S. mine rescue system. Advisory guidelines 
should be written for mine rescue teams. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
Protocols should be established and followed with regard to mine rescue and recovery, using lessons learned and best practices 
identified from other emergency response events. [Upper Big Branch Page 112] 
3.3 
The Ministry of Labour to work with stakeholders to develop proposed recommendations regarding the responsibilities of mine 
rescue crew members and mine owners/employers, with respect to mine rescue operations.  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1981 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario sever its ties with the Ontario Mining Association, retain the services of 
a full-time executive director, establish its own offices separate and apart from the Ontario Mining Association offices, make 
provision tor its own support staff and services, and continue to be financed by levies against its member companies. [Towards Safe 
Production Page 231] 
That the Mines Accident Prevention Association of Ontario establish labour-management advisory committees at both the 
provincial and regional levels and that it move to include representatives of labour and the public on its board of directors. 
[Towards Safe Production Page 232] 
1986 
That the current mine rescue organization be expanded to handle all underground emergencies. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue 
Page 63] 
2006 
MSHA must create a Mine Emergency Response Office (MERO) within the Agency. The MERO must be staffed 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, by experienced full-time MSHA employees with extensive mining knowledge. Emergency contact to MSHA by 
mine management personnel should be available using a toll-free phone number. [Sago Page 14] 
MSHA must take immediate control of all aspects of the rescue and recovery. It must create plans and implement them to facilitate 
the immediate use of all mine rescue assets as soon as possible. MSHA should exercise the authority mandated by Congress and not 
delay before implementing a plan to safely enter the mine and facilitate rescue activity. [Sago Page 15] 
The mine operator must be on-site to provide logistical and general mine information necessary to facilitate rescue and recovery 
operations. [Sago Page 15] 
The federal and state regulatory agencies must secure the surface area of the mine and limit access by individuals who have no right 
to enter the property or are not involved in the rescue efforts. This will ensure rescue teams, fire crews, police, miners’ 
representatives and other necessary personnel understand their roles in the disaster response and are not delayed in beginning the 
rescue effort. [Sago Page 15] 
Training, 4.1 
Enhance supervisor and management training by:  
 Requiring the Mining Tripartite Committee, which supports the development of Common Core training, to present to the 
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Skills and 
Labour 
Supply 
Issues 
Ministries of Labour and Training, Colleges and Universities options and recommendations to enhance supervisor and 
management health and safety training  
 Requesting the Mining Tripartite Committee to review the pre-requisites for Supervisor Common Core training and 
determine the best format for this training (e.g. classroom learning, hands-on experience).  
   1 2      
1981 
That joint training tor members of joint health and safety committees be undertaken and where possible, supervisors also be 
involved. [Towards Safe Production Page 229] 
1986 
That health and safety committee members shall receive the same training in ground control as supervisory staff. [Ground Control 
& Mine Rescue Page 53] 
That worker-inspectors, where they exist, be given the same training in ground control as that recommended for supervisory staff 
elsewhere in this report. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 69] 
4.2 
The Ministry of Labour to engage in discussions with the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities about the quality and 
consistency of Common Core training in the underground mining sector, evaluate the current state of that training delivery and 
identify circumstances where refresher training may be appropriate.  
    4 1 1    
1986 
That all miners receive periodic refresher courses in ground control if required. Labour shall be encouraged to participate in the 
development of the curriculum. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That miners who have been off the job for one year or more should be evaluated with respect to their knowledge of current ground 
control practices, and should receive appropriate training where necessary before they return to regular underground work. [Ground 
Control & Mine Rescue Page 52] 
That the mining industry in Ontario be encouraged to sponsor their employees’ attendance at existing short courses and other 
programs as they become available. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
That these short courses be designed so that adequate training can be given in various locations, including remote regions of the 
province. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 56] 
1995 
In particular, it is recommended that certificates not be granted for life and that a system needs to be developed and put into effect 
as soon as practicable that requires certificate holders to demonstrate their fitness to retain the certificate of competency on a 
regular basis, at intervals of not less than three and not more than five years. [Moura Page 64] 
1997 
The mine operator should be required to have in place a training program, approved by the regulator, for every position in the 
workplace. The mine operator's training proposal must: conform to or be more rigorous than the model curriculum; show when, 
how, and what training will be done; incorporate annual refresher training and safety education; provide for adequate orientation to 
the mine for all new employees, including those with experience in coal mines; and include complete and sufficient training for 
operators of individual pieces of mining equipment prior to their being assigned operating positions. [Westray Page 133] 
Capacity 
of the 
Occupatio
nal Health 
& Safety 
5.1  
The Ministry of Labour and the relevant Health and Safety Associations to increase their capacity to ensure the health and safety 
system has the resources to address mining hazards effectively – particularly the priority hazards identified in the risk- ranking 
exercise. In particular:  
 Increase ministry capacity in geotechnical, mining, mechanical, electrical, structural, and civil engineering   
 Increase system partners’ technical capacity/ resources related to industrial hygiene and mechanical issues.  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System 1976 
That the Occupational Health and Safety Branch publish biennially a critical review of factors that influence risks of accident and 
injury at workplaces in the mines and mineral plants [Royal Commission Page 130] 
5.2 
The Ministry of Labour to review its policies and procedures that apply to mining inspectors related to unannounced field visits, 
reprisals, repeat orders, the training of inspectors and the provision of information to workplace parties and how those policies and 
procedures are implemented. Take appropriate actions based on the findings of that review. In particular, address the following 
operational policies and procedures:  
 Clarify the use of unannounced proactive field visits   
 Clarify the appropriate use of orders versus other methods to achieve compliance  for priority hazards especially with 
regard to repeated non-compliance with the  same issue in a specific workplace   
 Clarify inspector action to be taken in situations of suspected reprisal   
 Align proactive activities, whenever possible, to the priority hazards identified in  the sector level risk assessment   
 Clarify the training provided to inspectors to address priority hazards and the  inspector’s role in the inquest process   
 Identify any further training required to support changes in policies and procedures brought about by the Review and/or 
changes in the regulations.  
 4 5 3  2 9 2 1 2 
1967 
The ambit of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, is restricted by its long title to “the management and control of mines and quarries 
and for securing the safety health and welfare of persons employed thereat; to regulate the employment thereat of women and 
young persons; to require the fencing of abandoned and disused mines and of quarries; and for purposes connected with the matters 
aforesaid”. Apart, therefore, from s. 151, which requires a disused mineshaft to be “provided with an efficient enclosure, barrier, 
plug, or other device so designed and constructed as to prevent any person from accidentally falling down the shaft,” there is no 
requirement on the owners or manager of a mine to have regard to the safety of the general public. It follows that there is no 
obligation on the Inspectorate of Mines, in the exercise of its powers of securing the enforcement of the Act, to have regard to the 
safety of the general public. Indeed, s. 146 (1) which gives power to the Inspector to serve a notice for prohibiting or changing “any 
matter, thing, or practice at a mine” which “is or is likely shortly to become dangerous” repeats the limitation to the safety of 
persons employed at the mine. We recommend that this limitation in the Act be removed and that the owners and managers of 
mines, and also the Inspectorate of Mines, should be required to consider the safety, health, and welfare of all persons going about 
their lawful business in the vicinity of a mine, including the safety of their property. We have already indicated (ante paragraph 74) 
our view of the civil liability of mine owners to pay damages under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, but the disaster at Aberfan 
clearly indicates that substantially more is required to give that protection to the public which it is every citizen’s right to expect. 
[Aberfan Page 129] 
Section 86 of the Mines and Quarries Act, 1954, (“All buildings and structures on the surface of a mine shall be kept in safe 
condition”) should be amended so as to eliminate any doubt whether tips are “structures” within the meaning of the Section. 
[Aberfan Page 129] 
The existing Town and Country Planning Acts require to be amended so as to vest local planning authorities with greater control 
over the starting of new tips or the extension of existing ones. As to new sites, we favour the suggestion made by Sir Andrew Bryan 
that these should not be started until a report as to the suitability of the tipping scheme has been submitted to and approved by the 
planning authority. As to the continued use of an existing tipping site, we recommend that the General Development Order, 1963, 
be revised by adding to Col. (2) of Class XIX (3) a condition that such continued use after a given date (say, January 1st, 1969) be 
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subject to the production of a similar report prepared by persons professionally qualified and satisfactory to the planning authority. 
If an impasse arises, the dispute should be submitted to the appropriate Minister and he should be vested with power to refer to an 
independent expert in the manner set out in paragraph 292 above. Provision should be made enabling the Minister to exclude, in a 
proper case, any claim for compensation if in the ultimate result permission to tip or to continue tipping is withheld or refused on 
grounds of safety. [Aberfan Page 130] 
Recommend adoption of, the suggestion made by Sir Andrew Bryan that the National Coal Board should prepare for consideration 
by the National Tip Safety Committee, with a view to its thereafter being issued publicly, a Code of Practice giving guidance on (a) 
features and factors that may give rise to or reveal instability in a tip, and (b) standards of safety called for in particular locations or 
circumstances. We attach in Appendix F Sir Andrew Bryan’s suggestions as to the topics which should be covered by such a Code. 
But the vexed question remains: Within the National Coal Board itself, what organisation should in future be responsible for tip 
safety and stability ? We were told that during the Inquiry the lay-out of Board administration had been drastically altered, that 
Divisions and Groups had already been abolished and the whole country divided into 17 Areas, each headed by its own Area 
Director, and that the old South Western Division had become two Areas. And it was said in Parliament on June 6th last (Hansard 
Vol. 747, col. 173-4) that the Minister of Power had ascertained from the National Coal Board that, “A procedure has been 
established by the Board for technical and operational control over spoil heaps which includes frequent and regular investigations 
by specialists to ensure safety and stability”. Furthermore, Mr. Wien, Q.C., told the Tribunal that in South Wales:“.. . we have 
recently established a Tip Control Unit under the direction of Mr. Gareth Jones, the civil engineer, and he has got a complete team 
with independent experts to be consulted about old tips. They will give technical guidance to Areas on active tips or on the 
selection of new tips, and I daresay that when the Tip Safety Committee comes into existence this will be a matter that will be 
carefully considered by that Committee ... The Coal Board has been proceeding assiduously with training courses which have been 
held quite recently and all kinds of people (from Area Directors downwards, and including Area Civil Engineers from the rest of 
the country and Her Majesty’s Divisional Inspector of Mines) have attended, dealing with tip stability. And in due course 
instruction will be given down to a very much lower level, to chargehands and foremen”. When these assurances are implemented, 
the whole attitude in relation to tip stability should soon become dramatically altered. To ensure this, urgent consideration should 
be given to the appointment of civil engineers to the Inspectorate. [Aberfan Page 127] 
1976 
That an Occupational Health and Safety Authority, encompassing the Mines Engineering and Inspection Branch, the corresponding 
branches under the Industrial Safety Act and the Construction Safety Act, and the Occupational Health and Safety Branch, be 
established in the Ministry of Labour under an assistant deputy minister [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That a Health and Safety in Mines and Plants Act, separate from the Mining Act, be prepared to replace part ix and the relevant 
sections of part xi of the Mining Act and be administered within an Occupational Health and Safety Authority established in the 
Ministry of Labour [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That the Health and Safety in Mines and Plants Act consist of a core of general provisions supplemented by regulations the 
issuance of which is authorized by the Act [Royal Commission Page 254] 
That under the Workmen's Compensation Act provision be made for the levying on all employers in class 5 an amount of 0.03 per 
cent of wages currently subject to levy under the Act to create a fund for research on occupational health and safety by the joint 
labour- management health and safety committees [Royal Commission Page 239] 
That Section 53 of the Workmen's Compensation Act be amended as necessary to provide clear entitlement for rehabilitative 
compensation based on the principle of work adjustment for persons subject to exceptional exposure to environmental hazards at 
work [Royal Commission Page 57] 
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1981 
That the Government of Canada incorporate by reference the Ontario Act and regulations, as amended from time to time, directly 
into the Canada Labour Code as a proviso covering uranium miners and plant workers, and also provide in the code that where the 
other provisions of the code and this provision arc in conflict, the latter shall apply. [Towards Safe Production Page 237] 
That the Government of Canada proceed by way of a reference to the Supreme Court of Canada by the Governor General in 
Council under section 55 of the Supreme Court Act. R.S.C. 1979 C S-19 and determine whether the federal jurisdiction is exclusive 
or concurrent. [Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
That the Governments of Canada and Ontario continue the arrangement under which the enforcement of statutory
1
 health and safely 
requirements in Ontario uranium mines is assigned to provincial authorities. [Towards Safe Production Page 238] 
1995 
It is recommended, therefore, that it be made a requirement of Part 60 (Second Working Extraction) submissions that spontaneous 
combustion be specifically included as a factor to be considered and evaluated. [Moura Page 72] 
The Inquiry recommends that the Act be amended to enable either proxy or alternative members to fill temporary or permanent 
positions on the panel or for an Inquiry to continue with a reduced number of panel members. [Moura Page 73] 
1997 
The mandate of the Department of Natural Resources should be formally reviewed and clarified vis-a- vis the mandate of the 
Department of Labour to ensure that there are no gaps in the regulatory process. [Westray Page 404] 
The Mineral Resources Act should be amended to identify clearly the role of the Department of Natural Resources in monitoring 
mine planning in the province. Such a role should encompass the duty to make site inspections to ensure that an operator is mining 
in conformity with plans approved by the department. [Westray Page 405 
The Mineral Resources Act should be amended to identify clearly the role of the Department of Natural Resources in ensuring the 
"safe" operation of mines in the province. [Westray Page 405] 
The Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1996, should be revised to incorporate the following changes: Except in the case of a 
demonstrated emergency, any communication respecting health and safety concerns should go initially to the first-line supervisor. 
If the first-line supervisor is unable or unwilling to resolve the matter, then the complaint should be taken directly to a member of 
the joint occupational health and safety committee, for resolution by the committee as expeditiously as possible. Provisions should 
be adopted to clarify how interests of non-union employees in a union shop will be met on the joint occupational health and safety 
committee. No member of management whose principal duty or concern relates to production quotas should be eligible for 
membership on the joint occupational health and safety committee. No member of the executive of any employee organization or 
union, or any person who has served in such capacity within the preceding year, should be eligible for membership on the joint 
occupational health and safety committee. Provisions should be adopted to define clearly the health and safety obligations of 
employees to workers on site who are employed by contractors other than the principal employer. Those contractor employees 
should have obligations similar to those of the employees of the principal employer. For greater certainty, the terms "serious injury" 
and "bodily injury" should be replaced with the one term "serious injury," defined as any injury that requires immediate medical aid 
or hospitalization or renders the employee unable to perform his or her regular duties for a period in excess of 24 hours. [Westray 
Page 510] 
All rules and regulations relating to the operation of coal mines should be contained in Regulations made pursuant to the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act. The Coal Mines Regulation Act and the portions of the Mineral Resources Act dealing with 
operations should be repealed. [Westray Page 540] 
The province should take immediate action to reach agreement with the federal Department of Labour for the inspectorate of that 
department to assume the underground coal mine regulation and inspection functions currently under the aegis of the provincial 
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Department of Labour. [Westray Page 542] 
The province should collaborate with the federal Department of Labour to draft updated underground coal mining regulations 
applicable to all coal mines in Nova Scotia. These common regulations would then be administered throughout the province by the 
inspectorate at present functioning under the provisions of the Canada Labour Code regulations. Such regulations should be drafted 
with the advice and assistance of competent coal mining professionals with demonstrated expertise in the various fields of 
ventilation, ground control, electrical applications, training, and mine rescue. [Westray Page 542] 
A legislative regime should be put in place to ensure regulatory involvement in all areas of ground control in which safety is a 
consideration. The regime should encompass planning approval, materials and equipment certification, and any other aspect of 
ground control having safety implications. [Westray Page 383] 
The legislation governing coal mines should be revised to ensure that every underground coal mine operator be required to engage, 
when required, the services of a qualified mining engineer with specialized post-graduate training in rock mechanics relating to coal 
mines. [Westray Page 385] 
2006 
Future regulations must focus first on the health and safety benefits they afford miners. Considerations regarding cost benefits 
should not in any way negatively impact the protections miners enjoy. [Sago Page 17] 
In addition to the recommendations already made in this report and the MINER Act, MSHA must immediately take the following 
actions: Repeal the belt-air regulation; Require flame resistant conveyor belts in all mines; Move to increase the number and skill 
level of mine rescue teams; Lower the maximum exposure limit for respirable coal mine dust and silica; Update and expand 
training and retraining of miners; Develop a public hearing- style investigation process; Update the penalty and assessment scheme; 
Modify the conferencing process; Improve the certification and approval process; Assist NIOSH in developing the next generation 
SCSRs; Update permissible exposure limits for contaminants in the mine environment; Improve atmospheric monitoring systems; 
Develop a nationwide emergency communications system; Develop air quality, chemical substances and respiratory protection 
standards; and Address issues related to working in confined spaces. [Sago Page 17] 
2011 
The current law, which states that no mine operator or anyone else should provide advance notice for federal mine safety and health 
inspectors, should be strengthened. Such a violation should constitute a felony. [Upper Big Branch Page 111] 
2012 
The activities of the New Zealand Mines Rescue Service need to be supported by legislation: The Mines Rescue Trust Act 1992 
should reflect the functions performed by the Mines Rescue Service; and The adequacy and fairness of the current levies imposed 
on mines to fund the service need to be reviewed. [Pike River II Page 355] 
Worker participation in health and safety in underground coal mines should be improved through legislative and administrative 
changes. Legislative changes should:require operators of underground coal mines to have documented worker participation 
systems; ensure all workers, including contractors, are competent to work safely, are supervised and are included in the mine's 
worker participation system; empower trained worker health and safety representatives to perform inspections and stop activities 
where there is an immediate danger of serious harm; require the results of monitoring and investigation of health and safety in the 
workplace to be automatically made available to workers; and allow unions to appoint check inspectors with the same powers as the 
worker health and safety representatives. The regulator should: issue an approved code of practice on employee participation; 
promote workers’ rights and obligations through education and publicity; and ensure that inspectors routinely consult workers and 
health and safety representatives as part of audits and inspections. [Pike River II Page 336-337] 
5.3 
The Ministry of Labour and its partners to review the health and safety system’s ability to meet the needs of the mining sector 
especially related to providing services to remote communities, training small numbers of trainees, and aligning their training 
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activities to the priority hazards. Take appropriate actions based upon the findings of that review.   
5.4 
The Ministry of Labour to work with the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services to enhance the information 
supplied to the Chief Coroner’s Office and build better linkages between both ministries. This collaboration includes:  
 Conducting and regularly updating an aggregate analysis of all past inquests into mining fatalities   
 Holding information sessions with the Chief Coroner to identify opportunities for coroners to use the analysis to improve 
future inquests into fatalities in the mining sector   
Internal 
Responsibi
lity System 
6.1 
The Ontario Mining Association to work with labour representatives to develop an Internal Responsibility System best practice 
guideline as an industry benchmark and to be endorsed by the Ontario Mining Association for implementation by its members.   
    6      
1986 
That the Ministry of Labour review and monitor the regional stability affecting underground mines in Ontario, and discuss potential 
problems with the mining companies involved. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That mining companies sharing a common boundary exchange information that may affect the regional stability of either or both. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That workplace mining plans be made available to miners and be discussed with them, including any indications of abnormal 
ground conditions, geological anomalies, and the location of ground monitoring instruments, as a method of ensuring worker 
participation in planning ground control procedures in the “micro” environment. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 61] 
That every underground mine be required to prepare a ground control macro-environment design prior to the introduction of a new 
mining method, or the introduction of any expansion of the present mine design; such designs shall be submitted to the Ministry of 
Labour as required by Section 5 of the Mining Regulations. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
That technically competent personnel of the Ministry of Labour review ground control design and procedures at all Ontario mines, 
at the mine site, at least once per year, and more frequently as required. [Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 60] 
This organization shall be funded by mining companies operating in Ontario, and by the federal and provincial governments. 
[Ground Control & Mine Rescue Page 51] 
6.2 
The health and safety system to share information both on emerging injury and illness trends, and information on incidents causing 
serious injury across the industry to trigger preventative actions by workplace parties.   
 
